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Abstract 
 
Jacques Lacan and Sigmund Freud‟s ideas are presented with specific 
emphasis on the themes presented in Freud‟s (1920a) Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle. Freud‟s Project for a Scientific Psychology 
(1950) provides important clues to describe the pleasure principle 
in terms of Quantity (Q), facilitations [Bahnung] and contact-
barriers. Therefore, the implications of the pleasure principle 
relate greatly to 1) Freud‟s notion of the unconscious, 2) Lacan‟s 
explanation of das Ding, 3) the difference between jouissance and 
plaisir, and 4) the relationship between das Ding and the Law. 
Lacan‟s understanding of the death drive is consequently the 
culmination of all the topics mentioned and repeated throughout. 
Lacan‟s description of the death drive is twofold: firstly, the 
mechanical explanation of the pleasure principle, and secondly, how 
desire features within the pleasure principle. Lacan‟s description 
of the death drive encompasses libido, desire, economy, Linguistics, 
and the Oedipus complex, which illustrates why Freud‟s (1920) Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle is not only an important text in Freud‟s 
oeuvre, but also in Lacan‟s. 
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Opsomming 
 
Jacques Lacan en Sigmund Freud se idees word nagegaan met spesifieke 
beklemtoning van die temas in Freud (1920a) se Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle. Freud (1950) se Project for a Scientific Psychology 
verskaf belangrike wenke vir die beskrywing van die pleasure 
principle in terme van kwantiteit (Q), fasilitasies (Bahnung) en 
kontak-versperrings [contact-barriers]. Gevolglik het die 
implikasies van die pleasure principle betrekking tot 1) Freud se 
begrip van die onbewussyn, 2) Lacan se verduideliking van das Ding, 
3)die verskil tussen jouissance en plaisir, en 4) die verhouding 
tussen das Ding en die Wet. Lacan se begrip van die doodsdrang 
(death drive) is gevolglik die toppunt van al die onderwerpe wat 
deurentyd genoem en herhaal is. Lacan se beskrywing van die 
doodsdrang is tweedelig: eerstens, die meganiese verduideliking van 
die pleasure principle en tweedens, die rol van begeerte in die 
pleasure principle. Lacan se beskrywing van die doodsdrang behels 
libido, begeerte, ekonomie, Linguistiek, en die Oedipus-kompleks, 
wat wys hoekom Freud (1920) se Beyond the Pleasure Principle nie net 
„n belangrike teks in Freud se werke is nie, maar ook in Lacan s‟n. 
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Introduction 
 
“Lacan and Freud: Beyond the Pleasure Principle” sets out to explore 
Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle, so as to rediscover 
important themes and concepts which could influence a contemporary 
understanding of Psychoanalysis. Lacan and Freud are presented side 
by side, not only to demonstrate the influence and effects of Lacan 
on Psychoanalysis, but also the effects of Freud on Lacan. 
Consequently, the emphasis isn‟t placed on Lacan‟s “return to 
Freud”, as Lacan has introduced concepts and terms that have altered 
the way Psychoanalysis is perceived today. 
 
This thesis is a sustained analysis of Sigmund Freud‟s Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle. It argues that this text is seminal, not only 
for Freud‟s subsequent works, but also for the works of Jacques 
Lacan‟s. This is not a free interpretation of Freud or Lacan, but a 
rigorous reading of the primary texts. What makes this thesis 
different and new in many regards is the incorporation of Freud‟s 
(1950) A Project for a Scientific Psychology, a posthumously 
published manuscript that provides a different framework to describe 
and define the pleasure and the reality principle. It therefore 
becomes a question as to how Freud‟s (1950) Project for a Scientific 
Psychology changes or adapts our understanding of the pleasure 
principle and in turn, of Psychoanalysis.  
 
The thesis poses challenge to mainstream understandings of 
Psychoanalysis, especially in the discipline of Psychology. This 
point is illustrated through, for example, the reality principle. An 
undergraduate psychology textbook, written by Pervin and John (2001) 
define the reality principle as follow: “gratification of an 
instinct is delayed until the time when the most pleasure can be 
obtained with the least pain or negative consequences” (p. 81). This 
thesis agrees with half of their definition, as to the reality 
principle being the delaying of gratification; however, the reality 
principle is not goal orientated, as signified when Pervin and John 
write “until the time…”. The relation between the reality principle 
and the pleasure principle can best be explained in terms of a 
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movie, for example about the delivery of an object. The pleasure 
principle would be the delivery of the object, i.e. the goal. If the 
goal was achieved immediately, there would be no film or it would be 
a very short film. The reality principle is what prevents the 
achievement of the goal. In the example of the movie about the 
delivery of an object, a flat tyre or a wrong phone number would 
constitute the reality principle. Every action that results in the 
delay of the achievement of the pleasure principle is the reality 
principle. To quote Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle:  
The latter principle [the reality principle] does not abandon 
the intention of ultimately obtaining pleasure, but it 
nevertheless demands and carries into effect the postponement 
of satisfaction, the abandonment of a number of possibilities 
of gaining satisfaction and the temporary toleration of 
unpleasure as a step on the long indirect road to pleasure. 
(p. 7) 
Freud‟s words might seem to corroborate Pervin and John‟s definition 
of the reality principle. However, Freud illustrates that the 
reality principle is the delay of pleasure until it can be achieved, 
which means that the reality principle is not a conditional 
principle that aims for a delay until maximum pleasure can be 
obtained. 
 
Another example in an undergraduate psychology textbook is Meyer, 
Moore, and Viljoen‟s (2003) definition of the reality principle: 
This contains the idea that the ego takes physical and social 
reality into account by using conscious and preconscious 
cognitive processes such as sensory perception, rational 
thinking, memory and learning. Instead of the id‟s futile 
attempts at drive satisfaction by means of fantasy and wish 
fulfilment, the ego uses reality testing, object choice and 
object cathexis, which means that the ego tries to establish 
on rational grounds whether or not an object is serviceable. 
(p. 54, their italics) 
Their conception of the reality principle is also connected to a 
conscious and rational thought process, whereby the reality 
principle is also a conditional procedure that only functions under 
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certain circumstances. They go on to define the secondary process as 
follow: 
This means that the ego evaluates and weighs up a situation 
before any action is undertaken. Unlike the id, which insists 
upon the immediate drive satisfaction (primary process); the 
ego is therefore able to reflect upon and plan the 
satisfaction of drives, and to postpone satisfaction to an 
appropriate time and situation (secondary process). (p. 54) 
However, in Freud‟s (1950) Project for a Scientific Psychology, the 
reality principle is established as synonymous with the second 
principle. Meyer, Moore and Viljoen‟s (2003) description is not 
necessarily wrong, as Freud (1970) has formulated the reality 
principle in a similar fashion: “the reality principle, which at 
bottom also seeks pleasure – although a delayed and diminished 
pleasure, one which is assured by its realization of fact, its 
relation to reality” (p. 365, my emphasis), but Freud also writes - 
validating the description presented in this thesis - “Then it 
appeared that from the outset they each have a different relation to 
the taskmistress Necessity, so that their developments are different 
and they acquire different attitudes to the reality-principle” (p. 
419). Therefore, when Freud speaks of the reality principle as a 
necessity, he does not propose an alternative to the pleasure 
principle, but posits that the reality principle occurs when the 
pleasure principle cannot be sustained. Meyer, Moore and Viljoen‟s 
description is difficult to follow and not always concisely worded. 
Their argument is an over complication of the reality principle. 
Consequently, their reading is difficult to incorporate in the 
larger corpus of Freudian Psychoanalysis. 
 
The two definitions of the reality principle provided by two 
different undergraduate textbooks illustrate two varying yet similar 
descriptions. This thesis proposes a modest reading, where the 
reality principle proves more fruitful through a simplistic 
definition in line with Freud‟s (1950) Project for a Scientific 
Psychology. The application of this simpler definition increases its 
scope.  
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Another concept that provides difficulties is Lacan‟s description of 
the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real. However, this thesis does not 
define, but aims to illustrate and demonstrate the Imaginary, 
Symbolic, and Real. The reason for not defining and then applying 
the definition is that they are emergent properties
1
, rather than a 
priori descriptions. The problem of defining the Imaginary, 
Symbolic, and Real can be illustrated through Meyer, Moore and 
Viljoen‟s (2003) definitions. According to them the Imaginary “is 
associated with images and imagery, is ontogenetically older than 
the symbolic order” (p. 219). The most important description of the 
symbolic order is “Language controls the symbolic order” (p. 221). 
As for the Real: “The real, for Lacan, includes contact with that 
which lies outside the limits of meaningful structuring and which 
cannot be interpreted as a meaningful whole” (p. 223). 
Unfortunately, Meyer, Moore and Viljoen (2003) don‟t sufficiently 
explain the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real, or how they are 
connected. A better illustration is to explain the Imaginary, 
Symbolic, and Real in terms of a game of chess. The Symbolic can be 
illustrated by the chessboard and pieces with the rules that dictate 
how the game is played, and includes as how the pieces move. The 
Imaginary is illustrated by means of the description of each piece 
whereby the Knight differs from the Bishop, and the Queen from the 
King. The Real is the indeterminable aspects, such as player skill, 
the impact of time control, or just pure luck. The Real is always 
the unknowable as illustrated in a chess game, which is why the 
outcome is always in doubt. 
 
Jean Baudrillard is one of the biggest detractors of Psychoanalysis. 
His critique will be summarized here, as well as the relevant 
response. This will demonstrate the wider application of Lacanian 
Psychoanalysis. Baudrillard‟s (2000) Symbolic Exchange and Death 
criticizes the relation between the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real; 
                         
1
 Emergent property is used in the same way that Cilliers‟ (2000) 
Complexity and Postmodernism describes: “The concept „emergence‟ is often 
used in a way that creates the impression that something mysterious happens 
when „things come together‟. The way in which it is used here implies 
nothing ineffable whatsoever. It merely underlines the fact that nothing 
„extra‟, no external telos or designer, is required to „cause‟ the complex 
behavior of a system. Perhaps it would be better to employ the term 
„relational properties‟ rather than emergent properties” (p. 143n2). 
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he defines the Symbolic and its relation to the Imaginary and the 
Real as: 
The symbolic is neither a concept, an agency, a category, nor 
a „structure‟, but an act of exchange and a social relation 
which puts an end to the real, which resolves the real, and, 
at the same time, puts an end to the opposition between the 
real and the imaginary. (p. 133, his emphasis) 
Baudrillard‟s critique is that the symbolic overwrites both the 
Imaginary and the Real, and consequently “puts an end to the 
opposition”. Lacan already acknowledges the primacy of the Symbolic 
and the destructive nature of the signifier, as seen when the 
signified is replaced by the signifier and consequently becomes 
known as the signifier. As Ferdinand de Saussure (1960) explains, 
the signifier is not the signified, but is connected through an 
arbitrary relation. For Freud and Lacan, the signifier is a close 
approximation, but since it is not an exact match, the Imaginary and 
the Real are lost. It is for this reason that Lacan emphasizes a 
language theory, which is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
For Baudrillard (2000), Psychoanalysis‟ understanding of the 
relation between the signifier and the signified can be summarized 
as follow: 
It is certain, however, that Psychoanalysis has given the 
signifier-signified relation an almost poetic slant. The 
signifier, instead of manifesting the signified in its 
presence, is in an inverse relation with it: it signifies the 
signified in its absence and its repression, in accordance 
with a negativity that never used to appear in linguistic 
economy. The signifier is in a necessary (not arbitrary) 
relation with the signified, but only as the presence of 
something is with its absence. It signifies the lost object 
and takes the place of this loss. (p. 225) 
Baudrillard criticizes Psychoanalysis‟ usage of Linguistics, 
specifically in Lacan and Freud. This is illustrated when 
Baudrillard (2000) writes: 
The entire architecture of the sign must be demolished, even 
its equation must be broken, and it is not enough merely to 
multiply the unknown factors. Alternatively, then, we must 
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assume that Psychoanalysis still makes room somewhere for a 
certain mode of signification and representation, a certain 
mode of value and expression: this is in fact precisely what 
Mannoni‟s „empty‟ signified stands for – the place of the 
signified remains marked as that of the mobile contents of the 
unconscious. (p. 227) 
 
For Baudrillard, the relation between the signifier and the 
signified is at stake in terms of the production of meaning outside 
of the unconscious. He takes issue with Psychoanalysis because it 
continually connects the signified to unconscious processes whereby 
the unconscious has a fixed meaning, which Freud maintains is 
inaccessible. Properties that emerge from the unconscious are only 
fragments that do not give the full detail of the unconscious, but 
are just that, incomplete fragments. Baudrillard continues: 
There is no longer a means of unblocking the system, forever 
caught fast in the obsession with meaning, in the fulfilment 
of a perverse desire that comes to fill the empty form of the 
object with meaning. In the poetic (the symbolic) the 
signifier disintegrates absolutely, whereas in Psychoanalysis 
it endlessly shifts under the effect of the primary processes 
and is distorted following the folds of repressed values. 
(p.227, his emphasis) 
Baudrillard‟s critique is therefore aimed at the source of the 
„value‟ the signified has, and more specifically with the way that 
Psychoanalysis locates the source of „value‟ in the unconscious.  
 
This thesis explains how Freud pinpoints the source of values to the 
unconscious and how they become imbedded through the primary 
narcissistic stage, as well as the creation of the ego-ideal and the 
ideal-ego in Chapter 1. Consequently, Freud‟s response to 
Baudrillard‟s disagreement with Psychoanalysis‟ fixed unconscious is 
to locate and explain the unconscious in a developmental model. 
 
However, Baudrillard‟s disagreement stems from his disappointment 
with the inability of the signifier and the signified to produce an 
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“authentic”2 meaning, as illustrated in Baudrillard‟s (2005) The 
System of Objects when he writes: “Collecting is precisely that kind 
of organization. Our ordinary environment is always ambiguous: 
functionality is forever collapsing into subjectivity, and 
possession is continually getting entangled with utility, as part of 
the ever-disappointing effort to achieve a total integration” (p. 
92-3). Baudrillard highlights two aspects: function and possession. 
An object always has a purpose or a function in an ontological 
sense, but there is always another component attached: ownership of 
the object, which ties in with passion. This is clear when he 
writes: 
Apart from the uses to which we put them at any particular 
moment, objects in this sense have another aspect which is 
intimately bound up with the subject: no longer simply 
material bodies offering a certain resistance, they become 
mental precincts over which I hold sway, they become things of 
which I am the meaning, they become my property and my 
passion. (p. 91) 
The problem arises when this argument is combined with the argument 
against Psychoanalysis‟ usage of the signifier-signified relation: 
possession of an object is offset by the impossibility of 
possession. “What is possessed is always an object abstracted from 
its function and thus brought into relationship with the subject” 
(p.91, his emphasis). The argument Baudrillard tries to balance is 
the ratio between facticity and the added “imaginary” meaning. 
Baudrillard‟s critique is more focused on his own disappointment in 
establishing a complete description that accounts for 
“authenticity”, facticity and ownership. This is exactly what 
Lacan‟s language theory proposes when combined with the Symbolic, 
Imaginary and Real. A complete description that accounts for both 
the usage and ascribed meaning is impossible, as this equation is 
always disrupted by the Real - the unknown and indeterminable 
component that always distorts “authenticity”. Lacan‟s approach does 
account for how certain properties are desired, committed to, and 
                         
2
 On „authenticity‟ Baudrillard (2005) writes: “The demand for authenticity 
is, strictly speaking, a very different matter. It is reflected in an 
obsession with certainty – specifically, certainty as to the origin, date, 
author and signature of a work” (p.81). 
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held onto. This is achieved by connecting the unconscious to the 
developmental model proposed by Freud through the introduction of 
the primary narcissistic stage, the Oedipus complex and the mirror-
stage. Or as Lacan (2008a) put it: 
That the unconscious is structured as a function of the 
symbolic, that it is the return of a sign that the pleasure 
principle makes man seek out, that the pleasurable element in 
that which directs man in his behaviour without his knowledge 
(namely, that which gives him pleasure, because it is a form 
of euphony), that which one seeks and finds again is the trace 
rather than the trail – one has to appreciate the great 
importance of all of this in Freud‟s thought, if one is to 
understand the function of reality. (p. 15, my italics) 
 
This thesis consists of four chapters that consider the important 
themes that comprise Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle. 
The first chapter highlights the developmental approach as described 
by Freud in terms of the Ideal-ego, the Ego-ideal, and Narcissism, 
as well as Lacan‟s introduction of the Mirror stage. The first 
chapter consequently summarizes Freud‟s developmental model and 
Lacan‟s „return to Freud‟ which demonstrates how Lacan builds on 
Freud.  
 
Chapter 2 describes Freud‟s neurological model that determines the 
conditions whereby pleasure is achieved. This is described in terms 
of Freud‟s (1950) Project for a Scientific Psychology that 
emphasizes how the pleasure principle and the reality principle are 
defined, and sets the tone for Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle. Chapter 2 also introduces Freud and Lacan‟s language 
theory. Freud‟s rudimentary language theory was conceived to 
illustrate how the unconscious and the contents of the unconscious 
can be known. Freud‟s terminology is the Sachvorstellung and the 
Wortvorstellung, which Lacan links to Saussure‟s signified and 
signifier. What the language theory proposes is that there are 
discrepancies between the object and the word that the object is 
known as. Lacan takes Freud‟s conception further, even so far as to 
say that the object becomes the word, and as a result, any 
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“authenticity” is lost. Chapter 2 establishes the implications of 
the pleasure principle with regard to 1) Freud‟s notion of the 
unconscious, 2) Lacan‟s explanation of das Ding, 3) the difference 
between jouissance and plaisir, and 4) the relationship between das 
Ding and the Law. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on two important Freudian aspects presented in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), namely the repetition 
compulsion [Wiederholungszwang] and the case study of Fort/Da. It 
was in the Fort/Da case study that Freud found justification for the 
repetition compulsion whereby Freud demonstrated how a previous 
trauma repeats and manifests in subsequent behaviour. Lacan‟s L-
schema is also discussed to clarify a psychoanalytic description of 
an intersubjective theory, for example the relation between the 
Subject and the Other, or as presented in the Fort-Da case study, 
between the child and the mother. 
 
Chapter 4 centres on the most controversial aspect of Freudian 
Psychoanalysis, the Death Drive. This chapter focuses on Freud‟s 
description, Lacan‟s rewording, and the relevant criticisms. That 
chapter forms the crux of this thesis, as Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle has been rejected by many based on Freud‟s 
inconsistent wording.  
 
Chapter 5 is a conclusion, and a description that ties this thesis 
together. Each chapter can be read individually. Chapter 5, however 
highlight and emphasize the themes that tie the concepts and 
terminology together. 
 
There is plenty of repetition throughout this thesis, which stresses 
the multitude of ways that Lacan‟s descriptions are applicable. This 
thesis also has plenty of footnotes, which might not always be 
clear, but were added by the author for clarification and more 
importantly for reassurance. The reassurance also acts as a 
validation for the arguments.  
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Chapter 1  
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The first chapter of this thesis focuses on Freud‟s articles 
preceding Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). The aim of this 
chapter is to establish and elaborate on the vocabulary that Freud 
developed. The single most important aspect discussed in this 
chapter is the development of the ego. Any notion of the conscious 
or unconscious is described in terms of the ego.  
 
Therefore, the ego first needs to be described and defined, and this 
is done, first, through the development of the ego through Freud‟s 
conception of Primary Narcissism and the distinction between the 
Ideal-ego (Ideal-ich) and Ego-ideal (Ich-ideal); second, Lacan‟s 
focus on the development of the ego through the mirror stage, which 
is when and how Lacan states how the initial commitment to the 
ideals imposed by the primary caregiver
3
 take place. Lacan‟s mirror 
stage is read in two distinct ways, from an anthropological-
biological viewpoint, and a symbolic viewpoint. The mirror stage 
demonstrates the difference between the self and the representation 
of the self, or as Lacan shows, through the self and the reflection 
of the self in the mirror. Therefore, self-identity is not given 
from the outset, but has to be found in the mirror. Van Haute (1989) 
summarizes this as follow: “Het ik is niet van bij de aanvang 
gegeven. Het moet dus ontwikkeld worden” [The I is not given in 
advance. It therefore has to be developed]
4
 (p. 14).  
 
According to Moyaert (1983) “Twee perspektieven hebben voortdurend 
en afwisselend Freuds metapsychologische zoektochen georiënteerd” 
[Two perspectives have, perpetually and varyingly, orientated 
Freud‟s meta-psychology] (p. 392). The emphasis of the first 
perspective emphasizes the constitution of the I as a surface organ, 
                         
3
 Primary caregiver is used to denote the parents, whether they are the 
biological parents or otherwise. 
4
 All translations of the Dutch articles or texts indicated in the square 
brackets [] are my own. 
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whereby the ego acts as an extension of the body, and whereby the I 
must adapt to the limits of reality and rationality of 
consciousness. The ego, therefore, is an adaptive measure 
constrained by the undifferentiated ego. The emphasis is on the 
rational and reasonable ego to control the unconscious drives and 
impulses. The problem arises when the rational ego fails to control 
the unconscious drives and impulses. This failure results in the 
failure of the ego to adapt to reality, in what can be considered a 
rational, objective, and universal explanation.  
 
Moyaert describes the second perspective as follows: 
Naast dit eerste model dat sporadisch opduikt in het oeuvre 
van Freud is er evenwel een tweede dat bij de konstitutie van 
het ik rekening houdt met belangrijke fenomenen en koncepten 
als identifikatie, idealisatie, narcisme, auto-erotisme, ik-
ideal, ideal-ik. [In addition to the first model, emerging 
sporadic in the oeuvre of Freud, is also a second, that 
constitutes the I with recognition of the important phenomenon 
and concepts such as identification, idealization, narcissism, 
auto-erotism, Ideal-ego, Ego-ideal] (Moyaert, 1983, p. 394) 
 
This chapter falls within the second perspective of the development 
and constitution of the I, linking concepts such as narcissism, 
idealization, auto-erotism, Ideal-ego and Ego-ideal; each is dealt 
with in its own subsection. This is also the perspective prevalent 
in Lacan, which is illustrated in the mirror stage.
5
 Starting with 
Narcissism, this chapter will connect the abovementioned 
terminology, and end with a discussion on how narcissism manifests 
in everyday gestures and behaviours, as based on the preliminary 
definition of the pleasure principle as “the avoidance of pain and 
the production of pleasure” (Freud, 1920, p. 4). 
 
 
                         
5
 A variation of this chapter was presented at PPA Colloquium Locating 
Consciousness in the Pleasure Principle using Freudian and Lacanian theory 
(P.L. van der Merwe, 2008a) 
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1.2. Freud’s Primary Narcissism 
 
Freud aims to explain the ego in biological-anthropological terms, 
and has to find a starting point. Freud identifies the first innate 
location of sexual satisfaction, also known as the erotogenic zones. 
Importantly, erotogenic zones are preceded by auto-erotism, which 
denotes an automatic, innate perception to stimulation and 
excitation. Thumb-sucking, for example, “is determined by a search 
for some pleasure which has already been experienced and is now 
remembered” (Freud, 1905, p. 181). Freud is referring to remembrance 
of the past as well as a symbolic return to that past, whereby the 
sucking of the thumb is connected to the act of breastfeeding, but 
specifically connected with the pleasure gained from the act of 
breastfeeding. “Door te zuigen aan zijn duim zal het kind, bij 
onstentenis van de moederborst, in de mond de oorspronkelijke 
lustervaring opnieuw trachten op te wekken” [Through thumb-sucking, 
the child will, by default of the mother‟s breast, through the mouth 
attempt to awake (arouse) the original desire-experience] (Moyaert, 
1983, p. 396). Freud is very specific about the nature of the 
satisfaction gained, which is not reducible to sexual pleasure, but 
this pleasure does become affiliated with sexual pleasure. “To begin 
with, sexual activity attaches itself to functions serving the 
purpose of self-preservation and does not become independent of them 
until later” (Freud, 1905, p. 182). Freud continues: “the need for 
repeating the sexual satisfaction now becomes detached from the need 
for taking nourishment” (p. 182). In other words, the constant is 
not the body part, nor the purpose of that body part, but precisely 
the level of excitation that is experienced. “The quality of the 
stimulus has more to do with producing the pleasurable feeling than 
has the nature of the part of the body concerned” (p. 183). The 
significance of Freud‟s argument places pleasure in a genealogical 
context, in which the pleasure experienced is described in relation 
to the first experiences of pleasure. For Freud, the biological 
processes at work in the initial moments that produce pleasure are 
the same biological processes at work later on, in what is more 
commonly described as sexual pleasure. In other words, the same 
biological factors are involved from the beginning, which 
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necessitate Freud‟s developmental stages to explain how the initial 
moments of pleasure become sexual pleasure later on: “[P]recisely as 
in the case of sucking, any other part of the body can acquire the 
same susceptibility to stimulation as is possessed by the genitals 
and can become an erotogenic zone” (p. 184). 
 
The conceptual scaffolding which we have set up to help us in 
dealing with the psychical manifestations of sexual life 
tallies well with these hypotheses as to the chemical basis of 
sexual excitation. We have defined the concept of libido as a 
quantitatively variable force which could serve as a measure 
of processes and transformations occurring in the field of 
sexual excitation. (p. 217) 
 
The definition of libido that Freud provides emphasizes the 
quantitative measurement of libido and pleasure. Libido is 
accordingly described in terms of biology and neuro-chemical 
processes. The introduction of libido is also a measure to 
distinguish between the different forms of psychical energy and the 
production of pleasure. Since pleasure cannot solely be attributed 
to an erotogenic region, libido becomes the intermediary, which 
makes erotogenic zones possible to begin with; in other words, to 
develop an erotogenic zone, instead of assuming a fixed/automatic 
erotogenic zone. Freud‟s developmental stages assume replacement and 
substitution, which Freud only develops in greater detail in On 
Narcissism: an Introduction (1914) and Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
(1920). 
 
We can then perceive [libido] concentrating upon objects, 
becoming fixed upon them or abandoning them, moving from one 
object to another and, from these situations, directing the 
subject‟s sexual activity, which leads to the satisfaction, 
that is, to the partial and temporary extinction, of the 
libido. (Freud, 1905, p. 217) 
 
The argument that Freud is developing, is that it is not the body 
part that has an inherent potential to be an erotogenic zone, but it 
14 
 
is through libido that any body part can gain that role. This is 
exemplified when Freud writes in On Narcissism: 
Let us now, taking any part of the body, describe its activity 
of sending sexually exciting stimuli to the mind as its 
„erotogenicity‟, and let us further reflect that the 
considerations on which our theory of sexuality was based have 
long accustomed us to the notion that certain other parts of 
the body – the „erotogenic‟ zones – may act as substitutes for 
the genitals and behave analogously to them. (p. 84) 
 
The progression of Freud‟s argument leads from auto-erotic zones to 
libido to narcissism. The classical definition of narcissism is 
described by Paul Näcke and taken as a starting point by Freud in On 
Narcissism. Freud (1914) rewords Näcke‟s definition of narcissism: 
To denote the attitude of a person who treats his own body in 
the same way in which the body of a sexual object is 
ordinarily treated – who looks at it, that is to say, strokes 
it and fondles it till he obtains complete satisfaction 
through these activities. (p. 73)  
 
Narcissism entails the focus of libido onto the self, in which the 
body is seen as a source of pleasure and satisfaction. It is not 
just any body, but the own body. Freud‟s definition of narcissism 
(in line with the classical definition) is therefore: “The libido 
that has been withdrawn from the external world has been directed to 
the ego and thus gives rise to an attitude which may be called 
narcissism” (p. 75). This definition of narcissism and libido allows 
for greater manoeuvrability, whereby it allows libidinal investment 
onto the ego, as opposed to libidinal investment onto the body. The 
outcome of Freud‟s definition of narcissism allows different 
definitions of the self to be deemed narcissistic, compared to the 
classical definition which focuses on a body and the satisfaction 
derived from the presence of the body.  
 
This argument is also present in Lacan‟s mirror stage, by 
exemplifying this relationship between the ego and the body. Lacan 
also incorporates Freud‟s definition of narcissism. Consequently the 
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mirror stage demonstrates the gap between the self as an object and 
the self as an abstract concept, or in Lacanian terms, between the 
self and the representation of the self.
6
 
 
The more pertinent question to ask is, how does the separation in 
libido occur that distinguishes between pleasure produced through 
stimulation of the erotogenic zones (for example the genitals, etc) 
and the pleasure produced from an abstract concept, (for example a 
photograph, etc.)? Freud asks two important questions, focusing on 
the difficulties and relevance of the article on narcissism. First, 
“what is the relation of the narcissism of which we are now speaking 
to auto-erotism?” (p. 76). Second, “if we concede to the ego a 
primary cathexis of libido, why is there any necessity for further 
distinguishing a sexual libido from a non-sexual energy pertaining 
to the instincts?” (p. 76).  
 
Freud‟s solution to the first question is achieved through two 
explanations. First, by acknowledging the development of the ego, in 
terms of a linear explanation relating concepts back to an initial 
moment of pleasure (which forms the core of Freud‟s (1920) Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle
7
). Second, by achieving this linearization 
through connecting narcissism with auto-erotism. Essentially Freud 
is explaining the development of the ego using primordial auto-
erotism as the starting point.  
 
Freud‟s answer to the second question is more pertinent; he examines 
three reasons to differentiate between different types of libido.  
 
Firstly, by differentiating between the sexual instincts and ego-
instincts can also be seen as the “the common, popular distinction 
between hunger and love” (p. 78). The difference is between concrete 
physical stimulation and an abstract conceptual stimulation. 
 
                         
6
 The self and the representation of the self is discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 2, especially with regard to Lacan‟s adaptation of 
Saussurean Linguistics, i.e. the signifier and the signified. 
7
 Illustrated in the Fort/Da case study in Chapter 3, the repetition 
compulsion in Chapter 3, as well as the Oedipus complex that initiates 
desire within a chain of signifiers. 
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Secondly, by differentiating between sexual instincts and ego-
instincts Freud emphasizes a double function: “The individual does 
actually carry on a double existence: one to serve his own purposes 
and the other as a link in a chain, which he serves against his 
will, or at least involuntarily” (p. 78). This passage can be 
interpreted in a few ways. For one, the paradox between a Darwinian-
evolutionary-developmental model which is structured with rules and 
norms, as opposed to a hedonistic, pleasure-seeking, rule-ignoring 
(not subverting or undermining, but dismissing) behaviour. A second 
interpretation focuses on the separation between conscious and 
unconscious motivations. “He is the mortal vehicle of a (possibly) 
immortal substance” (p. 78). This quote refers to the germ-plasm 
theory discussed in greater length in Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle. However, the possibility of a germ-plasm theory 
connects one with a natural meta-historical progression that 
connects biology to a greater history that would connect the body to 
a purpose, but Freud abandoned the germ-plasm theory. The third and 
most prevalent interpretation emphasizes that the flow or focus of 
libido is not under the sole control of the ego, i.e. libidinal 
investment isn‟t done through a conscious-directing of libido. 
 
Thirdly, Freud acknowledges biology where the instinct is connected 
to an organic substructure. “We are taking this probability into 
account in replacing the special chemical substances by special 
psychical forces” (p. 78). Freud‟s emphasis on biology and relating 
psychical forces to a biological purpose connects any psychical 
phenomena to a biological foundation. In other words, love and 
hunger are both explained in terms of biological processes. However, 
Freud finds it difficult to explain all phenomena in terms of 
biology.  
 
As a result, Freud changes his focus from biology to the conditions 
during early childhood. He thereby changes his focus towards the 
relationship between the child and the primary caregiver, also known 
as attachment. He identifies two types of attachment, namely the 
narcissistic type and the anaclitic type [Anlehnungstypus]. The 
difference between the two is the focus of libido, highlighting the 
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inside/outside separation. In the anaclitic attachment type libido 
is focused on the primary caregivers, whilst in the narcissistic 
type the libido is focused internally, on the self. 
 
Freud (1914) describes the two types of attachment as follows: 
 A person may love: - 
(1) According to the narcissistic type: 
a. What he himself is (i.e. himself), 
b. What he himself was, 
c. What he himself would like to be, 
d. Someone who was once part of himself. 
(2) According to the anaclitic (attachment) type: 
a. The woman who feeds him, 
b. The man who protects him, 
c. And the succession of substitutes who take their 
place. (p. 90) 
Freud doesn‟t abandon the biological approach, but attempts to 
describe attachment in terms of development and sexual development. 
For Freud the type of preferred attachment is connected with the 
initial auto-erotic sexual gratification. Freud (1914) writes: 
The first auto-erotic sexual gratifications are experiences in 
connection with vital functions in the service of self-
preservation. The sexual instincts are at the outset supported 
upon the ego-instincts; only later do they become independent 
of these, and even then do we have an indication of that 
original dependence in the fact that those persons who have to 
do with the feeding, care, and protection of the child become 
his earliest sexual objects: in the first instance the mother. 
(p. 87). 
  
The relationship between the child and the primary caregiver is more 
complex than just the feeding, caring and protection of the child. 
“In the child to whom they [the mother] give birth, a part of their 
own body comes to them as an object other than themselves, upon 
which they can lavish out of their narcissism complete object-love” 
(p. 91). The role of the child in the mother-child relationship is 
therefore one of receptor, to receive the messages, hints and 
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intentions of the parent, who – in turn - imprints their own 
ambitions onto the child.   
Moreover, [the parents] are inclined to suspend in the child‟s 
favour the operation of all those cultural acquisitions which 
their own narcissism has been forced to respect, and to renew 
on his behalf the claims to privileges which were long ago 
given up by themselves. (p. 91) 
The privileges that Freud is referring to are explained: “He is to 
fulfil those dreams and wishes of his parents which they never 
carried out” (p. 91). Freud‟s argument is therefore incompatible 
with the notion of children born Tabula Rasa, whereby there can be 
no clean slate. “Parental love, which is so moving and at bottom so 
childish, is nothing but the parents‟ narcissism born again, which, 
transformed into object-love, unmistakably reveals its former 
nature” (p. 91). This is one of the first forms of repetition that 
Freud identifies. The narcissism leads to the creation of an ideal 
or a goal to which the child aspires. The dreams and ambitions that 
the parents project onto the child and which the child makes its 
own, is called the Ideal-ego (Ideal-ich). This projection, however, 
cannot be maintained, and leads to the formation of a sublimated 
version, which he termed the Ego-ideal (Ich-ideal).  
 
The next section is focused on these two concepts, Ideal-ego and 
Ego-ideal, their formation, and how the two terms relate to 
narcissism. 
 
1.3. Freud’s Ideal-ego and Ego-ideal 
 
It has been described how the Ideal-ego (Ideal-ich) and the Ego-
ideal (Ich-ideal) come to be, but the extent of the Ideal-ego and 
the Ego-ideal will be taken further in this subsection. The Ideal-
ego and the Ego-ideal is discussed in Freud‟s On Narcissism (1914) 
and also in The Ego and the ID (1923). 
 
This means that the subject is continually confronted by the ideals 
created, and this results in a divided subject; or as Moyaert (1983) 
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puts it: “Er is, volgens Freud, geen originele eenheid in het 
individu aanwezig, die met het ik te vergelijken valt” [There is, 
according to Freud, no original unity present in the individual, to 
which the I can be compared] (p. 396-7). 
 
Freud does not connect the ambitions and descriptions the parents 
have of the child with rationality or reason: “[the parents] are 
under a compulsion to ascribe every perfection to the child – which 
sober observation would find no occasion to do – and to conceal and 
forget all his shortcomings” (Freud, 1914, p.91). The problem arises 
with the impossibility of living up to the ideals envisaged by the 
parents, or even the ideals ascribed to the self. Therefore 
narcissism can be defined as the love of the self as corroborating 
with the ideal. 
 
This Ideal-ego is now the target of the self-love, which was 
enjoyed in childhood by the actual ego (wirkliche Ich). The 
subject‟s narcissism makes its appearance displaced on to this 
new Ideal-ego, which, like the infantile ego, find itself 
possessed of every perfection that is of value. (p. 94, his 
italics) 
 
“We can say that the one man has set up an ideal in himself by which 
he measures his actual ego, while the other has formed no such 
ideal. For the ego the formation of an ideal would be the 
conditioning factor of repression” (p. 93-4, his italics). 
Repression is done for the protection and self-preservation of the 
ego. The Ego-ideal takes shape because the Ideal-ego cannot be 
maintained through successful repression
8
 (also known as 
sublimation
9
).  
 
To recap: the initial impression that one has of oneself is always 
in reference to the Ideal-ego, which is mostly created by the 
                         
8
 Repression is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
9
 On sublimation, Lacan (2008a) writes: “in the definition of sublimation 
as satisfaction without repression, whether implicitly or explicitly, there 
is a passage from not-knowing to knowing, a recognition of the fact that 
desire is nothing more than the metonymy of the discourse of demand” (p. 
360) 
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primary caregiver. The definition therefore of primary narcissism is 
thus the love of the ideal, or more specifically the love of the 
self as complying with the ideal. The Ideal-ego precedes the 
development of the ego, which implies that even before the birth of 
the child, there is already an ideal created. Freud links the 
initial Ideal-ego with the lost narcissism of the parents. The 
biological developmental approach favoured by Freud links the 
formation of the Ideal-ego with auto-erotism. Therefore the 
formation of the Ideal-ego is conditioned through the libidinal 
investment into the Ideal-ego. The libidinal investment was made 
possible through the primary caregivers‟ nurture and protection, 
which he explains and describes as the satisfaction of self-
preservation. It seems that there is a coercion at work in which the 
infant is duped into accepting the ideals created by the parents.  
 
However, the emphasis of this chapter is not on how these ideals 
come to fruition, but how these ideals are the platform for further 
understanding of the self. The primary narcissism of the child is 
the love of the self as the ideal. Consequently, the representation 
of the self, or how the self would like to be seen, is greatly 
influenced by narcissism as shaped through the Ideal-ego. This is 
how Freud (1914) views the development of ego: 
The development of the ego consists in a departure from 
primary narcissism and gives rise to a vigorous attempt to 
recover that state. This departure is brought about by means 
of the displacement of libido on to an Ego-ideal imposed from 
without; and satisfaction is brought about from fulfilling 
this ideal. (p. 100). 
 
The Ego-ideal (Ich-ideal) replaces the Ideal-ego (Ideal-ich), and it 
will be explained that this replacement occurs out of logical 
necessity. Because the Ideal-ego retains a purity and perfection, 
the Ideal-ego has to be adapted and changed to a more accommodating 
version that includes perversions and distortions. The definition 
Lacan (1988) provides for the Ego-ideal denotes “an organism of 
defence established by the ego in order to extend the subject‟s 
satisfaction” (p. 3). The definition of Ego-ideal therefore serves 
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two purposes. First, through the inclusion of satisfaction 
experienced by corroborating with the ideal; and second, that the 
development of the Ego-ideal is pleasure oriented, which means that 
through the sublimation that occurs, the Ideal-ego has to change 
into a more acceptable and achievable version. From a developmental 
perspective, Freud is arguing that the Ideal-ego is not necessarily 
the ideal to which the subject aspires, since the process of 
sublimation does not guarantee the preservation of that ideal. 
Consequently, the adapted version is the ideal aspired to, which he 
calls the Ego-ideal (Ich-Ideal).  
 
The difference between the Ideal-ego and the Ego-ideal is not 
measurable, as the two are intertwined from a developmental 
standpoint. In other words, the Ideal-ego and the Ego-ideal cannot 
be viewed separately. “The Ego-ideal has imposed severe conditions 
upon the satisfaction of libido through objects; for it causes some 
of them to be rejected by means of its censor, as being 
incompatible” (Freud, 1914, p. 100).  
 
The conditions of satisfaction or pleasure or the effects thereof 
are discussed further in the next section under the heading of the 
Pleasure Principle. It is in line with the developmental model 
through which the first definition of the pleasure principle is 
provided in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). 
 
1.4. The Pleasure Principle 
 
The first step of this section is to define the pleasure principle, 
and then to place it in context of the developmental model proposed 
by Freud. This means that the pleasure principle will be connected 
with the Ideal-ego (Ideal-ich) and the Ego-ideal (Ich-ideal).  
 
Freud provides a definition of the pleasure principle early on in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920): “that any given process 
originates in an unpleasant state of tension and thereupon 
determines for itself such a pass that ultimately coincides with the 
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relaxation of that tension” (p. 4).10 The simplified version of the 
pleasure principle that will be dealt with in this chapter is a 
basic definition of the pleasure principle as the “avoidance of pain 
and the production of pleasure” (p. 4). 
 
This simplified definition of the pleasure principle is an inversion 
of what has been discussed in On Narcissism, where Freud argues that 
through the presence of an object, a release of libidinal tension 
takes place, whereas in Beyond the Pleasure Principle the excess 
libido precedes the object. Through the presence of a specific 
object is the release in tension possible. This provides a logical 
criticism as to what came first, the linear progression of the 
development of the ego or what will become an object of desire.  
 
This is where and how the pleasure principle ties in with the 
developmental model proposed by Freud. He achieves this through 
connecting the Ego-ideal (Ich-ideal) and the conditions for the 
achievement of pleasure: “The Ego-ideal has imposed severe 
conditions upon the satisfaction of libido through objects; for it 
causes some of them to be rejected by means of its censor, as being 
incompatible” (Freud, 1914, p. 100). However the Ego-ideal is shaped 
through the sublimation of the Ideal-ego, which is shaped through 
the ideal created by the parents and instilled through the 
satisfaction of object-libido and sexual-libido whilst the two are 
intertwined and completely oriented by the initial need for self-
preservation.   
 
Or, as described in more practical terms: 
Being in love consists in a flowing-over of ego-libido on to 
the object. It has the power to remove repressions and re-
instate perversions. It exalts the sexual object type (or 
attachment type), being in love occurs in virtue of the 
fulfillment of infantile conditions for loving, we may say 
that whatever fulfils that condition is idealized. (p. 100-1)  
 
                         
10
 This definition of the pleasure principle is presented in Chapter 2 in 
light of Freud‟s (1950) Project for a Scientific Psychology 
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In Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud needs to ratify the notion of 
perception into the biological description Freud provided. The 
biological explanation already presumes an automatic stimulus and an 
automatic response. The perception and expectation of pain in a way 
negate the biological processes at work and prevents the biological 
formula to complete its course. In other words, the perception of 
pain acts as an inhibitor for behaviour. This necessitates a 
mediator between the perceptive and the biological explanations of 
behaviour, which takes routine into account, yet at the same time 
allows for deviations from the norm. The mediator therefore has the 
possibility to extend or limit the influences of biology and/or 
conscious perception. The mediator was later to be termed the 
Superego, which is also known as the Ego-ideal. This results in the 
decentred subject to which Lacan often refers.  
 
This implies the functioning of the I as not wholly constituted 
through the conscious ego, but as continually mediated by an 
idealization. As a result, through this idealization, there is a 
decentering. Ijsseling (1968) summarizes: 
„La découvert freudienne est cele d‟un decentrement‟. Wat 
betekent dit? Uitgedrukt in de terminologie van Lacan zou men 
het volgende kunnen zeggen: De mens is een wezen dat spreekt. 
[…] Wanneer de mens spreekt vertelt hij een „verhaal‟ 
[histoire]. Dit verhaal kan natuurlijk vele en verschillende 
vormen aannemen. […] Welke vorm het verhaal echter ook heeft, 
de mens is geenzins de bezitter van dit verhaal, maar hij word 
eerder door bezeten. De mens beschikt niet over het betoog dat 
hij houdt, maar er word over hem beschikt. [„The Freudian 
discovery is one of decentering‟. What does this mean? 
Expressed in Lacanian terminology, one could say the 
following: the person is the being that speaks. When the being 
speaks, it tells a story. This story can take many shapes and 
forms. […] Whatever form the story takes, the person is not 
the owner of the story, but he is owned by it. The person does 
not control the story, but the story reigns over him] (p. 705-
6)  
 
24 
 
Consequently the story is our most basic description of the pleasure 
principle whereby the pleasure achieved is a result of the self 
corroborating with the ideals, as described in the Ego-ideal (Ich-
ideal). But how this narration comes to reign is demonstrated in 
Lacan‟s mirror stage. 
 
1.5. Lacan’s Mirror Stage 
 
Lacan‟s mirror stage is an important concept that illustrates far 
more than just the hypothesis of an 18 month old child gazing into a 
mirror. For Lacan, the mirror stage exemplifies a moment of self-
identification. In The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function, 
in Écrits (1966/2006) Lacan writes: 
We have only to understand the mirror stage as an 
identification, in the full sense that analysis gives to the 
term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the 
subject when he assumes an image – whose predestination to 
this phase-effect is sufficiently indicated by the use, in 
analytic theory of the ancient term imago. (p. 94, his 
emphasis) 
 
The role of the mirror stage is two-fold. First, the mirror stage 
explains the development of the subject in terms of a linear 
biological explanation; and secondly, explains the asymmetry between 
the self and the reflection in the mirror. The biggest criticism 
aimed at Lacan is with reference to the first explanation of the 
mirror stage with regard to biological development. The focus is 
ontological with specific emphasis on the formulaic description of 
the mirror stage. Two examples are that of Billig (2006) and Dreyer 
(2005), as well as a response to their claims and conclusions of the 
mirror stage. The second explanation focuses on how the separation 
between the self and the reflection/representation in the mirror 
attains meaning. 
 
Billig‟s (2006) main line of critique is: “[theorists] do not 
question whether there is evidence for such a stage or whether young 
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children act in a way that Lacan claims” (p. 1). This is a challenge 
to the biological validity of the mirror stage, by examining the 
biological developmental facts as Lacan (mis)uses them: “what is of 
interest here, is not the theory as such but the evidential 
justification Lacan gives for his ideas” (p. 6). Billig accordingly 
challenges Lacan‟s usage of Köhler (Lacan, 1966/2006, p. 93), 
Baldwin (p. 93) and Bühler (p. 98). For Billig, the issue resides in 
the ontological, biological justification of Lacan‟s 
conceptualization of the mirror stage. “Thus, Lacan‟s theorizing 
about the ideal image is grounded in claims about observable 
actions. He does not present further evidence to support his 
speculations about the mirror image providing the child with an 
idealized image” (p. 21). However this is a one-dimensional reading 
of the mirror stage. 
  
At the same time, Billig does allow for the second explanation and 
justification of Lacan‟s mirror stage. Billig writes: “However, the 
self-recognition of the mirror stage involves misrecognition 
[méconnaisance], laying the basis for an abiding alienation” (p. 6). 
This is essentially the point that Lacan is aiming for through the 
mirror stage, whereby the I is alienated from the actual (wirkliche) 
self. The I is the commitment to the misrecognized version, as will 
be demonstrated through the simplified schema of the two mirrors 
(see Fig 1, p. 34). Therefore, the mirror stage is the initial 
substitution in which the actual [wirkliche] ego is replaced through 
the misrecognition of the image in the mirror. The image in the 
mirror is the contents ascribed to the mirror image based on the 
ideals shaped by the primary caregiver, as argued by Freud with the 
development of the Ideal-ego and Ego-ideal. 
 
Dreyer‟s (2005) critique also focuses on the possibility of Lacan‟s 
description of the mirror stage: 
The foregoing dialectic demonstrates that Lacan‟s mirror stage 
formulation is not supported by empirical evidence and applied 
logic. As a consequence the conceptualization of the Other as 
to its disposition and essentially alienating function thus 
appears fallacious. (p. 69) 
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Dreyer focuses on the argument pertaining to the technical set-up of 
the mirror stage. Dreyer over-emphasizes the ontological set-up in 
which the infant would look into the mirror and see a reflection. 
Dreyer questions the possibility that the infant will recognize 
him/herself. Lacan‟s argument states that the infant will 
misrecognize the self in the reflection, and assume that reflection. 
This is achieved as the reflection has no content, but is only form, 
an outline. Content is ascribed, injected, imprinted, or projected 
onto the reflection, which is how the reflection in the mirror 
achieves any meaning. Dreyer writes: “Furthermore, with clandestine 
presumptuousness, Lacan‟s mirror stage formulation implicitly 
assumes that six to eighteen month old infants necessarily grasp the 
idiosyncratic properties of mirrors” (p. 68). The underlying 
argument in Dreyer‟s argument is therefore twofold; first, that the 
recognition is impossible because the child needs to use and 
understand the mirror correctly; and secondly, that if the 
recognition were possible, the self would see that reflection in the 
mirror as the actual [wirkliche] self. For Lacan, Dreyer‟s second 
argument does not hold water, as there is no way one can perceive 
oneself in the mirror as one actually is without the projection of 
the ideals created by the primary caregiver and enforced through the 
pleasure derived from assuming the image. “The author [Dreyer] will 
demonstrate that Lacan‟s infant, standing on the legs of the Other, 
has never been able to walk because these alienating limbs have no 
veridical substance” (p. 65).  
 
If Dreyer is arguing for Lacan‟s infant, shaped through the gaze of 
the Other (through Sartrean and Levinasian intersubjectivity), 
Dreyer would be correct in assuming the „alienating limbs‟ not to 
have any substance, as the mirror image contains nothing but the 
properties ascribed. However, Dreyer is missing the initial 
relationship with the self prior to the relationship with the Other, 
and how the self is viewed in the mirror.  
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How the self is viewed in the mirror, first needs to be established. 
Moyaert (1983) writes on the relationship between the self and the 
mirror image: 
Wanneer ik naar myself kijk, wil ik niet zozeer mezelf zien 
zoals ik ben maar wil zien hoe ik eruit zie als de ander me 
ziet; of anders gezegd: ik wil zien hoe de ander me ziet. En 
dit is een onbereikbaar ideal.  [When I look at myself, I 
don‟t necessarily want to see myself as I am, but to see 
myself as the other sees me; or put differently: I want to see 
how the other sees me. And this is an unachievable ideal] (p. 
400) 
 
However, it is only because “these alienating limbs have no 
veridical substance”, that the idealization can take place. In other 
words, this is how the void is filled through the attribution of 
properties to the self, as the self cannot be seen as it actually 
is.  
 
Van Haute (1995) writes on the relationship between the self and 
other, and connects intersubjectivity to attachment and narcissism: 
Het is waar dat dit Anlehnungs-model, zoals Freud het ons 
voorstelt, suggereert – maar alleen suggereert – dat de 
seksualitieit ontstaat uit een intersubjectief process: het 
ontstaan van de seksualiteit vereist de aanwezigheid van de 
ander. Maar ook al is die ander van bij de aanvang aanwezig, 
zijn rol kon nauwelijks onbeduidender zijn. De ander blijft 
louter passief. [It is true that the attachment-model, as 
Freud describes, suggests – but only suggests – that sexuality 
develops through an intersubjective process: the development 
of sexuality requires the presence of the other. But even if 
the other is present, his role simply remains unremarkable. 
The other remains passive.] (p. 729). 
 
But van Haute (1986) also expounds on the relationship between the 
self and the other in the mirror stage, whereby there is an 
otherness to the mirror image. Therefore, when I see an other, I see 
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as I would my own mirror image. This is why desire is for the 
(imaginary) other, and never the real other.  
He explains: 
De menselijke begeerte is dus op dit niveau gelijk aan deze 
van de (imaginaire) ander. Zij is de begeerte van de ander. 
Dit leide tot een absolute rivaliteit met betrekking tot het 
object van de begeerte: ik streef na wat de ander begeerte, 
omdat hy het begeert. Ik ben immers de ander. De ander is 
slecht een complement van mijn spiegelbeeld. [The human desire 
is thus equal to the (imaginary) other. That is the desire of 
the other. This leads to an absolute rivalry with regard to 
the object of desire: I strive towards what the other desires 
because he desires it. I am the other. The other is only 
complementary of my mirror-image] (p. 398, his emphasis) 
 
Dreyer refers to “these limbs” as having “never been able to walk”. 
As van Haute shows, the relationship with the other is determined by 
the relationship with the self. This relationship with the self is 
based on narcissism as shaped through the Ideal-ego and the Ego-
ideal. It seems that Dreyer is rushing into intersubjective theory 
without speculating on the nature of the interaction with the other, 
as well as the vantage point from where the other is viewed. The 
desire for the other sets off a narcissistic love that precedes the 
object of love, as the other is seen in the same light as one looks 
at one‟s own mirror image. The same expectations and idealizations 
that one has for oneself, are also expected of the other. Or as van 
Haute (1986) describes it, “het narcisme gaan die eigenlijke 
objectliefde vooraf” [narcissism precedes the actual object-love] 
(p. 394). Therefore, one loves another who exemplifies this 
idealization that one has for oneself. Narcissism consequently plays 
a far more important role than the classical definition ascribes to 
narcissism.  
 
Therefore, to respond to Dreyer in Lacan‟s own words (2008a): 
You are aware that the mirror function, which I thought it 
necessary to present as exemplary of the imaginary structure, 
is defined in the narcissistic relation. And the element of 
29 
 
idealizing exaltation that is expressly sought out in the 
ideology of courtly love has certainly been demonstrated; it 
is fundamentally narcissistic in character. […] It is only by 
chance that beyond the mirror may on occasion imply the 
mechanisms of narcissism […] And the only organization in 
which it participates is that of the inaccessibility of the 
object. (p. 186) 
 
The assumption that Dreyer is making, is that the reflection in the 
mirror is exactly proportionate to the infant/subject standing in 
front of the mirror. This initial (mis)recognition of the self 
precedes the relationship the self will have with the other. The 
emphasis of Lacan is therefore not the relationship the self has 
with the actual [wirkliche] other, but with the imaginary other. For 
Lacan, this relation with the actual is impossible, as is shown in 
Chapter 3 in terms of the L-schema (Fig 4, p. 86). This impossible 
relation results in misrecognition [méconnaisance] and an asymmetry 
between the actual [wirkliche] self and the perception of the self - 
the actual [wirkliche] other and the perception of the other.  
 
Antoine Mooij (1979) states the same a bit differently:  
Hierin slaagt het doordat het de noties van „zintuigelijke 
waarneembaarheid‟ en „werklijkheid‟ gaat loskoppelen. Dit mag 
de volwassene een simpele operatie toeschijnen, het impliceert 
dat de notie van wekelijkheid niet meer onlosmakelijk 
verbonden is met een zintuigelijke indruk en, omgekeert, dat 
een zintuigelijke indruk niet meer samenvalt met 
werkelijkheid. [This succeeds through detaching the notions of 
„sensory perception‟ and „reality‟. This allows the individual 
a basic procedure of attribution, this implies that the notion 
of reality is no longer inseparable from a sensory impression, 
and, inversely, that one sensory perception is no longer 
connected with reality] (p. 78-9) 
 
The second explanation is really where the mettle of the mirror 
stage is tested, as the mirror stage is not an anthropological 
explication of whether and under what circumstances a child looks in 
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the mirror at the age of 18 months, implying that a child that never 
looks at its own reflection at the age of 18 months would never go 
through the mirror stage. The mirror stage is merely the moment of 
separation between the self and the image of the self, and even more 
specifically the separation between the self and the representation 
of the self. In other words, the importance of the child seeing 
him/herself as an ideal body, as an object. Sam Weber (1991) writes, 
“The mirror stage hereby locates the constitution of the ego in a 
dimension of fictionality and of self-deception, which will have an 
alienating effect on the subsequent existence and development of the 
subject” (p. 12, his emphasis). The reflection in the mirror is void 
of any content except the content ascribed, which is why 
fictionality and self-deception is possible when looking at the 
reflection of the self. 
 
The function of the mirror stage thus turns out, in my view, 
to be a particular case of the function of imagos, which is to 
establish a relationship between an organism, and its reality 
– or as they say, between the Innenwelt and the Umwelt. 
(Lacan, 1966/2006, p. 96, his italics) 
 
The relationship between the Innenwelt [inside] and the Umwelt 
[outside] is to automatically assume a direct correlation between 
the two whereby the reflection of the mirror as seen in the Umwelt 
is a projection of the essence of the Innenwelt. Lacan argues that 
they are wholly separate from each other, but the appearance of 
unity allows for the appearance of control. “The sight alone of the 
whole form of the human body gives the subject an imaginary mastery 
over his body, one which is premature in relation to a real mastery” 
(Lacan, 1988a, p. 79). The imaginary mastery is done through the 
attribution of qualities to the image. This is done regardless of 
the accuracy or “truth” in the depiction of the self, but also then 
conforming to those attributes. In other words, there is an 
imaginary mastery over the image which denotes both a control of the 
body movements, but also control over what is represented.  
The essence of the image is to be invested by the libido. What 
we call libido investment is what makes an object become 
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desirable, that is to say how it becomes confused with this 
more or less structured image which, in diverse ways, we carry 
with us. (p. 141) 
 
Therefore, Lacan‟s mirror stage demonstrates this moment of 
“imaginary mastery”. Lacan also illustrates the function of the 
mirror stage through the simplified schema of the two mirrors (Fig 
1, p. 34). 
 
Lacan (1988a) describes the Simplified Schema of the two mirrors as 
follow: 
We may imagine that the real image formed thanks to the 
concave mirror is produced inside the subject, at a point 
which we call O. The subject sees this real image as a virtual 
image in the plane mirror, at O‟, in so far as he finds 
himself placed in the virtual symmetrical position in relation 
to the plane mirror. (p. 165) 
 
 
Fig 1: Simplified schema of the two mirrors (Lacan, 1988a, p. 165) 
 
The correlation between the mirror stage and the Simplified Schema 
of the two mirrors is that both demonstrate the separation between 
the self and the image of the self. The divide is also termed by 
Lacan as the separation between the object and the ego, “because 
they are strictly correlative and because their appearance is truly 
contemporaneous that the problem of narcissism arises” (p. 165). Or 
in terms of the Freudian definition of narcissism: the love of the 
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ideal and the self as corroborating with that ideal. This is 
demonstrated in the simplified schema of two mirrors, and equally so 
in the mirror stage. The reflection has no contents except the 
contents ascribed. The ideal that is aspired to is created through 
narcissism, whereby the true self is compared to the Ideal self. The 
Ideal self or the Ideal-ego is sublimated and transformed into the 
Ego-ideal. The Ego-ideal is a more acceptable and accommodating 
version that includes perversions, narcissism and improper ideation. 
The content that is ascribed to the image of the self (illustrated 
in the simplified schema of the two mirrors as O‟) is done 
regardless of the accuracy or possibility of the self achieving the 
ideal. 
 
Therefore Lacan‟s mirror stage illustrates the separation between 
the subject (O) and the image of the subject (O‟). The simplistic 
depiction of O = O‟ is proven false. The representation (O‟) has the 
shape or form of O, but it is the content is ascribed. This is where 
Lacan takes his cue from Freud: the representation (O‟) is already 
tainted with the ideals imposed through narcissism. If narcissism is 
the love of the self as the ideal, the only way the self can be the 
ideal is through the corroboration between O and O‟. This 
correlation is often artificially created through the pleasure 
principle and phantasy
11
. 
 
However, the mirror stage also illustrates another important facet, 
which has a longlasting effect. The next section will focus on the 
smaller, subtle manifestation of narcissism in terms of instincts, 
love and substitution. In other words, the section will focus on how 
narcissism manifests in smaller everyday behaviours. 
 
1.6 Instincts, Love and Substitution 
 
This section focuses on the manifestation of narcissism in smaller 
everyday behaviors, specifically in the objects of desire, as well 
as instincts. The argument that Freud presents, is to explain how 
through repression, narcissism manifests repeatedly in the objects 
                         
11
 Freud combined phallus and fantasy to coin the word „phantasy‟. 
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of desire. The arguments are structured around Freud‟s texts 
Instincts and their Vicissitudes (1915a). 
 
The first manifestation in everyday behaviour is instinctual. The 
description of an instinct is not necessarily linked with an 
evolutionary explanation in which the instincts relate to a 
historical biological functioning which still secretly resides in 
behaviour today. The usage of instincts, in the Freudian sense, is a 
reference to habitual behaviour which continually reproduces the 
same behaviour. Therefore, the definition of an instinct used in 
this thesis is: to behave or act in a fashion consistent with how 
one has acted in the past.
12
  
 
In Instincts and their Vicissitudes (1915a), Freud writes on an 
instinct, which links instincs with a satisfaction, which this 
thesis argues is connected with narcissism: 
The object [Objekt] of an instinct is the thing in regard to 
which or through which the instinct is able to achieve its 
aim. It is what is most variable about an instinct and is not 
originally connected with it, but becomes assigned to it only 
in consequence of being peculiarly fitted to make satisfaction 
possible. (p. 122, my emphasis)  
 
The emphasis is placed on satisfaction, which is possible through 
adhering to the description of narcissism. Therefore, Freud‟s 
definition of an instinct is: to behave in the same fashion as one 
has in the past, thereby increasing the possibility of satisfaction 
(the pleasure principle). An example of a habitual action/reaction 
is found in the description of love. Freud writes extensively on the 
differences and similarities between love and hate. However, for the 
purpose of explaining love as the satisfaction of an instinct, Freud 
refers back to the primary narcissism and the development of the 
Ideal-ego and the Ego-ideal. The argument is to show how the object 
of desire is attached to an instinct. This means that the object of 
                         
12
 This argument is also made by Horney (1939) when she writes: “An 
instinct, according to Freud, is caused by organic stimuli; its aim is to 
extinguish the disturbing stimulation and re-establish the equilibrium as 
it was before the stimulation interfered” (p. 122) 
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desire contains a quality that is consistent with previous objects 
of desire. The replacement of one object of desire is therefore the 
substitution of a material object. The consistent property that 
provides the appeal always remains, as this property is attributed 
to narcissism and instincts. Freud developed the developmental and 
economical model to stipulate that the properties that one loves are 
related back towards an initial moment, i.e. the satisfaction of 
ego- and sexual instincts. “Het cruciale punt is hier dan ook het 
volgende: seksualiteit ontstaat niet wanneer een adequaat object 
gevonden wordt (b.v. de borst als object van de orale libido), maar 
wanneer het object verlore gaat” [The crucial point here is the 
following: sexuality does not develop when the adequate object is 
discovered (for example, the breasts as the object of oral libido), 
but when the object (of desire) is lost] (van Haute, 1995, p. 728). 
For Freud, it is consequently a return to the initial satisfaction. 
Therefore, what one loves is the love of a reference to a prior 
satisfaction. The presence of the object (with a similar quality) is 
then an attempt to return to the previous state of satisfaction. 
Freud (1915a) writes on love: 
Love is derived from the capacity of the ego to satisfy some 
of its instinctual impulses auto-erotically by obtaining 
organ-pleasure. It is originally narcissistic, then passes 
over on to objects, which have been incorporated into the 
extended ego, and expresses the motor efforts of the ego 
towards these objects as sources of pleasure. (p. 138) 
 
In short, Freud‟s developmental model connects the development of 
love with a prior experience of satisfaction, which in the early 
developmental phases was both the satisfaction of the ego- and 
sexual-instincts. Love is exactly the infatuation with a person or 
object with the characteristics and features that can be related 
back to an earlier state or stage.
13
  
 
                         
13
 “When the ego assumes the features of the object, it is forcing itself, 
so to speak, upon the Id as a love-object and is trying to make the Id‟s 
loss by saying: „Look, you love me too – I am so like the object‟” (Freud, 
1923, p. 30) 
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This process is also known as substitution
14
, whereby one object (or 
person) is replaced by another in a continual process. Substitution 
takes place in search of the qualities and properties that are 
idealized. Moyaert (1983) demonstrates the links between 
substitution and narcissism: “Die ideale voorstelling van het ik, 
die ik beoog en wil bereiken, is de substituutvoorstelling van de 
oorspronkelijke lege narcistische volkomenheid” [The ideal 
representation of the I, including the goals, is the substitutive 
representation of the original missing narcissistic perfection] (p. 
403, his italics). The separation between the ideal and the actual 
self becomes difficult, as there is no definitive line to be drawn 
between the two. The perception then when looking into the mirror, 
as in Lacan‟s mirror stage, is to show that it is not possible to 
see the actual self in the reflection, but to see the self in a 
favourable light in line with the idealized version, the sublimated 
Ego-ideal. “Of paradoxaal uitgedrukt: het ik komt tot stand als 
substituut van zichzelf” (p. 404) [Or expressed paradoxically: the I 
comes to be through the substitution of the self]. This is why it is 
ironic when a person is advised to be himself. Psychoanalysis 
therefore questions the narration around the idealized version of 
the self, rather than looking at the qualities of the actual self. 
 
This section focused on instincts, love and substitution on a 
smaller, everday scale. Consequently, narcissism manifests not only 
in the big gestures of love, but also in the smaller habits. Freud 
identifies the purpose and aim of these instincts and objects of 
desire that continually change and progress, yet they still retain 
traceable elements to prior circumstances. If the outcome is 
satisfaction, Freud therefore looks at the conditions of 
satisfaction, and links it to the pleasure principle. 
 
                         
14
 Substitution is an important aspect of this thesis. There is continual 
return to the notion of substitution. For example in Chapter 3, 
substitution is explained in terms of Saussurian Linguistics (Chapter 2), 
and in Chapter 4, in terms of the death drive. 
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1.7. Conclusion 
 
The first chapter develops Freud‟s argument leading to Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle (1920). The leading question of this chapter is 
to explain how the I commits to the idealized version through 
satisfaction. The satisfaction experienced is the first definition 
of the pleasure principle this thesis explores; the pleasure 
principle as the “avoidance of pain and the production of pleasure” 
(Freud, 1920, p. 4).  
 
But for this definition of the pleasure principle to succeed, Freud 
locates and defends this definition in the developmental stages. By 
examining the development of the child, Freud shows how narcissism 
shapes and is shaped by the primary caregivers. As a result, this 
thesis has a very specific definition of narcissism: Narcissism is 
the love of the self as the ideal, which means that there is a 
specific way in which the self wants to be seen.  
 
Lacan takes narcissism further and demonstrates through the mirror 
stage how there is a difference between the self and the 
representation of the self. But to reaffirm the definition of the 
pleasure principle prevalent in this chapter, the satisfaction 
experienced entrenches the idealized version. This in turn affects 
instincts, love and substitution (Section 1.6). 
 
Section 1.6 demonstrates how narcissism manifests in smaller 
everyday behaviour. Therefore, instincts aren‟t a meta-concept which 
relates back to an evolutionary explanation for behaviour. These 
instincts, however, are unconscious. Freud focuses on behaviour and 
actions that are not the product of conscious thought, but show how 
unconscious processes reflect in everyday behaviour.  
 
The first chapter therefore focuses on origins of Psychoanalysis, 
and sets the tone for the rest of the chapters. “If the ego is an 
imaginary function, it is not to be confused with the subject” 
(Lacan, 1988, p. 193). The separation between the actual [wirkliche] 
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ego and the idealized version of the ego, leads to the question  of 
the location of the conscious ego. This impacts on the extent and 
limits of the pursuit of pleasure. In other words, the conscious ego 
cannot be solely responsible for behaviour and actions.  
 
The second chapter focuses on an alternative definition of the 
pleasure principle in light of Freud‟s (1950) Project for a 
Scientific Psychology. This definition is more often overlooked, as 
Freud‟s argument presents difficulties. 
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Chapter 2 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The second chapter attempts to define the pleasure and reality 
principle in Freud‟s Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). This 
chapter focuses mostly on the working and structure of the 
unconscious and on how the contents of the unconscious can be made 
conscious. Chapter 1 defines pleasure in line with the developmental 
model of Freud as shaped through the Ideal-ego [Ideal-ich] whereas 
Chapter 2 defines pleasure in terms of a neurological model, as 
presented by Freud‟s (1950) Project for a Scientific Psychology. 
  
The first section centres on the structure of the unconscious as 
described in Freud‟s (1950) „Project‟. The definition of the 
pleasure principle that Freud provides in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle (1920) is: “an avoidance of unpleasure or a production of 
pleasure” (p. 3). Freud‟s (1950) Project for a Scientific Psychology 
provides important clues to conceptualize a framework to describe 
the pleasure principle in terms of Quantity (Q), facilitations 
[Bahnung] and contact-barriers. The pleasure principle is therefore 
explained in terms of neurons, which shape an economy of behaviour. 
The neuronal structure is then based on the discharge of Q through a 
network of facilitations governed or controlled by contact-barriers. 
Pleasure can be described as the efficacy of the distribution of Q, 
whereas unpleasure (synonymous with the reality principle) 
correlates with Q that exceeds the limits of the contact-barriers.  
 
The second section focuses on the reality principle, which isn‟t an 
alternative to the pleasure principle, but occurs when the pleasure 
principle cannot be sustained. The reality principle is best 
explained in terms of the neurological model. The third section 
focuses on the unconscious, and how the contents of the unconscious 
can become known. Freud and Lacan both emphasize how there are 
discrepancies between the unconscious sensation and the conscious 
correlate. The fourth section focuses on repression as the prelude 
to a language theory. The fourth section highlights Linguistics to 
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explain two important aspects: First, the discrepancies between the 
unconscious and the conscious correlate, and second, by introducing 
the Law of the letter. The fifth section introduces das Ding, which 
is the unnameable unconscious object of desire. Consequently, 
Linguistics explains why representing das Ding is problematic, as 
well as how das Ding is connected to the Law. The sixth section 
revisits the connection between Instincts, Love and Substitution in 
terms of the revised definition of the pleasure principle. 
 
Therefore, the implications of the pleasure principle relate greatly 
to 1) Freud‟s structure of the unconscious and the changes in the 
structure of the unconscious; 2) How we can know of the unconscious 
(through repression and Freud‟s theory of language); 3) Lacan‟s 
explanation of das Ding; and 4) the connection between das Ding and 
the Law.
15
 
 
2.2. Pleasure Principle  
 
The definition of the pleasure principle and the reality principle 
in Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle, to quote Freud 
(1920) at length, is: 
We believe, that is to say, that the course of those events is 
invariably set in motion by an unpleasurable tension, and that 
it takes a direction such that its final outcome coincides 
with a lowering of that tension, and that it takes a direction 
such that its final outcome coincides with a lowering of that 
tension – that is, with an avoidance of unpleasure or a 
production of pleasure. (p. 3) 
 
We have decided to relate pleasure and unpleasure to the 
quantity of excitation and pleasure that is present in the 
mind but is not in any way „bound‟; and to relate them in such 
a manner that unpleasure corresponds to an increase in the 
                         
15
 A variation of this chapter was presented at the Philosophy Spring 
Colloqiuim, Definining Freud‟s Pleasure and Reality Principle (P.L. van der 
Merwe, 2008b) 
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quantity of excitation and pleasure to a diminution. (p. 4, 
his emphasis) 
 
This can best be explained in reference to Freud‟s (1950) 
posthumously published work, Project for a Scientific Psychology 
(from here on in this chapter referred to as „Project‟).  The 
„Project‟ is notoriously difficult and problematic. The neurological 
assumptions in Freud‟s „Project‟ are either praised (Cilliers, 1989; 
Cilliers & Gouws, 2001) or dismissed (Carel, 2006). The major 
argument against the „Project‟ is that it was never published by 
Freud. However, the role and the importance of the „Project‟ are 
still defended, for example by Cilliers & Gouws (2001): 
We agree with Strachey [in Freud, 1950, p. 290] that “the 
Project … contains within itself the nucleus of a great part 
of Freud‟s later psychological theories” and that “the 
Project, or rather its invisible ghost, haunts the whole 
series of Freud‟s theoretical writings to the end” (p. 238n2). 
 
Freud‟s „Project‟ demonstrates how the lowering and diminution of 
tension results in pleasure, whereby the „Project‟ links Freud‟s 
(1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle to a neurological model, with 
tension referring to the overloading of the neural network. Freud‟s 
„Project‟ distinguishes between two functions of the nervous system, 
or as Freud calls them, principles.  
 
The first principle can be summarized as the discharge of Qñ 
[Quantity of the intercellular order of magnitude] preferred and 
retained. “A primitive neuronal system accordingly discharges any Qñ 
acquired via sensory neurons directly through motor neurons leading 
to muscular mechanisms” (Cilliers & Gouws, 2001, p. 239). “A primary 
nervous system makes use of this Qñ which it has thus acquired, by 
giving it off through a connecting path to a muscular mechanism, and 
in that way keeps itself free from stimulus” (Freud, 1950, p. 296). 
The isolated effect of the discharge of Qñ is done in accordance 
with a preferred path of discharge. Therefore, the first principle 
is the establishment of “preferred” neuronal paths through which the 
discharge occurs. The discharge then results in the transference to 
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muscular mechanisms, resulting in the physical manifestation of the 
neuronal discharge, i.e. behaviour. 
 
The second principle focuses on the potential of the neuron to store 
Qñ, as well as the ability to prevent the discharge. “A neuron may 
be cathected [besetzt] – filled with a greater or lesser Qñ - or it 
may be empty” (Cilliers & Gouws, 2001, p. 239; Freud, 1950, p. 298). 
The forces that prevent the discharge are also the same forces that 
allow for the accumulation of Qñ. 
The postulated secondary function requires the possibility of 
an accumulation of Qñ. To account for this, Freud assumes 
resistances that oppose discharge; he presumes that these are 
located in the contacts between neurons, which therefore 
function simultaneously as contacts and as barriers: contact-
barriers. (Cilliers & Gouws, 2001, p. 239; Freud, 1950, p. 
296-8) 
 
The emphasis is placed on the contact-barriers as intermediary that 
serves both principles. The first principle, also known as the 
principle of neuronal inertia, emphasizes “that neurons tend to 
divest themselves of Q [Quantity in general, or of the order of 
magnitude in the external world]” (Cilliers & Gouws, 2001, p. 238-
9). The second principle is focused on the possibility of divesting 
Qñ, as well as the prevention of divesting Qñ. This is made possible 
through the contact-barriers, also known as the point of contact 
between the neurons. On contact-barriers, Freud (1950) writes: 
The theory of contact-barriers, if it adopts this solution, 
can express it in the following terms. There are two classes 
of neurons: [1] those which allow Qñ to pass through as though 
they had no contact-barriers and which, accordingly, after 
each passage of excitation are in the same state as before, 
and (2) those whose contact-barriers make themselves felt, so 
that they only allow Qñ to pass through with difficulty or 
partially. The latter class may, after each excitation, be in 
a different state from before and they thus afford a 
possibility of representing memory. (p. 299, his emphasis) 
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The abovementioned quote is dealt with in three parts, 1) permeable 
neurons, 2) impermeable neurons, and 3) memory. The two different 
types of neurons are distinguished by the difference in the 
permeability of the neuron. According to Freud, there are the ф 
system, which consists of permeable neurons, and the ψ system, which 
consists of impermeable neurons. But this alone does not account for 
the alterations that occur within the arrangement of the neural 
paths. The quantity of the discharge establishes the connection 
between the neurons, wherefore the facilitation [Bahnung] is made 
possible. “Facilitations serve the primary function, because through 
them the nervous system can avoid being filled up with Qñ” (Cilliers 
& Gouws, 2001, p. 240; Freud, 1950, p. 301). 
 
The role of the „Project‟ is explanative of Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle (1920) regarding the description of the pleasure principle 
and the reality principle. To quote Freud (1950) at length: 
Pleasure would be the sensation of discharge […] Pleasure and 
unpleasure would be the sensations in ω of its own cathexis, 
of its own level; and here ω and ψ would, as it were, 
represent intercommunicating vessels. In this manner the 
quantitative process in ψ too would reach consciousness, once 
more as qualities. The aptitude for perceiving sensory 
qualities which lie, so to say, in the zone of indifference 
between pleasure and unpleasure disappears with the [presence 
of the] feeling of pleasure and unpleasure. This might be 
translated: the ω [system of perceptual neurons] show an 
optimum for receiving the period of neuronal motion at a 
particular [strength of] cathexis; when the cathexis is 
stronger they produce unpleasure, when it is weaker, pleasure 
– till, with a lack of cathexis, their capacity for reception 
vanishes. (p. 312)  
 
The emphasis of the abovementioned quote is that pleasure and 
unpleasure are both unconscious processes at work. Stimuli are 
therefore perceived in terms of the quantity of cathexis. Stimuli 
are only experienced consciously depending on the strength of the 
cathexis. In other words, only when the cathexis is significant – in 
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terms of the contact-barrier – are conscious experiences either 
pleasure or unpleasure (pain). Anything that occurs between is not 
significant enough and remains unconscious. Once again this falls 
into the economic style of behaviour on a neuronal level. The 
divestment of Q leads to a chain of neuronal activity which is made 
possible through the contact-barriers that selectively allow the 
passing or obstruction of Qñ. Whenever the quantity is significant 
is it made conscious. However, it is not the quantity that we are 
aware of consciously, but the quality. “Consciousness gives us what 
are called qualities – sensations which are different in a great 
multiplicity of ways and whose difference is distinguished according 
to its relations with the external world” (Freud, 1950, p. 308, his 
emphasis). What would the difference between quantity and quality 
then be? 
 
“During perception the Ф and the ψ systems are in operation 
together; but there is one psychical process which is no doubt 
performed exclusively in ψ – reproducing or remembering – and this 
speaking generally, is without quality” (Freud, 1950, p. 308, his 
emphasis). The impermeable neurons are therefore solely affected 
through quantity, considering that the facilitation is only affected 
once the Qñ exceeds the threshold of the contact-barriers, and 
subsequently, forces an adaptation in the structure of the neuronal 
pathways. 
 
Therefore, the difference between quantity and quality are 
significant in the neuronal system affected. Pleasure and unpleasure 
are significant in terms of quantity and quality. However, the 
difference lies in the effects: the ψ [impermeable] neurons are 
affected by quantity, and the Ф [permeable] and the ω [perceptual] 
neurons are affected by both quantity and quality. 
 
Of memory, Cilliers (1989) writes
16
: 
Memory does not lie in the facilitated pathways themselves, 
but in the relationship between them, and this relationship is 
                         
16
 In line with Freud‟s (1920) “The latter class may, after each 
excitation, be in a different state from before and they thus afford a 
possibility of representing memory” (p. 299, his emphasis) 
44 
 
one of differences. […] The forming of memory traces in the ψ 
neurons by quantity from the perceptual system, and from the 
endogenous stimuli, and the methods of the ψ used to discharge 
this quantity, are all unconscious. Neither the primary nor 
the secondary processes are under the control of the conscious 
ego. (p. 112) 
 
The significance for Derrida, Lacan, and Cilliers, is therefore not 
in the fixed possibility of the divestment of Q, or the 
establishment of the chain of neurons, which for practical and 
economical purposes are devised through the contact-barriers and the 
limits imposed by the contact-barriers. The significance lies with 
the changeability of the chain of neurons. “It is because breaching 
breaks open, that Freud, in the Project, accords a privilege to 
pain. In a certain sense, there is not breaching without a beginning 
of pain, and „pain leaves behind it particularly rich breaches‟” 
(Derrida, 2004, p. 254). It is for this reason that pain has such an 
important descriptive function, as “Pain is thus characterized as an 
irruption of excessively large Q into ф and ψ: that is, of Qs which 
are of a still higher order than the ф stimuli” (Freud, 1950, p. 
307). The link between the „Project‟ and Freud‟s Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle is reiterated when Freud (1920) writes: “The specific 
unpleasure of physical pain is probably the result of the protective 
shield having been broken through in a limited area” (p. 34). 
 
On our theory that Q produces facilitation, pain no doubt 
leaves permanent facilitations behind in ψ – as though there 
had been a stroke of lightning – facilitations which possibly 
do away with the resistance of the contact-barriers entirely 
and establish a pathway of conduction there such as there are 
in ф. (Freud, 1950, p. 307) 
 
The possibility of a fixed facilitation [Bahnung] is at stake, as 
cathexis cannot be done in a predictable, mechanical fashion that 
avoids any alterations in the facilitations. What is desired is the 
consistent flow of Q, void of any sudden influxes, which have a 
detrimental effect on the system. Pain, for example, is a sudden 
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influx of Q that the contact-barriers are incapable of containing or 
controlling.  
 
The pleasure and reality principle are therefore articulated in 
terms of Freud‟s „Project‟. The primary process is equated with the 
pleasure principle and the secondary process with the reality 
principle. The establishment of facilitation [Bahnung] equated with 
the pleasure principle, is synonymous with the principle of inertia. 
The secondary process can be equated with pain, like lightning; can 
override the limits imposed by the contact-barriers, thereby 
resulting in alterations in the neural networks. This is essentially 
the platform that Freud uses to describe the pleasure principle as 
the avoidance of disruption, and the maintenance of constancy. 
 
However strongly I rely on Cilliers‟ reading of Freud, there is one 
small error. Cilliers & Gouws (2001) writes: “The constancy 
principle – the tendency to keep Qñ as low as possible – therefore 
coincides with something like an unpleasure principle – the tendency 
to avoid unpleasure whenever possible” (p. 241). Cilliers and Gouws 
introduce the unpleasure principle, which is completely unnecessary 
as their description of the unpleasure principle is implied in the 
pleasure principle. If the pleasure principle and the unpleasure 
principle coincide with the volume of Q - pleasure correlated with 
the diminution of Q and unpleasure with an increase of Q – the 
opposite of the pleasure principle (or as Cilliers and Gouws write) 
is an unpleasure principle. The tendency to avoid unpleasure is the 
pleasure principle. Therefore, the opposite of the pleasure 
principle has to be a measure built around the second principle, as 
well as incorporating the notion of pain. The opposite of the 
pleasure principle is therefore a principle set on the disruption of 
the neural network, through excess Qñ. This principle is more 
commonly known as the reality principle.  
 
The next section focuses on the reality principle to illustrate and 
emphasize the difference between the pleasure principle and the 
reality principle. The difference is clear when the reality 
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principle is described in terms of Freud‟s neuronal model presented 
in the „Project‟. 
 
2.3. Reality Principle 
 
In the introduction of this thesis, preliminary definitions of the 
reality principle are examined. The descriptions emphasized and 
highlighted a selection, whereby the pleasure principle and the 
reality principle stand in opposition to each other. In other words, 
the conscious self would select a delay in the pleasure so as to 
maximize the effects of the pleasure. This definition of the reality 
principle is refuted, as the neuronal model illustrates how the 
reality principle is the delay in pleasure. The delay in pleasure is 
not a conscious selection, but occurs out of necessity. Freud‟s 
description of the reality principle is synonymous with the second 
principle, as described in Freud‟s „Project‟. The facilitations 
[Bahnung] are disrupted and consequently transformed. 
 
In Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the disturbance of 
the pleasure principle is “so that the final outcome cannot always 
be in harmony with the tendency towards pleasure” (p. 6). The 
effects of the reality principle are described by Freud (1920): 
The latter principle [the reality principle] does not abandon 
the intention of ultimately obtaining pleasure, but it 
nevertheless demands and carries into effect the postponement 
of satisfaction, the abandonment of a number of possibilities 
of gaining satisfaction and the temporary toleration of 
unpleasure as a step on the long indirect road to pleasure. 
(p. 7) 
 
Therefore, the reality principle is not a substitute that alters the 
goal of pleasure, but defers pleasure. It is important to note that 
the reality principle does not function as an alternative to the 
pleasure principle, but occurs out of necessity. Just as the 
contact-barriers cannot cope with the increase of Qñ, the first 
principle cannot be maintained in order to cope with the influx of 
Qñ, alterations need to be made.  
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The original facilitations [Bahnung] are already established in 
accordance with what Freud refers to as the sexual instincts. 
However, the original facilitations cannot be maintained, as the 
protective measures of the contact-barriers are not sufficient in 
controlling the Qñ. Freud argues that the over-writing of the neural 
network isn‟t always the outcome, but that there could never be a 
return to the previous condition.  
The pleasure principle long persists, however, as the method 
of working employed by the sexual instincts, which are so hard 
to „educate‟, and, starting from those instincts, or in the 
ego itself, it often succeeds in overcoming the reality 
principle, to the detriment of the organ as a whole. (Freud, 
1920, p. 7)   
 
Lacan‟s explanation of Freud‟s pleasure- and reality- principle in 
terms of the „Project‟ follows in a very similar vein to what has 
been argued. For Lacan, the starting point is also Freud‟s 
„Project‟. The trace of the neurological model cannot be avoided. 
For Lacan, both the pleasure- and reality- principle are co-
dependent. “The reality principle is the dialectical correlative of 
the pleasure principle. One is not simply, as one at first imagines, 
the application of the consequence of the other; each one is really 
the correlative of the other” (Lacan, 2008a, p. 91).  
 
Lacan takes the association further. The role of the reality 
principle, in terms of Freud‟s second principle, is equated to the 
disruptions in the facilitations [Bahnung]. This results in both the 
alterations of the facilitations, and consequently delays the 
pleasurable outcome [“Pleasure relating to a diminution” of Qñ 
(Freud, 1920, p. 4)].   
 
The role of the reality principle is therefore a source of 
adaptation and change, and the question therefore arises about the 
qualities that emerge when the facilitations [Bahnung] are disrupted 
when the Qñ exceed the limits of the contact-barriers. The 
alterations are significant. The role of changes in the 
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facilitations [Bahnung] is twofold. First, in the establishment of 
the properties that emerge. The changes allow for the creation of 
new elements within the system. Second, the threat of the reality 
principle changes the established order, or harmony, and acts as a 
deterrent, partly due to the unpredictable outcome, but mostly due 
to the unpleasant experience that occurs [“unpleasure corresponds to 
an increase in the quantity of excitation” (Freud, 1920, p. 4, his 
italics)].  
 
Lacan (2008a) writes: 
In order to [explain the normal functioning of the mind], 
[Freud] starts with an apparatus whose basis is wholly 
antithetical to a result involving adequation and equilibrium. 
He starts with a system which naturally tends toward deception 
and error [the pleasure principle]. The whole organism seems 
designed not to satisfy need, but to hallucinate such 
satisfaction. It is, therefore, appropriate that another 
apparatus [the reality principle] is opposed to it, an 
apparatus that operates as an agency of reality; it presents 
itself as a principle of correction, of a call to order. (p. 
32) 
 
The outcome of the reality principle and this has to be emphasized, 
is a traumatic experience, but isn‟t always described as negative. 
Moyaert (1995) describes the reality principle as a wake-up call. 
The outcome of this awakening “rukt het uit zijn verdoving en 
doorbreekt de „gevoelloosheid‟ van het lustprinciple dat in de ban 
is van zijn voorstellingen” [jerks one out of one‟s stupor and 
breaches the „numbness‟ of the pleasure principle under the spell of 
its representation] (p. 97). Therefore, even though the reality 
principle is a traumatic experience, it is necessary for the 
development of the subject. The subject is awoken through the 
reality principle. As Lacan states, a correction takes place through 
a call to order. However, it is stressed that the outcome of the 
intrusion of the reality principle into the pleasure principle is 
unpredictable, as there is no way of knowing what effects the 
reality principle have or will have. Moyaert (1995) links the 
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development of the ego to the pleasure principle, as well as 
illustrating the tyranny of the pleasure principle: “Het ik komt tot 
stand door zich te verdedigen tegen de destructieve kracht van het 
lustprinciple” [The I comes to be by defending against the 
destructive force of the pleasure principle] (p. 97). 
 
To describe the pleasure principle and the reality principle in 
terms of a mechanical metaphor (in terms of Ф, ψ, ω, and contact-
barriers) allows one to critique in terms of the biological model 
that is the „Project‟. “Immers, niet elke spanning wordt door het 
organisme (en door het ik) zomaar als onlustvol en niet elke 
ontspanning (ontlading) als lustvol ervaren” [For, not every tension 
is experienced by the organism (and through the I) as unpleasure and 
not every relaxation (discharge) as pleasure] (Moyaert, 1995, p. 
98). This critique appears justified, but as Moyaert argues, misses 
the point that Freud is trying to make. The critique is false for 
two reasons: First, whereby “lust beschrijft vanuit het standpunt 
van een ik dat minstens goed wil zijn voor zichzelf en rekening 
houdt met zichzelf” [desire described from the position of the self 
wanting to be good for oneself and being accountable for itself] (p. 
98). Second, with “lust laat samenvallen met wat het ik aangenaam 
vindt voor zichzelf” [attaching desire to that which the I finds 
pleasant for itself] (p. 98). The processes at work in what Freud 
calls the pleasure principle and the reality principle operate 
unconsciously. In other words, the processes involved with the 
pleasure principle and the reality principle cannot be described in 
terms of the satisfaction experienced by the conscious self. Moyaert 
(1995) emphasizes the separation between the subject and the 
conscious subject: 
Uiteraard ben ik het subject, maar toch is het subject dat 
geniet niet op mij betrokken. Het is geen reflexief subject. 
De gedrevenheid, de bezieling of de overgave waarmee iemand 
iets doet, laten de buitenstaander vermoeden dat er een 
subject is dat geniet, ofschoon men toch niet kan zeggen dat 
het subjet van het genot een „ik‟ is. [Naturally I am the 
subject, but yet, the subject that enjoys is not based on me. 
It is not a reflexive subject. The drive, the overwhelming 
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exuberance with which someone does something, leaves the 
witness suspecting that it is the subject that enjoys, 
although one cannot say that the subject that enjoys is „me‟.] 
(p. 98, his emphasis) 
  
It becomes clear that a distinction needs to be made between the two 
types of pleasure experienced, and that the unconscious and 
conscious desire is not the same. This is why Lacan distinguishes 
between jouissance and plaisir. Jouissance refers to unconscious 
pleasure and plaisir refers to conscious pleasure. Jouissance is 
bound by the unconscious structure that dictates pleasure, whereas 
plaisir remains contained within the limits of jouissance.  
 
To relate the pleasure derived (including both jouissance and 
plaisir) to the pleasure- and the reality- principle, one has to 
focus on the pleasure principle as the attainment and maintenance of 
pleasure, or jouissance. The reality principle defers and delays 
jouissance, and impedes the experience of pleasure. The condition of 
pleasure is therefore an innate perception. The experience of 
pleasure is possible in terms of conditions set by the pleasure 
principle. This is when the pleasure principle is described as a Law 
that allows for the experience of pleasure. It becomes clear that 
the pleasure principle acts as a tyrant, setting the terms and 
conditions. The only force that opposes the tyranny of the pleasure 
principle is the reality principle. This is why Lacan (2008a) calls 
the reality principle a “call to order” (p. 32). However, Freud 
(1920) writes in Beyond the Pleasure Principle: “Protection against 
stimuli is an almost more important function for the living organism 
than reception of stimuli” (p. 30), which is achieved through 
repression. 
 
On the role of repression within the larger corpus of 
Psychoanalysis, Freud (1915b) writes: 
Psycho-analytic observation of the transference neurosis, 
moreover, leads us to conclude that repression is not a 
defensive mechanism which is present from the very beginning, 
and that it cannot arise until a sharp cleavage has occurred 
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between conscious and unconscious mental activity – that the 
essence of repression lies simply in turning something away, 
and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious. (p. 147, his 
emphasis)  
 
Consequently, repression is introduced as a defence mechanism 
linking conscious and unconscious mental activity. The defence 
mechanism is structured around the painful experience introduced by 
the intrusion of the reality principle into the pleasure principle. 
 
2.4. Repression 
 
Repression introduces two important aspects, language (§ 2.5) and 
das Ding (§ 2.6). This section explains repression in terms of the 
pleasure principle as illustrated in Freud‟s (1950) „Project‟. The 
notion of repression illustrates the link between the conscious and 
the unconscious, and acts as a defence mechanism. 
 
The opening sentence of Freud‟s (1915b) Repression is: “One of the 
vicissitudes an instinctual impulse may undergo is to meet with 
resistances which seek to make it inoperative” (p. 146); and the 
opening sentence of The Unconscious (1915b): “We have learnt from 
psycho-analysis that the essence of the process of repression lies, 
not in putting an end to, in annihilating, the idea which represents 
an instinct, but in preventing it from becoming conscious” (p. 166). 
 
By connecting the notion of repression with the intrusion of the 
reality principle into the pleasure principle, emphasizes that the 
reality principle and the pleasure principle precede repression. 
Repression only takes place once the reality principle impedes the 
pleasure principle. Therefore, repression is between the conscious 
and unconscious, and is consequently located in what Freud called 
the pre-conscious. 
 
Repression, therefore, has a very specific function that lies 
between conscious and unconscious mental activity. “Repression in 
fact interferes only with the relation of the instinctual 
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representative to one psychical system, namely, to that of the 
conscious” (Freud, 1915b, p. 149, his emphasis). In other words, 
repression acts on the level of the pre-conscious to prevent the 
effects of the intrusion of the reality principle from reaching 
consciousness. “Repression was nothing else than the avoidance of 
unpleasure” (Freud, 1915b, p. 153). But at the same time Freud does 
acknowledge that a certain investment of energy is at work in 
preventing the source of unpleasure from becoming conscious. 
Repression has no effect on the unconscious structures, and 
consequently does not alter or correct the facilitations [Bahnung], 
but serves as a process. 
The process of repression is not to be regarded as an event 
which takes place once, the results of which are permanent, as 
when some living thing has been killed and from that time 
onwards is dead; repression demands a persistent expenditure 
of force, and if this were to cease the success of the 
repression would be jeopardized, so that a fresh act of 
repression would be necessary. (p. 151, his emphasis) 
 
The process of repression is therefore not free or void of 
consequences. The act of repression has its own consequences, not 
only in terms of the continual process of the repressed being kept 
repressed, but also in terms of an attempt to make what is repressed 
known. The return of the repressed (Freud, 1915b, p. 154) not only 
occurs with the failure of repression, but also has to do with the 
impossibility of the repressed remaining rooted within the pre-
conscious, or even, the unconscious. The contents of the repressed 
trickle through and it is only then that we can begin to know what 
is repressed. If the process of repression acts as a filter, 
preventing unconscious unpleasure from becoming conscious, 
repression can therefore be equated with the role of contact-
barriers. The difference between contact-barriers and repression is 
that, if the contact-barrier is confronted with Quantity that 
exceeds the limits of the contact-barrier, that contact-barrier is 
overrun and destroyed. Repression, however, is not an either/or 
process that either fully represses or fully fails to repress. “Let 
us make it clear that it is not even correct to suppose that 
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repression withholds from the conscious all the derivatives of what 
was primally repressed” (p. 149, his emphasis). 
 
These small fragments are the only clues to what is repressed, to 
what is in the unconscious, and to what extent we are affected by 
the unconscious. Freud focuses on the fragments that seep through 
into consciousness. To quote at length how Freud (1915b) proposes to 
examine the contents of the repressed, as well as the effects of the 
repressed becoming conscious: 
In carrying out the technique of psycho-analysis, we 
continually require the patient to produce such derivatives of 
the repressed as, in consequence either of their remoteness or 
of their distortions, can pass the censorship of the 
conscious. Indeed, the associations which we require him to 
give without being influenced by any conscious purposive idea 
and without any criticism, and from which we reconstitute a 
conscious translation of the repressed representative – these 
associations are nothing else than remote and distorted 
derivatives of this kind. During this process we observe that 
the patient can go on spinning a thread of such associations, 
till he is brought up against some thought, the relation of 
which to what is repressed becomes so obvious that he is 
compelled to repeat his attempt at repression. Neurotic 
symptoms, too, must have fulfilled this same condition, for 
they are derivatives of the repressed, which has, by their 
means, finally won the access to consciousness which was 
previously denied to it. (p. 149-150) 
 
The significance of Freud‟s text on Repression (1915b) is twofold: 
first, the introduction of a language theory (§ 2.5), which is 
criticized, yet at the same time amended by Lacan; and second, 
through the introduction of das Ding (§ 2.6). Therefore, when Freud 
speaks of the return of the repressed, Freud is referring to the 
return of the repressed das Ding [the Thing], which always returns 
in the form of language. 
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2.5. Language theory 
 
The development of language and Psychoanalysis is explored in three 
parts. Each part focuses on a linguistic aspect, the first as 
proposed by Freud, second by Ferdinand de Saussure and the third 
figure is Lacan‟s. The importance of language is the primary gauge 
for examining the fragments of the repressed as they surface to the 
conscious. Language therefore accounts for the difference between 
the unconscious sensation and the conscious correlate. 
 
The first figure is Freud, who introduces two technical terms in 
Repression (1915b), namely Wortvorstellungen and Sachvorstellungen 
to emphasize the structural difference between the pre-conscious and 
the conscious. The pre-conscious is necessary as a bridge between 
the unconscious and the conscious, whereby the „cleavage‟ between 
the two is tapered. The conscious inaccessibility into the 
unconscious is thereby mediated through the pre-conscious. However, 
for Freud, there is a difference between the pre-conscious and the 
conscious in the potential of the pre-conscious to become conscious, 
considering that the pre-conscious is not necessarily the same as 
that which ends up in the conscious.  
 
The rift between the pre-conscious and the conscious necessitates 
the difference in the presentation and description of the contents 
in the pre-conscious and the conscious. In other words, the pre-
conscious has its own language that is different from the conscious 
language. The role of language does not have the same purpose or 
function on the three levels of the unconscious, the pre-conscious, 
and the conscious. The difference between the three is best 
illustrated when Freud (1915c) writes in The Unconscious: 
In the first phase, the psychical act is unconscious and 
belongs to the system Ucs. [Unconscious]; if, on testing, it 
is rejected by the censorship, it is not allowed to pass into 
the second phase; it is said to be „repressed‟ and must remain 
unconscious. If, however, it passes this testing, it enters 
the second phase and henceforth belongs to the second system, 
which we call the system Cs [Conscious]. But the fact that it 
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belongs to that system does not yet unequivocally determine 
its relation to consciousness. It is not yet conscious, but it 
is certainly capable of becoming conscious – that is, it can 
now, given certain conditions, become an object of 
consciousness without any special resistance. (p. 173, his 
emphasis) 
 
The role of language then within the conscious/unconscious 
separation is significant, as language is the only means to describe 
the contents of both the conscious and unconscious. It is here where 
Psychoanalysis and Linguistics meet:  
“Het onbewuste is het object van de psychoanalyse; de 
linguïstiek daarentegen heeft als object de voorbewuste 
wetmatigheden van de taal, d.w.z. die wetmatigheden waarvan 
het competente taalsubject impliciet weet heft. Dit heft tot 
gevolg dat de termen van de linguïstiek bij Lacan een andere 
extensie krijgen” [The unconscious is the object of psycho-
analysis; linguistics, in contrast, only has the pre-conscious 
as authority of language, i.e. the authority of which the 
competent subject-of-language implicitly knows. This results 
in Lacan adding a different extension to linguistic 
terminology] (Moyaert, 1981, p. 36). 
 
Lacan argues that Freud would have devised a similar language system 
if Freud had access to a linguistic theory such as Saussure‟s 
(Lacan, 1966/2006, p. 503; Lacan 2008a, p. 53). Saussure 
distinguishes between the signifier and the signified, whereas Freud 
distinguishes between the Wortvorstellungen [word-representation] 
and the Sachvorstellungen [thing-representation]. Moyaert (1981) 
elaborates on Freud‟s distinction between the word-presentation and 
the thing-presentation: “De Wortvorstellungen behoren tot het 
voorbewuste taalsysteem waarvan het competente taalsubject impliciet 
weet heft. De Sachvorstellungen behoren tot het onbewuste” [The 
word-representation belongs to the pre-conscious language system of 
which the competent language-subject implicitly knows. The thing-
representation belongs to the unconscious] (p. 37, his italics). 
Freud necessitates the difference between the Wortvorstellungen and 
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the Sachvorstellungen, whereby it is impossible to verbalize the 
unconscious. The implementation of the difference between the 
Wortvorstellungen and Sachvorstellungen maintains the 
inaccessibility of the unconscious in terms of verbalizing and 
modelling. Moyaert (1981) describes the transformation of the 
unconscious to consciousness in two stages: 
De bewustwording verloopt bij Freud, schematisch gezien, in 
twee stadia: eerst worden de onbewuste dingvorstellingen 
geactiveerd en geïnvesteerd („besetzen‟) en daarna worden die 
geïnvesteerde dingvoorstellingen nog eens geïnvesteerd 
(„überbesetzen‟) door woordvoorstelingen. […] De 
woordvoorstellingen komen slechts in contact met de 
ongrijpbare onbewuste inhouden („unbewusste Gedanken‟) nadat 
deze in dingvoorstellingen geïnvesteerd zijn. Het mechanisme 
van de verschuiving en de verdichting blijven gebonden aan een 
andere soort voorstellingen: de dingvoorstellingen. [The 
conscious-awakening proceeds in Freud, seen schematically, in 
two stages: first the unconscious thing-presentation is 
activated and invested („besetzen‟) and thereafter the 
invested thing-presentation is once more invested 
(„ϋberbesetzen‟) through word-presentation. […] The word-
presentation only comes in contact with the incomprehensible 
unconscious content after these thing-presentations are 
invested. This mechanism of transference and repression remain 
bound to one other representation: the thing-presentation] (p. 
39-40) 
 
Freud presented a very basic distinction between the word- and the 
thing-presentation that he was never fully able to develop. Lacan 
was able to amend Freud‟s linguistic approach, but achieved this 
through Saussurean Linguistics. 
 
The second relevant figure is the linguist Saussure (1974) who 
distinguished between the signifier and the signified. Saussure‟s 
approach is summarized by Cilliers & Gouws (2001) as follows: “In 
Saussure‟s conception, language is differentiated both at the level 
of the signifier (speech sounds or written words) and at the level 
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of the signified (meaning)” (p. 244, his italics). Meaning is 
generated through the dialectical interaction between the signifier 
and the signified. Cilliers and Gouws (2001, p. 244) present two 
examples to illustrate how the signifier and the signified are 
complementary in the production of meaning: 
a a a a a a a 
 
Each letter is an „a‟, but each letter is at the same time 
different. Yet we can agree that each letter is the letter a. A is 
signified, however, each time the signifier is different. This can 
be taken further, when the letter „a‟ is contrasted to the letter 
„g‟ (ibid): 
 g g g g g g g 
 
There is a dialectical interaction, for Saussure, between the 
signified and the signifier. The difference therefore between 
Saussure and Freud, is that Freud‟s Sachvorstellung becomes the 
Wortvorstellung, and that there isn‟t necessarily a direct or 
accurate correlation between the two; whereas for Saussure the 
dialectical connection between the signifier [Wortvorstellung] and 
the signified [Sachvorstellung] are connected. For Saussure (1960) 
meaning is made possible through the interaction between the two: 
“Language is a system of inter-dependent terms in which the value of 
each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the 
others” (p. 114; quoted in Malan, 1993, p. 29). Saussure uses the 
example of chess (1960, p. 88&110, quoted in Malan, 1993, p. 30-1). 
A chessboard is a closed system, with its own rules. However, the 
number of variations and possibilities open to any game of chess is 
what makes the game of chess possible. Chess is possible with 
different chess sets of different sizes and design, but this is only 
possible as long as you can differentiate between a rook and a 
knight, for example. For Saussure, the same is applicable to the 
difference between Langue [language] and Parole [spoken language]. 
Langue is the language system, but more specifically, the potential 
and possibility of language. Parole is the manifestation of this 
possibility. Lacan develops Freud‟s approach to Linguistics through 
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Saussure. Consequently, Saussure is the linguistic link between 
Freud and Lacan. 
 
The third language figure
17
 is Lacan, whose linguistic approach is 
based on the Saussurian model. Lacan‟s approach is summarized as
: “signifier over signified, „over‟ corresponding to the bar 
separating the levels” (Lacan, 1966/2006, p. 498). Saussure 
designates equal value to the signifier and the signified, whereas 
Lacan emphasizes the primacy of the signifier. The primacy of the 
signifier is implicated when Lacan designates the uppercase „S‟ to 
the signifier and the lowercase „s‟ to the signified. This is also 
implied when the big „S‟ is placed „over‟ the small s. Lacan 
(1966/2006) illustrates the difference between the signifier and the 
signified in the famous Lacanian example of the two toilet doors 
(Lacan, 1966/2006, p. 499; Moyaert, 1995, p. 34): 
 
Fig 2: The example of the two toilet doors (Lacan, 1966/2006, 
p. 499) 
 
The example of the two toilet doors show how two doors, exactly the 
same, lead to rooms that serve the exact same purpose. Aside from 
the plaque on the wall, there would be no way to discern between the 
male stall and the female stall. The example of the two toilet doors 
are significant in two ways, first, as an example of the signifier 
and signified, and secondly, as an example of the Law of the symbol. 
The two doors are differentiated, not in terms of what is signified 
by the doors, but through the different names on the plaque at the 
door. For Saussure, through a dialectical process of interaction 
between the signifier and the signified - in this example, between 
the toilet door and the plaque on the door - is meaning created, 
which is the example of the two toilet doors as either for gentlemen 
                         
17
 Emphasized when Lacan (2008b) writes: “My teaching is in fact quite 
simply language, and absolutely nothing else” (p. 26) 
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or ladies. The Law of the letter as illustrated in the example of 
the two toilet doors, is demonstrated by the command of the plaque: 
“Een man die al dan niet door onoplettendheid of onder een te hevige 
druk van zijn behoeften het damestoilet binnenstapt, zal 
onvermijdelik terecht worden gewezen, uitgelachen of voor een voyeur 
worden aangezien” [A man who, through inattention or tremendous 
pressure of his needs, enters the ladies toilet stall will 
unavoidably be reprimanded, laughed at, or seen as a voyeur] 
(Moyaert, 1995, p. 34).  
 
The differences between the Saussurian model and Lacan‟s description 
of the signifier and the signified, is summarized by Moyaert (1981): 
Bij de Saussure worden betekenaar en betekende door een ellips 
samengehouden; de twee polen zijn onafscheidelijk met elkaar 
verbonden als de voor- en keerzijde van een blad papier. De 
ene is er niet zonder de andere. Hun wederzijdse implicatie 
binnen het taalteken wordt nog benadrukt door twee pijlen. Bij 
Lacan zijn zowel de ellips als de dubbele pijl verdwenen [Fig 
3]. [In Saussure the signifer and the signified are connected 
through an ellipsis; the two poles are as inseparable from 
each as the front and the back of a piece of paper. The one 
does not exist without the other. The reciprocal implication 
within the language sign is emphasized through the two arrows. 
In Lacan, the ellipsis as well as the arrows disappears] (p. 
42) 
 
Fig 3: The Saussurian model of the signifier and the signified 
(Moyaert, 1981, p. 42) 
 
Moyaert (1981) highlights the crux of the critique against Saussure: 
“De betekenaar wordt gekenmerkt door de radicale afwezigheid van een 
eigenlijke betekenis. De fundamentele onbepaaldheid van het 
betekende is het gevolg van het feit dat er geen eigenlijke (en dus 
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ook geen oneigenlijke) betekenis bestaat” [The signifier is 
distinguished by the radical absence of any actual meaning. The 
fundamental indefiniteness of the signified is the result of the 
fact that there isn‟t any tangible (and therefore also no 
intangible) meaning] (p. 47).
18
 Lacan‟s approach to Linguistics 
maintains the connection between the signifier and the signified, 
but meaning is not generated by the dialectic connection between the 
two. Lacan‟s approach to Linguistics validates the Mirror stage. The 
méconnaisance [misrecognition] of the signifier for the signified is 
equally visible in the méconnaisance between the subject and the 
reflection in the mirror.  
 
Lacan‟s return to Freud is at the same time a return to Freud‟s 
Linguistics. Lacan‟s return reintroduces the progression from 
Sachvorstellung to Wortvorstellung. For the Sachvorstellung to 
become Wortvorstellung, Lacan then argues that the Sachvorstellung 
needs to find a Wortvorstellung that is applicable. The problem that 
arises is the multitude of options available to the Sachvorstellung. 
Just as with the example of the two toilet doors, so too does the 
signified (Sachvorstellung) disappear. The original signified 
(Sachvorstellung) is destroyed in the process, and is therefore 
replaced by the signifier (Wortvorstellung).
19
 This is how one enters 
the realm of language, through a process of attribution and 
acquisition. Unconscious notions that surface are connected with 
words to describe the unconscious notions. However, language 
presents rules of its own, and the rules of language therefore 
dominate the rules of the representations of the sensations as they 
become conscious. The attribution of language to the sensations as 
they are experienced proves problematic, as the rules of the 
                         
18
 Derrida (2004) writes: “Thus it has always been thought that the center, 
which is by definition unique, constituted that very thing within a 
structure which while governing the structure, escapes structurality. This 
is why classical thought concerning structure could say that the center is, 
paradoxically, within the structure and outside it. The center is at the 
center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not belong to the 
totality (is not part of the totality), the totality has its center 
elsewhere. The center is not the center” (p. 352, his italics)   
19
 Derrida (2004) writes, emphasizing the unpredictable outcome of Sache 
becoming Wort: “The movement of signification adds something, which results 
in the fact that there is always more, but this addition is a floating one 
because it comes to perform a vicarious function, to supplement a lack on 
the part of the signified” (p. 365-6).  
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language become the rules of the Sachvorstellung when they become 
Wort (word).  
 
Any attempt at the unconscious can only be achieved through 
language, but even this proves problematic. This leads Lacan (2008a) 
to conclude that the unconscious is structured like a language: 
We only grasp the unconscious finally when it is explicated in 
that part of it which is articulated by passing into words. It 
is for this reason that we have the right – all the more so as 
the development of Freud‟s discovery will demonstrate – to 
recognize that the unconscious itself has in the end no other 
structure than the structure of language. (p. 38) 
 
Lacan‟s approach can therefore be summarized as providing the 
necessary linguistic model to Freud‟s rudimentary linguistic design 
by incorporating the Saussurian model. Lacan (1966/2006) continually 
reiterates the dominance of the signifier, “Man thus speaks, but it 
is because the symbol has made him man” (p. 277).  
 
The next section will clarify the notion of the Law, and how the Law 
features in Psychoanalysis. The Law is relevant to both the Law of 
language and the Law of the pleasure principle. The one explains an 
external Law and the other an internal Law. Consequently, the next 
section will demonstrate through the Law, how an object of desire 
[the Thing] is created and maintained. 
 
2.6 The Thing and the Law 
 
In this section, the pleasure principle is reintroduced to describe 
Desire and the Law. The focus is on an alternative explanation of 
pleasure as derived in Freud‟s (1950) „Project‟, whereby the 
pleasure principle is based on a constancy principle. Therefore, 
this section aims to ratify the notion that the pleasure principle 
aims for a constant object of desire [the Thing], which is created 
and maintained through the Law.  
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The first problem faced when discussing the Thing, or das Ding, or 
la Chose, is to define the Thing
20
 other than as the anonymous 
object-cause of desire. The connection then between the Thing and 
Linguistics is that the Thing can only be expressed in language. 
“The Thing only presents itself to the extent that it becomes word” 
(Lacan, 2008a, p. 66). However, as Moyaert (1995) demonstrates, 
qualities can only be ascribed if the signifier is empty. “Het 
verlangen is gebonden aan een Object zonder kwaliteiten. De 
objectpool noem Lacan het Ding, la Chose” [Desire is attached to an 
object without qualities. Lacan names the object-pole the Thing] (p. 
107, his italics).  
 
The definition of the Thing is accounted for in the linguistic turn 
in Psychoanalysis. Freud differentiated between Sache and Wort, 
which separated the unconscious notion and the notion once surfaced. 
In Saussurian terminology the unconscious notion becomes known as 
the signified, and the conscious correlate the signifier 
(conscious). However, Saussure connects the signified and the 
signifier, as the two combined generate meaning. For Freud and 
Lacan, the Sache (signified) and the Wort (signifier) remain 
separated, on different levels. “Sache and Wort are, therefore, 
closely linked: they form a couple. Das Ding is found somewhere 
else” (Lacan, 2008a, p. 54).  
 
The definition of the Thing comprises three parts. The Thing is 
consequently defined in terms of the unconscious, substitution and 
the Law. 
 
The first aspect of defining the Thing is to distinguish the Thing 
from representation. This would isolate the Thing from 
representation, and locates the Thing outside the field of 
representation. The Thing is always present, hovering beneath the 
surface in the unconscious.  
 
                         
20
 Derrida (1994) writes on the Thing: “The Thing is still invisible, it is 
nothing visible at the moment one speaks of it and in order to ask oneself 
if it has reappeared. It is still nothing that can be seen when one speaks 
of it” (p. 5, his emphasis) 
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Lacan (2008a) consequently defines the Thing in terms of stability 
and continuation.  
Das Ding [the Thing] seeks whatever is repeated, whatever 
returns and guarantees that it will always return, to the same 
place – and it has driven us to the extreme position in which 
we find ourselves, a position where we can cast doubt on all 
places, and where nothing in that reality which we have 
learned to disrupt so admirably responds to that call for the 
security of a return. (p. 92) 
 
The second aspect of defining the Thing incorporates substitution. 
Freud and Lacan emphasize that substitution is always the 
substitution of the same. This means that different words and 
different descriptions are applicable, but the Thing essentially 
remains at the core of the untranslatable unconscious. Consequently, 
one substitution isn‟t radically different from the next as the 
common factor can be deemed as the Thing.
21
 
 
Lacan (2008a) summarizes the second aspect of defining the Thing by 
linking the object of desire to the unconscious through 
substitution: 
The object is by nature a refound object. That it was lost is 
a consequence of that – but after the fact. It is thus refound 
without our knowing, except through the refinding, that it was 
ever lost. We come once again upon a fundamental structure, 
which allows us to articulate the fact that the Thing in 
question is, by virtue of its structure, open to being 
represented by what I called earlier, in connection with 
boredom and with prayer, the Other thing. And that is the 
second characteristic of the Thing as veiled; it is by nature, 
in the refinding of the object, represented by something else. 
(p. 146) 
Lacan emphasizes the arbitrary nature of the signifier, as any word 
would have sufficed to illustrate das Ding. This means that it is 
                         
21
 The Thing can also be described in terms of phantasy (discussed in 
Chapter 4, which is formulated as ($◊a) as the barred subject‟s orientation 
to the object or object-cause of desire, or how the subject situates the 
self in terms of the object or object-cause of desire. 
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impossible to lose the object of desire, as it is never „found‟. All 
that is held onto is an approximation of what seems to be the 
„refound object of desire‟. Without any access to the unconscious, 
the unconscious object of desire is always „veiled‟ and therefore 
open to possibilities of representation.  
 
The third aspect of defining the Thing is to explain the Thing in 
terms of the Law [la Loi]. Lacan (2008a) explains how the source of 
the Thing is connected with symbolic identification that takes place 
in the early developmental stages: 
Let me add das Ding insofar as it is the very correlative of 
the law of speech in its most primitive point of origin, and 
in the sense that this Ding was there from the beginning, that 
it was the first thing that separated itself from everything 
the subject began to name and articulate, that the 
covetousness that is in question is not addressed to anything 
that I might desire but to a thing that is my neighbour‟s 
Thing. (p. 102)
22
 
 
The question still remains as to how the Thing is identified. The 
solution, put more succinctly by Lacan (2008a), is that “I can only 
know of the Thing by means of the Law” (p. 102). In other words, the 
Thing can only be known through prohibition. Since the Thing remains 
protected from representation, but feigned through Wortvorstellung. 
The Thing can therefore only be known once the Thing is in conflict 
with the Law; in other words, when you are forbidden to indulge in 
the Thing. For example the indulgence of chocolate: you can only 
really know that you enjoy the indulgence of chocolate once you are 
forbidden to have chocolate, or when you don‟t have chocolate to 
indulge in. The Thing, or in this case, the indulgence of chocolate, 
is always there and was always there. However, the Thing only comes 
to be known as the indulgence of chocolate, once chocolate becomes 
prohibited and the absence of chocolate reveals chocolate as a 
representation of the object of desire. While chocolate is a very 
basic example, it does illustrate how prohibition reveals desire. 
                         
22
 The latter part of this quote is dealt with in Chapter 3 with the 
explanation of Lacan‟s L-schema. This relates greatly to Lacan‟s 
explanation of Man‟s desire is desire for the Other. 
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The Law can therefore be described in two ways: First through 
connecting the Law with the pleasure principle, and second by 
describing the Law as established through societal conventions and 
norms. This explains how desire that is illegal, unlawful or in 
conflict with the Law reveals the object of desire. 
 
The first explanation of the Law in terms of the pleasure principle 
is to explain the Law in terms of maintaining a constant and stable 
condition, i.e. the equal distribution of Qñ, which is at the same 
time the avoidance of any excess Q. The Law in terms of the pleasure 
principle can be described in light of an economical functioning 
that aims to avoid any upheaval or deferral. The Law is therefore 
the maintenance of homeostasis. 
 
The link between the Law and the object of desire to the pleasure 
principle is achieved through Linguistics. Lacan‟s description of 
the pleasure principle recalls the definition of the Thing in terms 
of the unconscious, substitution and the Law. To quote Lacan (2008a) 
at length: 
For according to the laws of the pleasure principle, the 
signifier projects into this beyond equalization, homeostasis, 
and the tendency to the uniform investment of the system of 
the self as such; it provokes its failure. The function of the 
pleasure principle is, in effect, to lead the subject from 
signifier to signifier, by generating as many signifiers as 
are required to maintain at as low a level as possible the 
tension that regulates the whole functioning of the psychic 
apparatus. (p. 147) 
 
This relationship [between the pleasure principle and the play 
of the signifier] is founded on the fact that the pleasure 
principle basically involves the sphere of investment, 
besetzung, and its bahnungen. It is facilitated by the 
Vorstellungen and even more by what Freud calls the 
Vorstellungsrepräsentanzen – a term that appears very early, 
before the article on the Unconscious (1915c). Each time a 
state of need arises, the pleasure principle tends to provoke 
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a reinvestment in its content – in inverted commas, that is, 
since at this metapsychological level clinical practice is not 
involved – a hallucinated reinvestment of what had previously 
been satisfying hallucinations. The diffuse energy of the 
pleasure principle tends towards this reinvestment of 
representation. The intervention of the reality principle can 
only therefore be a radical one; it is never a second stage. 
(p. 169-70) 
 
The connection between the Law and language is once again affirmed 
in the abovementioned quote. The role of Freud‟s (1950) „Project‟ 
cannot be undervalued due to the far reaching implications of 
language as the expression and presentation of desire. 
 
The second explanation of the Law in terms of societal conventions 
and norms, however, shows a more practical explanation of how the 
Law and the Thing are connected. For Lacan (2008a), it is still a 
matter of how the Law is sublimated, in other words, internalized 
and made part of the internal processes through the formation of the 
facilitations [Bahnung]. This is illustrated when he writes: 
Is the Law the Thing? Certainly not. Yet I can only know of 
the Thing by means of the Law. In effect, I would not have had 
the idea to covet it if the Law hadn‟t said: „Thou shalt not 
covet‟. But the Thing finds a way by producing in me all kinds 
of covetousness thanks to the commandment, for without the Law 
the Thing is dead. (p. 102) 
The Law therefore reveals the Thing, but the tension between the 
Thing and the Law maintains the desire for the Thing. Therefore, the 
Law not only serves to identify desire, but also to solicit desire. 
Lacan (1966/2006) opposes the classical notion that the absence of 
Law would result in a permissive society, where everything would be 
allowed: 
To the concupiscence gleaming in old man Karamazov‟s eyes when 
he questioned his son – “God is dead, thus all is permitted” – 
modern man, the very one who dreams of the nihilistic suicide 
of Dostoevsky‟s hero or forces himself to blow up Nietzsche‟s 
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inflatable superman, replies with all his ills and all his 
deeds: “God is dead, nothing is permitted anymore”. (p. 130) 
The result of the absence of God would lead to everything being 
prohibited. It would be commonly assumed that the absence of God 
would result in everything being permitted, but as a result, nothing 
is allowed. Desire is therefore not only revealed, but solicited 
through the Law. The Law therefore functions as the source of desire 
as the Law acts as the injunction to enjoy.  
 
Slavoj Žižek (2002) clarifies how the absence of the Law would 
universalize prohibition in Lacan‟s explanation using Dostoevsky‟s 
quote regarding the absence of God embedding prohibition: 
How do we account for this paradox that the absence of Law 
universalizes Prohibition? There is only one possible 
explanation: enjoyment itself, which we experience as 
„transgression‟, is in its innermost status something imposed, 
ordered – when we enjoy, we never do it „spontaneously‟, we 
always follow a certain injunction. (p. 9, his emphasis) 
 
Psychoanalysis understands the Law differently and applies a more 
classical description. Rudolf Bernet (1992) describes the relation 
between Kant and Lacan. His starting point is the similarities 
between Freud and Kant‟s description of the Law: “Wat hier verder 
ook van zij, Kant en Freud zijn het minstens hierover eens: voor de 
mens, dat ongelukkige en verdeelde subject, is geen heil te 
verwachten buiten de wet!” [What is also applicable here is that 
Kant and Freud at least agreed on this: for people, the unhappy and 
divided subject, there is no protection to be expected outside the 
Law!] (p. 33). Therefore, Freud and Kant both highlight the 
protection that the Law provides and both demonstrate how the Law is 
a safe haven. 
 
Lacan‟s description of the Law includes the effects of language. 
Lacan adds to the description of the Law by introducing Linguistics 
to Psychoanalysis. With this in mind, Bernet illustrates the 
significant difference between Kant and Lacan: 
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De wet van de begeerte bij Lacan daarentegen is de wet van de 
taal. Deze wet kan men rationeel noemen voorzover zij 
universeel is, maar zij is tegelijkertijd „arbitrair‟, d.w.z. 
zonder enig fundament buiten de taal. De arbitrariteit van de 
wet van de begeerte is niet hetzelfde als wat Kant op het oog 
heft wanneer hij de morele wet een „factum van de rede‟ noemt. 
[The law of desire, according to Lacan, is the law of 
language. This law can be rationally explained insofar as it 
is universal, but it is at the same time „arbitrary‟, i.e. 
without any foundation outside of language. The arbitrariness 
of the law of desire is not the same as that which Kant has in 
mind when he speaks of the moral law as a „factum of reason‟] 
(p. 44) 
The main difference between Kant and Lacan‟s view of the Law can be 
summarized by viewing the relation between the subject and the Law; 
Bernet summarizes the difference based on access to the Law, “in 
ieder geval wil Lacan hiermee aantonen, dat de wet van de begeerte 
van dergelijke aard, is dat het subject begeert volgens deze wet en 
niet deze wet zelf begeert” [in any case Lacan wants to indicate 
with this that the Law of desire is of a similar nature, that the 
subject desires according to this Law and does not desire this Law 
itself] (p. 46). In Kant‟s explanation, the Law is desirable, as it 
is the Law that is a safe haven
23
. For Lacan
24
, it is not the Law 
that is desirable, but it is in accordance with the Law that desire 
occurs. In other words, according to Kant one can know what the Law 
is as the Law is universal
25
, whereas for Lacan the Law functions and 
features without one‟s accord. For Kant the Law provides a solution, 
whereas for Lacan, the ethical is always blurred or veiled by the 
unconscious. 
                         
23
 “The absolutely good (the object of moral feeling), as subject‟s powers 
to be determined by the conception of a law that obligates absolutely” 
(Kant, 1987, p. 267, his emphasis) 
24
 Lacan (2008a) writes : “The desire of the man of good will is to do 
good, to do the right thing, and he who comes to seek you out, does so in 
order to feel good, to be in agreement with himself, to identify with or be 
in conformity with some norm […] In the irreducible margin as well as at 
the limit of his own good, the subject reveals himself to the never 
entirely resolved mystery of the nature of his desire” (p. 292) 
25
 “for if laws are not originally given by reason, and compliance with 
them brought about by it as a pure practical power, they cannot be moral” 
(Kant, 1987, p.485). Freud argues the opposite, that there are no intrinsic 
laws (Van Haute, 2006) 
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The Oedipus complex is an illustration of the unknowing 
transgression of the Law, to quote Bernet (1992): “Lacan herinnert 
in dit verband ook aan het tragische lot van Oedipus, die – zonder 
dit te weten – in zijn begeerte de wet van de begeerte overtreden 
had” [Lacan reminds in this context also of the tragic fate of 
Oedipus, who - without knowing it – in his desire breaks the Law of 
desire] (p. 48). Moyaert (2006) uses an example to illustrate the 
problem of Kant‟s ethics: For example, if you had a friend in 
hospital, do you visit your friend because he is a dear friend, and 
because you want to see him, or is it as Kant argues, it is your 
duty that you go to see him.
26
  
 
This section demonstrates how the pleasure principle features in 
establishing an internal Law. Linguistics introduces the description 
of the Thing in terms of the unconscious, substitution, and the Law. 
The next section provides a rewording of § 1.6, whereby instincts, 
love, and substitution are described in terms of the pleasure 
principle. 
 
2.7. Instincts, Love and Substitution revisited 
 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 provide two different approaches. Chapter 1 
illustrates Freud‟s developmental model as well as the incorporation 
of Lacan‟s Mirror stage. § 1.6 provides a description of instincts, 
love, and substitution in light of the developmental model. § 2.7 
illustrate instincts, love, and substitution in light of Freud‟s 
(1950) „Project‟ and the pleasure principle.  
 
This section aims to introduce the words signifier and both the 
pleasure- and reality-principle to the description of the process of 
substitution. What is substituted is not one object for another 
object, but one signifier for another signifier. It never was about 
the object or the properties of the object as illustrated through 
das Ding, but for Lacan, it is purely about the signifier. The 
                         
26
 Moyaert (2006) presented in 14 March 2006 
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introduction of a language theory is the separation between the 
signifier and the signified, between the word and the object. For 
Lacan, the word has greater significance than the object. This is 
seen in Fig 2 (p. 63) in the example of the two toilet doors, where 
two doors of exactly the same proportions, shape, size, colour, etc, 
are differentiated by the words Gentlemen and Ladies. The words 
create a rule regarding who may or may not enter. It is only through 
the rule of the word that the meaning of the toilet door is carried. 
The same is applicable to the object of desire, which, according to 
Lacan, has more to do with the word (representing the object of the 
desire) than the actual object of desire. This is another 
explanation of the primacy of the signifier over the signified, in 
this case the primacy of the word (representing the object of 
desire) over the object of desire, as we only have the word 
available in analysis. 
 
In terms of the pleasure principle and the reality principle, the 
object of desire can only be known in terms of the primacy of the 
signifier, and is only realized in two ways. To recap: firstly, 
through the modality of loss, and secondly, through contravening the 
Law. 
 
Substitution is the replacement of one signifier for another 
signifier. Lacan focuses on the process whereby one signifier can 
replace another signifier, which is always an attempt to match the 
signified. Since the signified is veiled in the unconscious, Lacan 
(1993) summarizes the repetition of substitution of das Ding through 
the signifier: 
But this reality principle is basically misrecognized. It 
expresses precisely this – the subject does not have to find 
the object of his desire, he is not led, channelled there, by 
the natural rails of a more or less pre-established 
instinctual and, moreover, more or less stumbling, adaptation, 
such as we see in the animal kingdom. He must on the contrary 
refind the object, whose emergence is fundamentally 
hallucinated. Of course, he never does refind it, and this is 
precisely what the reality principle consists of. The subject 
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never refinds, Freud writes, anything but another object that 
answers more or less satisfactorily to the needs in question. 
He never finds anything but a distinct object since he must by 
definition refind something that he has on loan. This is the 
essential point that the introduction of the reality principle 
into the Freudian dialectic hinges on. (p. 85, his italics) 
 
Psychoanalysis has identified the starting point for the process of 
substitution. The first confrontation with the Law is demonstrated 
through the Oedipus complex, best illustrated in Freud‟s (1924b) The 
Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex. The condition for the 
dissolution of the Oedipus complex is emphasized through the 
prohibition of the Oedipus complex. In boys, Freud argues, “The 
child may have had only very vague notions as to what constitutes a 
satisfying erotic intercourse; but certainly the penis must play a 
part in it, for the sensations in his own organ were evidence of 
that” (p. 176). Freud‟s argument is that the boy establishes a 
phantasy
27
 built around the penis as the condition of enjoyment. 
Therefore, the dissolution of the Oedipus complex is a result of a 
choice between the phantasy and reality: 
If the satisfaction of love in the field of the Oedipus 
complex is to cost the child his penis, a conflict is bound to 
arise between his narcissistic interest in that part of his 
body and the libidinal cathexis of his parental objects. In 
this conflict the first of these forces normally triumphs: the 
child‟s ego turns away from the Oedipus complex. (p. 176) 
A Lacanian reading of this passage emphasizes how the phallus and 
the penis are confused with one another, how the penis is seen as 
the source of power and pleasure, which as Lacan points out is 
falsely construed.
28
 There is a misrecognition of the penis (as 
signifier) for the phallus (as signified), whereby phantasy is 
structured around the penis. Freud argues that the narcissistic 
                         
27
 Phantasy is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, specifically 3.2. 
Lacan‟s L-schema 
28
 Lacan (1966/2006) writes: For the phallus is a signifier, a signifier 
whose function, in the intrasubjective economy of analysis, may lift the 
veil from the function it served in the mysteries. For it is the signifier 
that is destined to designate meaning effects as a whole, insofar as the 
signifier conditions them by its presence as signifier” (p. 690) 
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sentiments towards the possession of a penis override any sense of 
self. But the route that Freud takes to establish the penis as 
centre of phantasy originates in Freud‟s establishment of auto-
erotic zones. “With this, the loss of his own penis becomes 
imaginable, and the threat of castration takes its deferred effect” 
(p. 176). By means of Lacan‟s distinction between phallus and penis, 
one can argue that Freud mistook the presence of the penis for the 
phallus, whereby phantasy is structured around the subject‟s 
relation to the object or object-cause of desire, or in terms of the 
Oedipus complex, structured around the penis.  
 
Freud (1924b) argues that, for girls, the Oedipus complex is 
structured around the lack of a penis. “The girl‟s Oedipus complex 
is much simpler than that of a small bearer of the penis; in my 
experience, it seldom goes beyond the taking of her mother‟s place 
and the adopting of a feminine attitude towards her father” (p. 
178). Freud takes the female version of the Oedipus complex further 
to demonstrate how it manifests: 
Her Oedipus complex culminates in a desire, which is long 
retained, to receive a baby from her father as a gift – to 
bear him a child. One has an impression that the Oedipus 
complex is then gradually given up because this wish is never 
fulfilled. The two wishes – to possess a penis and a child – 
remain strongly cathected in the unconscious and help to 
prepare the female creature for her later sexual role. (p. 
179) 
Feminists, such as Betty Friedan (1963), have expressed great 
resentment against Freud‟s description, and correctly so, if one 
argues that the penis and the phallus are equal. In other words, 
penis envy is the product of confusing the signifier for the 
signified. 
 
When Freud‟s Oedipus complex is described in different terms, the 
Oedipus complex illustrates how the process of substitution 
originates, specifically pertaining to the establishment of a 
phantasy structured around a penis. This is done through the 
misrecognition of the attainment of power and desire through the 
73 
 
presence of a penis. Through the impossible object-cause of desire, 
a chain of substitutions is set in motion. The Oedipus complex is 
therefore the illustration of the original impossible-object-cause 
of desire, of which there subsequently remains a trace; in Freud‟s 
instance it is the penis. All subsequent substitutions are done in 
light of the object-cause of desire, formulated within Freud‟s 
Oedipus complex. The chain of substitution is set in motion through 
castration, as introduced through the Oedipus complex. On castration 
and the difference between Freud and Lacan, Paul Verhaeghe (2006) 
writes:  
It is clear that Lacan defines the notion of castration in a 
completely different way than Freud. For Freud, the emphasis 
is on castration anxiety in which the Oedipal boy fears being 
castrated by the father in punishment for his incestuous 
desire for the mother. For Lacan, symbolic castration is the 
inevitable consequence of the fact that man becomes a subject 
and must therefore pass through the signifier in order to gain 
jouissance, with the simultaneous implication that jouissance 
is impossible. (p. 42-3, his italics) 
 
In a modest reading of Freud, Lacan proposes the necessary 
alterations to the Oedipus complex, emphasizing the relations 
between the signifier and the signified. The Oedipus complex is 
retained, yet then, through the necessary vernacular, is 
reinstituted as an example of the origins of desire and the 
structuring of phantasy. Love is then accordingly redefined in terms 
of Linguistics and substitution. Lacan (1998) writes, “I love you, 
but, because inexplicably I love in you something more than you – 
the objet petit a – I mutilate you” (p. 268, his italics). For 
Lacan, it is therefore not about the signifier, but an attempt to 
get to the signified. Love is therefore not the love of the 
[physical] Other, but the love for what the Other potentially has, 
as defined through what the self lacks. Lacan (1998) concludes: 
The relation to the Other is precisely what which, for us, 
brings out what is represented by the lamella
29
 – not sexed 
                         
29
 Lacan (1998) defines the lamella thus: “The lamella is something extra-
flat, which moves like the amoeba. It is just a little more complicated. 
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polarity, the relation between masculine and feminine, but the 
relation between the living subject and that which he loses by 
having to pass, for his reproduction, through the sexual 
cycle. (p. 199, my emphasis) 
Love introduces a relation to the Other, that will be explored in 
greater detail in § 3.2 when discussing the L-schema (Fig 4, p. 86).  
 
2.8. Conclusion 
 
The aim of the second chapter is to present an alternative 
theoretical development to the argument presented in the first 
chapter. The second chapter achieves a description of desire without 
referring to a fixed origin, but still maintains the ghost
30
 of the 
origin.  
 
The biggest question uniting both chapters is: how can we account 
for the desire for certain properties and the extreme lengths that 
are taken to uphold (suspend) the desire? The first chapter focuses 
on the development of the infant and the relationship with the 
primary caregiver in the development of ideals
31
 (which are 
desirable). It also focuses on Lacan‟s mirror stage and the 
implications of the mirror stage. The second chapter focuses on the 
internal processes in the unconscious, as Freud (1950) argues in the 
„Project‟. The structure of the unconscious can therefore be equated 
with the structure of a language, where Freud differentiated between 
                                                                            
But it goes everywhere. And as it is something – I will tell you shortly 
why – that it is related to what the sexed being loses in sexuality, it is, 
like the amoeba in relation to sexed beings, immortal – because it survives 
any division, any scissiparous intervention. And it can run around. […] 
This lamella, this organ, whose characteristic is not to exist, but which 
is nevertheless an organ – I can give you more detail as to its zoological 
place – is the libido” (p. 197-8) 
30
 Derrida (2006) writes on ghosts: “For there to be a ghost, there must be 
a return to the body, but to a body that is more abstract than ever. The 
spectrogenic process corresponds therefore to a paradoxical incorporation. 
Once ideas or thoughts (Gedanken) are detached from their substratum, one 
engenders some ghost by giving them a body. Not by returning to the living 
body from which ideas and thoughts have been torn loose, but by incarnating 
the latter in another artifactual body, a prosthetic body, a ghost of 
spirit, one might say a ghost of the ghost” (p. 157-8) 
31
 Lacan emphasizes how the ideals are overvaluated [ϋberschätzen], but 
that the values that are overvaluated are not a fixed point in life. The 
overvaluation creates an extra value, and it is in this extra value that 
can‟t be explained or rationalized. 
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the Sachvorstellung [thing-presentation] and the Wortvorstellung 
[word-presentation]. For Freud, the differentiation was necessitated 
through the separation between the unconscious thought and the 
conscious thought. Cilliers (1989) summarizes: “There is not 
consciousness without both word- and thing-presentations being 
present. The thing-presentation comes from their only source, the 
system conscious. In this way Freud provides us with two 
preconditions for consciousness: language and the unconscious” (p. 
127). The primacy of the unconscious is reaffirmed when Cilliers 
(1989) writes: 
Consciousness is not the function of the ego, or the ω system 
[of perceptual neurons], or any structural, functional or 
topological component of the mental apparatus. It is the 
result of an interaction between the various components where 
the unconscious seems to have some priority. (p. 121) 
 
The structure of the unconscious is therefore dominated by the 
pleasure principle (the first principle), which is explained in 
terms of a neuronal economy focusing on the efficient discharge of 
Q. The reality principle (the second principle) is the disturbance 
to the neuronal economy, which through excessive Q, forces a pathway 
through the contact-barriers, in effect changing the facilitations 
[Bahnung]. This biological explanation of the pleasure principle 
entrenches an economical basis for the experience of pleasure in 
terms of efficiency. Once the amount of Q exceeds the limits of the 
contact-barriers is pain
32
 experienced. For Freud, only extremes 
within the unconscious structure reaches consciousness, which is why 
pain is important as one can only be aware of the unconscious in so 
far as there are deviations from the efficient functioning of the 
unconscious. 
 
The role of language then in consciousness is preceded by the 
unconscious notion, which, according to Freud, is the source of the 
thing-presentation [Sachvorstellung] and is consequently attached to 
a word-presentation [Wortvorstellung]. The lack of a direct 
                         
32
 See Chapter 2.2. To quote Derrida (2004) again: “Pain leaves behind 
particularly rich breaches” (p. 254). 
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correlation between the thing-presentation and the word-presentation 
proves problematic. Lacan takes the separation further, equating the 
word and thing to what Saussure called the signifier and the 
signified. However, for Saussure, through a dialectical relationship 
between the signified and the signifier, meaning is generated. For 
Lacan, this is insufficient, as there is a certain primacy of the 
signifier. Consequently the signified is attached to a property that 
already exists in language, in the symbolic order. In other words, 
language precedes being. The implication of this is, as described by 
Moyaert (1995): 
Onze gevoelens (indrukken, lichamelijke gewaarwordingen) 
worden gestructureerd (gedifferentieerd) door de 
voorstellingen te binden. In de plaats van een confuus gevoel 
dat in het luchtledige hangt en met niets kan worden 
verbonden, komt een gevoel dat zich aan iets – een teken – 
vashecht. [Our feelings (impressions, physical sensations) are 
structured (differentiated) through the binding of it and the 
representation. In place of a feeling of confusion that is 
suspended in a vacuum and cannot be connected with anything, 
comes the feeling that attaches itself to something – a 
sign/symbol] (p. 115) 
 
That a name is given to a child, often even before birth, 
demonstrates an example that Lacan gives for the precedence of 
language over being. Moyaert (1995) takes it further, to even 
suggest that the subject exists before birth, at the moment when a 
name is given: “Het leven begin niet by de geboorte: het kind krijgt 
een naam en het wordt in een ceremonieële doopplechtigheid 
toevertroudt aan de wilsbeschikking van een goddelijke 
lotsbestemming” [Life does not begin at birth: the child receives a 
name and the name is given in a ceremonial christening, entrusting 
the child to the will of a godly destiny] (p. 29). This also 
illustrates that we have no control over language or the uses of 
language. Language creates meaning with or without our approval. 
 
However, there still remains an aspect that belongs to the 
unconscious that remains free from representation. To maintain the 
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anonymity of this property, Lacan refers to this property as das 
Ding, also known as la Chose, or the Thing. The Thing remains 
protected from language, in both the Freudian Sachvorstellung and 
Wortvorstellung and the Saussurian signifier and signified. The 
question arises then of how we can come to know of the Thing [das 
Ding]? The solution that Freud provides, as presented in Repression 
(1915b) is through the examination of fragments as they surface from 
the unconscious, for example, as described in dreams.  
 
The Thing as unrepresentable object or object-cause of desire is 
dependent on the Law. Lacan corrects Dostoevsky‟s “if God is dead, 
then everything is permitted” to “if God is dead, then everything is 
prohibited”. The notion of God allowing desire is therefore God as 
source of desire. Note that God is an example of the Nom-du-Père 
[Name of the Father] through a play on words, which Lacan uses 
synonymously with le Non-du-Père [the No of the Father] (Lacan, 
2008a, p. 79). “It is the name of the father that we must recognize 
the basis of the symbolic function which, since the dawn of 
historical time, has identified this person with the figure of the 
law” (Lacan, 1966/2006, p. 278, his emphasis). The Non-du-Père as 
illustrated through the Oedipus complex shows the origins of the 
„No‟, which sets the process of substitution in motion whereby 
acceptable substitutes are pursued. In other words, if there is no 
Law, then everything is prohibited. This may seem confusing, but for 
Lacan, the argument is that the Law creates desire. 
 
The connection between Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 is that the first 
chapter highlights the development of the Superego in terms of the 
development of the Ego-ideal and the Ideal-ego, whereas Chapter 2 
highlights the development of the Superego in terms of neurons and 
economy. The substitution process proceeds with the idealized 
qualities when acceptable substitutes materialize. Slavoj Žižek 
(2002) summarizes the connection between the Superego and the Law: 
Within the subject‟s psychic economy, the categorical 
imperative
33
 is experienced as an agency which bombards the 
                         
33
 “The super-ego – the conscience at work in the ego – may then become 
harsh, cruel, inexorable against the ego which is in its charge. Kant‟s 
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subject with injunctions that are impossible to fulfil: it 
brooks no excuses (“you can because you must!”) and observes 
with mocking, malevolent neutrality the subject‟s helpless 
struggle to live up to its “crazy” demands, secretly enjoying 
his failure. The imperative‟s categorical [Immanuel Kant‟s 
Categorical Imperative] demand goes against the subject‟s 
well-being – more precisely, it is totally indifferent to it: 
from the viewpoint of the “pleasure principle” and its 
inherent prolongation, the “reality principle”, the imperative 
is “non-economical”, “unaccountable”, senseless. The Freudian 
name for such an “irrational” injunction which prevents the 
subject from acting appropriately to present circumstances and 
thus organizes his failure is, of course, superego. (p. 232) 
 
Chapter 3 and 4 focus on illustrating how Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle is based on the descriptions found in the first 
two chapters. The next two chapters unite two important 
psychoanalytic themes, the Law and desire. The first two chapters 
illustrate how the Law and desire manifest and the next two chapters 
illustrate the effects and consequently how the Law and desire shape 
the course for what Freud deemed the death drive.  
  
                                                                            
Categorical Imperative is thus the direct heir of the Oedipus complex” 
(Freud, 1924a, p. 167) 
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Chapter 3 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the case study that shapes the central theme 
of Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The case study 
presents a practical example for the application of the theory 
posited thus far in this thesis. The Fort/Da case study is based on 
a game that a child plays with a reel that demonstrates the 
application of the pleasure principle, the repetition compulsion, 
and intersubjectivity. 
 
The first section focuses on Lacan‟s description of the L-schema 
(Fig 4, p. 86) that establishes Lacan‟s explanation of 
intersubjectivity. This serves to elucidate the relationship that 
the subject has with the Other, or in terms of the Fort/Da case 
study, the relationship between the child and the mother. Lacan‟s L-
schema demonstrates the practical elements; as well as the potential 
risks of misreading (as demonstrated through Dreyer‟s (2005) 
reading). 
 
The second section focuses on the repetition compulsion 
[Wiederholungszwang]. This section focuses on Freud and Lacan‟s 
description whereby the repetition compulsion accounts for the 
repeatability of behaviour. The repetition compulsion is explained 
in terms of the pleasure principle, whereby the repetition 
compulsion is described through the formation of facilitations 
[Bahnung]. The pleasure principle demonstrates that the repetitions 
are not reproductions but reiterations
34
. 
 
                         
34
 Derrida (1988) wrote: “Through the possibility of repeating every mark 
as the same it makes way for an idealization that seems to deliver the full 
presence of ideal objects (not present in the mode of sense perception and 
beyond all immediate deictics), but this repeatability itself ensures that 
the full presence of a singularity thus repeated comports in itself the 
reference to something else, thus rendering the full presence that it 
nevertheless announces. This is why iteration is not simply repetition” 
(p.129) 
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The third section focuses on the Fort/Da case study; first with 
Freud‟s description, followed by Lacan and ending with Jacques 
Derrida‟s: Freud‟s description is the initial setup of the game; 
Lacan situates the game within a psychoanalytic context; and Derrida 
provides a powerful critique. 
 
This chapter demonstrates the important example of the Fort/Da case 
study as the prelude to the death drive in Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle. Derrida demonstrates that it is difficult to 
separate theory from biography; in this case separating the Fort/Da 
case study from Psychoanalysis or separating Psychoanalysis from the 
Fort/Da case study. 
 
3.2. Lacan’s L-schema 
 
This chapter starts with the L-schema, which elucidates Lacan‟s 
intersubjective position. The L-schema demonstrates the possibility 
of an intersubjective theory in Psychoanalysis, which would account 
for the relationship between the child and the mother, as discussed 
in the Fort/Da case study.  
  
 
  Fig 4: Lacan‟s L-schema (Lacan, 1966/2006, p. 54) 
 
Lacan (1966/2006, p. 54) introduced the L-schema in the Seminar on 
“The Purloined Letter” and it has a very specific place within 
Lacanian Psychoanalysis. The L-schema ties together the primary 
narcissistic stage in the first chapter with the unconscious of the 
second chapter. The L-schema also demonstrates the language theory 
as described in terms of Freud‟s differentiation between 
Sachvorstellung [thing-presentation] and Wortvorstellung [word-
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presentation]. This can even be translated into Saussure‟s schema of 
signifier over signified, whereby Sachvorstellung correlates with 
the signified and Wortvorstellung correlates with the signifier. 
However, in Freud‟s description there always remains a distance 
between the signifier and the signified, as opposed to Saussure who 
connects the signifier and the signified in a dialectical 
association.
35
 
 
The departure for the description of the L-schema is the formation 
of the ego in terms of the imaginary and symbolic. In this instance 
the imaginary correlates with the signified and the symbolic with 
the signifier. The symbolic pertains to language as both description 
and symbolic Law, whereas the imaginary pertains to a fiction 
encompassing the attributes described. 
 
The four corners of the L-schema are independently described by 
Lacan (1966/2006) as: “S, his ineffable and stupid existence; a his 
objects; a‟, his ego, that is, his form as reflected in his objects; 
an A, the locus from which the question of his existence may arise 
from” (p. 550, his italics). 
 
But for Lacan, the ego (the conscious) is aware of the self: the way 
the self is viewed is significantly different from the actual self. 
This can be described as the separation between the signifier and 
the signified. This is equally applicable to the ego and the subject 
(S): “S is the letter S, but it‟s also the subject, that is to say 
not the subject in its totality” (Lacan, 1988b, p. 243). The 
starting point is always the subject (S). However, because it is the 
decentred subject, or the fragmented subject, the L-schema shows how 
the ego is not located within the actual body, but within the 
imaginary (a‟). In other words, Lacan emphasizes the difference 
between the ego and the Subject, as seen in the L-schema, whereby 
the ego is located separately from the Subject. This is illustrated 
through the separation between the signifier and the signified, 
whereby the signifier cannot fully express the signified.  The L-
                         
35
 See Chapter 2.5 
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schema presents a more complicated interaction than the Simplified 
schema of the two mirrors (Fig 1, p. 34). Lacan (1988b) elaborates: 
What analysis teaches us, on the other hand, is that the ego 
is an absolutely fundamental form for the constitution of 
objects. In particular, it perceives what we call, for 
structural reasons, its fellow being, in the form of the 
specular other. This form of the other has a very close 
relation to the ego, which can be superimposed on it, and we 
write it as a‟. (p.244, my emphasis) 
 
For Lacan, the specific usage of a‟, is to maintain the French autre 
[other], as seen in the mirror image, to maintain the distinctness 
of the image from the actual self as the Subject. But because a‟ is 
only form, and consists simply of the content ascribed, a‟ remains 
within the imaginary, i.e. the specular. This explains why the 
subject doesn‟t have direct access to the other (a‟), as it remains 
a fictitious description. Because language separates the actual 
object and what the object is known as, the description falls with 
the imaginary. Lacan (1988b) explains:  
The imaginary gains its false reality, which nonetheless is a 
verified reality, starting off from the order defined by the 
wall of language. The ego such as we understand it, the other, 
the fellow being, all these imaginary things are objects. (p. 
244) 
The wall of language is established through the separation between 
the signifier and the signified. There is no direct access to 
describe the signified, because of the separation. This is exactly 
why there remains a barrier, a wall that cannot be crossed or 
breached; as a result the signifier is all that remains accessible. 
The signifier is consequently treated as an object. “But they are 
indeed objects, because they are named as such within an organised 
system, that of the wall of language” (Lacan, 1988b, p. 244). 
Through the signifier is the object known, even if the object is 
imaginary, illusion, or fiction. The signified lies beyond the wall 
of language, which is something entirely different when put in words 
(the signifier). This is exactly why the presence of the object 
cannot be the source of meaning, as the object becomes lost behind 
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the wall of language. The subject I am speaking to is never the true 
subject, but the signifier, the word that is a close approximation. 
Lacan (1988b) illustrates: 
They are on the other side of the wall of language, there 
where in principle I never reach them. Fundamentally, it is 
them I‟m aiming at every time I utter true speech, but I 
always attain a‟, a‟‟, through reflection. I always aim at 
true subjects, and I have to be content with shadows. The 
subject is separated from the Others, the true ones, by the 
wall of language. (p. 244) 
 
The only means of gauging the Other is through language, speech, 
words. But because the true Other is behind the wall of language, 
there is no way of really speaking of the Other other than as a 
signifier, an object. On speech, Lacan (1988b) writes: 
If speech is founded in the existence of the Other, the true 
one, language is so made as to return us to the objectified 
other, to the other whom we can make what we want of, 
including thinking that he is an object, that is to say that 
he doesn‟t know what he‟s saying. When we use language, our 
relation with the other always plays on this ambiguity. In 
other words, language is as much there to find us in the Other 
as to drastically prevent us from understanding him. And that 
is indeed what is at stake in the analytic experience. (p. 
244) 
The L-schema is built around the chain of signifiers which never 
penetrates the signified. The outcome is the incorporation of the 
Other within the L-schema whereby the Other cannot be seen as wholly 
other, but in terms of the ideal-ego; in terms of the imaginary 
other or the image of the self (a‟). For this reason, there can 
never be an actual Other (signified), because the Other cannot be 
penetrated. The Other is only viewed in terms of the self and the 
ideals for the self (the same ideals even created by the primary 
caregivers, linking with Chapter 1: primary narcissism and the 
ideal-ego). 
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The process of the L-schema is neatly packaged to explain, not only 
the relation between the ego and the Other, but also the 
psychoanalytic notion of transference
36
. Transference occurs within 
speech: “The pig‟s grunt only becomes speech when someone raises the 
question as to what it is that they want to make you believe. Speech 
is precisely only speech in as much as someone believes in it” 
(Lacan, 1988a, p. 240). This consequently affects the therapeutic 
situation. Lacan, in Écrits (1966/2006) examines the position of the 
psychoanalyst within the L-schema (the psychoanalyst in the role of 
the Other), whereby the emphasis lies with speech, but Lacan 
concedes the difficulty: 
But true speech, questioning true discourse as to what it 
signifies, will find that one signification always refers to 
another signification in true discourse, no thing being able 
to be shown other than by a sign, and will thus make true 
discourse seem to be doomed to error. (p. 352) 
 
Speech is therefore problematic for two reasons: first, the 
ambiguity of the signifier; and second, through the application of 
the L-schema. The L-schema demonstrates how one signification refers 
to another signification in terms not only of one signifier to 
another signifier, but also in terms of the relation between the ego 
(a), the other (a‟), the Subject and the (big) Other. 
If the analyst is thus subjected to the ideal condition that 
the mirages of his narcissism must have become transparent to 
him, it is in order that he be permeable to the other‟s 
authentic speech; we must now try to understand how he can 
recognize the latter through the other‟s discourse. (p. 353) 
It is then a question of how the Other can feature authentically 
within the L-schema, how the speech of the Other can be discerned 
from the speech of the self, or even how the Other can be 
differentiated from the Subject. The possibility then of speech and 
                         
36
 Lacan (1998) writes on transference: “The transference is the means by 
which the communication of the unconscious is interrupted, by which the 
unconscious closes up again” (p. 130) and “In analytic practice, there are 
many ways of conceiving the transference. They are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. They may be defined at different levels” (p. 130) and “the 
transference is the enactment of the reality of the unconscious” (p. 149, 
his italics)  
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interaction cannot be founded on the actual interaction, or on the 
symbolic discourse, as the imaginary has to be accounted for. The 
imaginary takes the form of an idealization, the attribution of an 
inapplicable quality, even a lie. Speech is both unreliable and 
ambiguous due to the lack of unity between the signifier and the 
signified; and results in alienation. Alienation - in terms of the 
L-schema - is seen in the relationship between the subject and the 
image of the self, or the subject and the Other. Or, in Lacan‟s own 
words: 
This is how true discourse, by isolating the givens [données] 
of promises in the giving of one‟s word [parole donnée], makes 
the latter appear to be lying speech – since it pledges the 
future which, as they say, belongs to no one – and ambiguous 
too in that it constantly outstrips the being it concerns in 
the alienation in which its becoming is constituted. (p. 352) 
 
A further clarification of the L-schema is given when Lacan (1988b) 
draws the correlation between the L-schema and Freud‟s statement, Wo 
Es war, soll Ich werden. The correlation is emphasized through the 
similarities between the description of the subject in the L-schema 
and in Freud‟s statement. Both are equally applicable to the 
therapeutic situation. 
There are two meanings to be given to Freud‟s phrase – Wo 
Es war, soll Ich werden. This Es, take it as the letter S. It 
is there, it is always there. It is the subject. He knows 
himself or he doesn‟t know himself. That isn‟t even the most 
important thing – he speaks or he doesn‟t speak. At the end of 
the analysis, it is him who must be called on to speak, and to 
enter into relation with the real Others. Where the S was, 
there the Ich should be. (p. 246) 
 
Lacan (1966/2006) demonstrates how loaded Freud‟s Wo Es war, soll 
Ich werden is. 
Wo (Where) Es (the subject devoid of any das or other 
objectifying article) war (was [était] - it is a locus of 
being that is at stake, and that in this locus) soll (must – 
it is a duty in the moral sense that is announced here, as is 
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confirmed by the single sentence that follows it, bringing the 
Chapter to a close) Ich (I, there must I – just as in French 
one announced “ce suis-je”, “this am I”, before saying, “c‟est 
moi”, “it is me”), werden (become [devenir] – not occur 
(survenir), or even happen (advenir), but be born (venir au 
jour) of this very locus insofar as it is a locus of being). 
(p. 417) 
 
Further investigation will be devoted to Lacan‟s L-schema, not only 
in terms of the relation to the self, as demonstrated in Freud‟s Wo 
Es war, soll Ich werden, but explained through the relation between 
the Other and the Subject (S). Two readings of the L-schema are 
examined in greater detail, that of Boothby (1991) and Dreyer 
(2005). 
 
Richard Boothby wrote two significant books, Death and Desire (1991) 
and Freud as Philosopher (2001) with specific reference to the L-
schema. The feature of the L-schema within the larger corpus of 
Lacanian theory, according to Boothby (1991), focuses not only on 
the alienation of the subject, but also on the development of the 
ego: 
I qualify the expression “being of the subject” as provisional 
because what is expressed by the Schema L has the structure of 
a question. That is to say, the schema is intended to 
represent not a static being but a process, a coming-into-
being. It is readable in terms of the commentary Lacan gives 
on Freud‟s formula, Wo Es war, soll Ich werden. (p. 115) 
 
The biggest area of contestation to Lacan‟s L-schema, and the only 
aspect that really proves problematic in many readings of the L-
schema, is the role of the Other and how the Other features within 
the L-schema. 
The initial position of the schema, designating the formation 
of the ego in imaginary identification with an other – “the 
other which isn‟t an other at all, since it is essentially 
coupled with the ego, in a relation that is always reflexive, 
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interchangeable – the ego is always an alter-ego.” (1991, p. 
115-6, quoting Lacan, 1988b, p. 321, his emphasis) 
 
But this still only accounts for the other (a‟) within the L-schema. 
The biggest feature of the [big] Other, is that the Other speaks. 
The Other can interrupt, and the Other can interact within the L-
schema. However, it is emphasized that there are limitations to the 
Other within the L-schema. Speech is the only means available for 
the Other to interject. The limitations of the interjection of the 
Other is negated or minimalized through the identification of the 
subject as other (a‟). The subject (S) does not fully relate to the 
specular image of the other (a‟). As Boothby (1991) writes: 
The contribution of the symbolic function can now be plotted 
by opening this axis against itself. What is required is a 
differentiation of the desire of the subject from the ego with 
which it is originally confused. This differentiation is 
effected in concert with a differentiation in the other, 
according to which the specular other of imaginary 
identification is distinguished from the Other who speaks, the 
Other with a capital “O”. (p. 116, my emphasis) 
Boothby is opening the L-schema to a different reading as well by 
emphasizing the underlying complexity of the L-schema. The tension 
holding the corners apart are also keeping the corners bound. The 
symbolic function is not enough to separate the subject from the 
Other. Merely calling the one the Subject and the Other is not 
enough to separate the two. The significant difference between the 
Subject and the Other, as argued by Boothby, is through the 
imaginary, which are both the imaginary difference and the imaginary 
potential. On the relationship between the other and the Other, 
Lacan (1993) writes:  
The distinction between the Other with a big O, that is, the 
Other in so far as it‟s not known, and the other with a small 
o, that is, the other who is me, the source of all knowledge, 
is fundamental. (p. 40) 
Only now does the possibility of a difference between the Subject 
and the Other become apparent. The limitations that the Subject has 
in terms of achieving or living up to the ideals imposed by the 
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primary caregivers (as argued in Chapter 1), are twofold: First, 
through the impossibility of maintaining the ideals or even of 
always living up to the ideals. Secondly, which is more applicable, 
is the language component: that one can never fully realize what the 
ideals are. In the process of becoming word, the word never fully 
encompasses what the terms and conditions of the ideals are which 
means that there remains a hidden kernel within the ideals that 
aren‟t verbalized, yet internalized. Therefore the ideals are 
impossible, as they can never be fully realized within the Subject. 
However, because the Other is impenetrable, it can only be the Other 
who can comply with the ideals, which means that the Other is the 
unrealized self. The Other is the uncastrated image of the self. 
 
In Dreyer‟s (2005) critique on Lacan, Dreyer‟s argument is well 
constructed and seems to be a very good reading of Lacan‟s L-schema. 
However, there are two major areas of concern, illustrated when 
Dreyer writes: 
Lacan thus enunciates two definite processes involved in the 
fabrication of a fundamental „lack of being‟ – firstly the 
lack of being engendered by the subject‟s alienation in the 
Other (mirror stage), and secondly a lack resulting from the 
fact that the subject depends on the signifier, and that the 
signifier is first of all in the field of the Other. (p. 27) 
The relationship between the self and the Other in Dreyer‟s reading 
of Lacan, hinges on: “Lacan asserts that this schema signifies that 
the condition of the subject (neurosis or psychosis) is dependent on 
what is being unfolded in the Other” (p. 28), which is demonstrated 
in the L-schema. The outcome is perhaps an overemphasis on the Other 
within the L-schema, as if the Other has the final say. For Dreyer, 
the return link to the Subject (S), is described as “It is the gaze 
of others (approving, guilt-inducing) which trigger unconscious ego 
effects and prompt the articulation of the latter‟s self-
justification, anger, grandiosity, or any other such Imaginary 
“effect” that rigidly resists knowledge of its desire” (p. 29). 
Through the use of the word gaze, the interaction with the Other 
presupposes the presence of the Other, which is the same as 
supposing the mirror stage requires the presence of a mirror. Dreyer 
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argues that it is necessary for the Other to be present, or even for 
the Other to gaze at the self, and in turn elicit a reaction which 
is self-justification, anger, grandiosity, etc. The necessity of the 
„gaze of the Other‟ is inappropriately introduced within the L-
schema in terms of an intersubjective theory (exemplified through 
J.P. Sartre
37
 or E. Levinas
38
). This leads to the description of “the 
signifier is first of all in the field of the Other”, whereby Dreyer 
argues for the Other as an autonomous, metaphysical being, acting in 
accordance with the reality principle (the second principle, a 
disruption to the homeostasis). The problem, however, is that there 
are measures in place to limit the effect of the reality principle. 
The intrusion of the Other into the L-schema is mediated through 
defence mechanisms, aimed at the preservation and maintenance of the 
pleasure principle. This is why the Other cannot be an autonomous 
entity, manifesting materially through “a gaze” and consequently 
mediating the behaviour of the Subject. The lack of direct access - 
not only to the Other, but also that the Other has to the Subject - 
isn‟t as apparent as Dreyer argues.  
 
For Lacan, the link between the Subject and the Other is therefore 
unconsciously mediated by the pleasure principle, which we can only 
describe through signifiers. To place the signifier into the realm 
of the Other is rather dubious as the Other is also dependent on the 
same rules of language. If the Other had the power that Dreyer 
ascribes to the role of the Other within the L-schema, the outcome 
is a continual change of evaluation of the Subject, with continual 
transformation of the Subject, of the ego. But because of the 
pleasure principle and the reality principle, the neuronal economy 
dictates that there is an active avoidance of continual change (the 
intrusion of the reality principle) - as Freud describes in Project 
for a Scientific Psychology (1950) - that is a traumatic experience, 
even a painful one, and consequently lessens the effects of the 
Other as described by Dreyer. 
 
                         
37
 Jean-Paul Sartre (2003) Being and Nothingness 
38
 Emmanuele Levinas (1978) Existence and Existents and Levinas (1991) 
Totality and Infinity 
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Therefore, the two main areas of concern is the role of the Other 
within Dreyer‟s description of the L-schema, and secondly, through 
the description of the Other (in the mirror stage) or as Dreyer put 
it “engendered by the subject‟s alienation in the Other (mirror 
stage)”. Even if Dreyer referred to the [small] other: the 
alienation of the self is not done in accordance with the other, but 
through an inevitable méconnaisance [misrecognition] of the self. 
For one, through the misrecognition of the self in the mirror in 
terms of the ideals, but also articulated through the separation 
between signified and signifier. The signifier of the self cannot 
fully describe what is signified. Dreyer would be correct to refer 
to the [big] Other within the mirror stage. An initial Other has to 
be accounted for in the mirror stage, in terms of origins - played 
by the primary caregiver – that is crucial in the development of the 
initial ideals. However, the return to the initial criticism against 
Dreyer‟s reliance on a continual call to order through the Other, 
whereby the Other facilitates adaptation and alteration, is exactly 
what the pleasure principle is set to avoid. The emphasis is quite 
clear when Lacan (1988b) writes: 
But that‟s not the point. The point is for the subject to get 
to know what he‟s saying, get to know who‟s speaking from 
there, S, and to this end, to become aware of the essentially 
imaginary character of what is said in that place when the 
absolute transcendent Other is invoked, this Other to be found 
in language each time speech endeavours to be uttered. (p.268) 
 
A distinction has to be made between the two types of Other: the one 
being the person who stands in front of me and the Other who is the 
figure in the unconscious relation as seen in the L-schema. Dreyer‟s 
account of the L-schema is therefore an emphasis on the Other as the 
person in front of me, and is based on an intersubjective theory 
whereby the gaze of the Other, the presence of the Other, acts as a 
deterrent. However, for Lacan, the Other in front of me can only be 
known through language and has the qualities that are ascribed to 
the Other, in other words, imaginary features. The second 
description of the Other, as Lacan emphasized, is the Other that 
resides in the symbolic domain. This Other is also known as the 
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unconscious Other and it is problematic to speak of this unconscious 
Other, because once we name this Other, the Other ceases to be 
unconscious. For Dreyer, it is through the physical Other that the 
law is enforced; however, it is not the physical Other that Lacan 
sees as the enforcer of the Law, but the unconscious Other, the 
symbolic Other: “The father, the Name-of-the-father sustains the 
structure of desire with the structure of the law” (Lacan, 1998, p. 
34).
39
 
 
The difference between Lacan and Dreyer is emphasized by their 
different views regarding ethics. For Lacan, ethics or morality 
proves extremely difficult, and while ethics is not the topic of 
this thesis, it still needs to be clarified. For Lacan, the problems 
facing any contemporary ethics are threefold
40
: First, the loss of 
the notion that human nature (or even consciousness) as a 
trustworthy guide for right and wrong. Second, that the loss of the 
idea that the experience of the microcosms and the macrocosms are 
not each other‟s echo. In other words, the perspective of human 
beings as the main and final narrative is no longer confirmed. 
Third, that the incest taboo
41
 (the most basic taboo) is incompatible 
                         
39
 Lacan (1966/2006) writes: “But Freud reveals to us that it is thanks to 
the Name-of-the-Father that man does not remain bound [attaché] to the 
sexual service of his mother, that aggression toward the Father is at the 
very heart of the Law, and that the Law is at the service of the desire 
that Law institutes through the prohibition of incest. For the unconscious 
demonstrates that desire is tied to prohibition and that the Oedipal crisis 
is determinant in sexual maturation itself” (p. 723) 
40
 These three arguments were presented by Paul Moyaert (2006), 14 March 
2006 regarding the topic of Lacan and ethics. 
41
 Taking his cue from Claude Lévi-Strauss‟ (1969) The Elementary 
Structures of Kinship, Derrida (2004) writes: “The incest prohibition is 
universal; in this senese one could call it natural. But it is also a 
prohibition, a system of norms and interedicts; in this sense on could call 
it cultural” (p. 357). Jacques Lacan (2008) writes: “If one reads Lévi-
Strauss‟s text closely, one can see that it is the most enigmatic and the 
most stubborn point separating nature from culture. And I want to make you 
stop there. What we find in the incest law is located as such at the level 
of the unconscious in relation to das Ding, the Thing. The desire for the 
mother cannot be satisfied because it is the end, the terminal point, the 
abolition of the whole world of demand, which is the one that at its 
deepest level structures man‟s unconscious. It is to the extent that the 
function of the pleasure principle is to make man always search for what he 
has to find again, but which he never will attain, that one reaches the 
essence, namely, that sphere or relationship which is known as the law of 
the prohibition of incest. This metaphysical analysis is not worthy of our 
interest, however, if it cannot be confirmed at the level of the effective 
discourse which manages to put itself at the disposition of man‟s knowledge 
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with the moral Law as natural Law; added is the argument that there 
is no ultimate explanation for why there is an incest taboo. For 
Dreyer, the ethical is located within the intersubjective relation. 
In Dreyer‟s (2005) conclusion, he writes: 
Future research can attempt to conceptualize the inter-
relation of sexuality and the desire for reciprocated 
subjectifications. […] Future research can also examine the 
psychosexual stages of development in terms of the desire for 
reciprocated subjectification to establish possible stable 
(universal) patterns of dichotomous subject objectification 
formation. (p. 132) 
The summary of Dreyer‟s future research is unfortunately also the 
loss of the distinction between the signifier and the signified, 
illustrated through the “reciprocated subjectifications”. The 
impasse that Dreyer reaches is how to account for the Otherness of 
the Other, but his solution is undermined when his solution is 
rooted in the establishment of “possible stable (universal) patterns 
of dichotomous subject objectification formation” (p. 132). Dreyer‟s 
solution can be summarized as the establishment of a mode of 
language that would embody the positivist dream of universal, 
stable, empirical descriptions and observations that would result in 
the recognition and description of the Other as Other. Dreyer‟s 
research can then be summarized as the phantasy ($◊a) of the barred 
subject‟s relation towards equality, „reciprocal subjectifications‟. 
This is also achieved through the separation (dichotomy) between the 
subject and the objectification of the subject. Dreyer‟s obtuse 
wording doesn‟t help clarify his argument. Dreyer‟s phantasy is the 
avoidance of xenophobia, racism, homophobia, etc, through 
„subjective objectification formation‟ (language), or put in his own 
words: “he will religiously, without repose, continue to try and 
dominate and destroy his own mirror image. He will not turn the 
other cheek” (p. 136).42 
                                                                            
that preconscious or unconscious discourse or, in other words, the 
effective law” (p. 83, his italics) 
42
 Alain Badiou (2007) provides a different, yet applicable explanation of 
Wo Es war soll Ich werden, in terms of the Cartesian cogito, [Cogito ergo 
sum‟ ubi cogito, ibi sum], which presupposes a transparency, which is clear 
in Badiou‟s rewording of the Cartesian cogito as “that there where it is 
thought that thinking it must be, it is” (p. 431, his emphasis). The 
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Dreyer‟s argument concludes in a very similar vein to the argument 
of Jürgen Habermas‟ Communicative action, illustrated in a dialogue 
with Borradori (2003). “They do not encounter each other like 
members of a society who might become alienated from each other only 
through systematically distorted communication” (p. 35). 
Systemically distorted communication results in violence: 
The spiral of violence begins as a spiral of distorted 
communication that leads through the spiral of uncontrolled 
reciprocal mistrust, to the breakdown of communication. If 
violence thus begins with a distortion in communication, after 
it has erupted it is possible to know what has gone wrong and 
what needs to be repaired. (p. 35) 
Habermas consequently reintroduces an ideal-speech situation, but 
Dreyer‟s argument differs, as Habermas emphasizes the situation and 
the conditions of communication as a cure, whereas Dreyer focuses on 
language itself. Ironically, it is Dreyer who writes: “In many cases 
what people believe to be their salvation, surreptitiously acts as 
their self-condemnation and delimitation” (p. 132). 
 
The perpetuation of certain ideas, thoughts and behaviour, 
regardless of their destructive nature, as is exemplified in Freud‟s 
discussion of the repetition compulsion. This will be the topic of 
the next section. Specific attention will be given to Freud‟s 
description, as well as the alterations proposed by Lacan. The 
biggest question pertaining to the repetition compulsion is: who is 
the Master of the repetition? Is it a consciously-willed repetition, 
or do the repetitions occur in spite of the conscious ego? 
                                                                            
Lacanian version is as follows: “I am not, there where I am the plaything 
of my thought; I think of what I am, there where I do not think I am 
thinking” (p. 431). For Badiou, this is exactly why science fails; or why 
Verdi Dreyer‟s (scientific) reading fails. “This identity [the subject of 
science], however, can only be grasped by attempting to think the subject 
in its place” (p. 431, his emphasis). 
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3.3. Freud’s Repetition Compulsion 
 
The repetition compulsion is an important aspect of Freud‟s (1920) 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, and is the important link between the 
L-schema and Freud‟s case study of Fort/Da. The repetition 
compulsion explains why behaviour is repeated; or as Lacan (1998) 
put it: “Let us not forget that when Freud presents it to us, he 
says – what cannot be remembered is repeated in behaviour” (p. 129, 
his italics). 
 
Freud (1920) describes and defines the repetition compulsion in 
terms of the unconscious: 
In order to make it easier to understand this „compulsion to 
repeat‟, which emerges during the psycho-analytic treatment of 
neurotics, we must above all get rid of the mistaken notion 
that what we are dealing with in our struggle against 
resistances is resistance on the part of the unconscious. (p. 
19-20, his emphasis)  
 
Freud initially focuses the discussion of the compulsion to repeat 
in the therapeutic situation, which is noticeable “in the sphere of 
the transference, of the patient‟s relation with the physician” (p. 
19). On the one hand, the repetition demonstrates the relationship 
between the patient and the physician that is reminiscent of the 
Oedipus complex. The relationship between the patient and the 
therapist imitates the relationship the patient had with a primary 
caregiver, or a paternal/maternal figure. According to Freud, this 
relationship is then the repetition of the primary relationship. On 
the other hand, the subtle yet significant difference between 
remembering and reproduction is important, “the ratio between what 
is remembered and what is reproduced varies from case to case” (p. 
19). This distinction will be emphasized by Lacan later in this 
section, but for Freud, the emphasis lies with remembering the past, 
as opposed to re-enacting or transferring the past based on the 
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repetition of the infantile relationship with the parents onto the 
“physician”. The “physician‟s” role is therefore, “to force as much 
as possible into the channel of memory and to allow as little as 
possible to emerge as repetition” (p. 19). In other words, the 
physician‟s role is to limit the continuation and repetition of 
previous behaviours or interactions in the therapeutic situation. 
Freud links the repetition with the unconscious and links the 
unconscious with the ego, “it is certain that much of the ego is 
itself unconscious” (p. 20). The argument that Freud is developing 
is to explain the hindrance of therapy due to the repetition of 
previous behaviour on an unconscious level. It is unconscious by 
means of the unknowing repetition of the behaviour by the patient, 
and consequently acts as a resistance to the therapy. Freud 
elaborates on the link between repetition and the unconscious: “we 
can say that the patient‟s resistance arises from his ego, and we 
then at once perceive that the compulsion to repeat must be ascribed 
to the unconscious repressed” (p. 20). Repetition is therefore the 
link between the conscious and the unconscious, or in Freud‟s words, 
“the coherent ego and the repressed” (p. 20). 
 
Freud returns to the distinctive feature of the pleasure principle 
as the source of repetition and the reality principle as the 
intrusion into the pleasure principle, i.e. the disruption of the 
repetition: “There is no doubt that resistance of the conscious and 
unconscious ego operates under the sway of the pleasure principle: 
it seeks to avoid unpleasure which would be produced by the 
liberation of the repressed” (p. 21). Freud‟s penultimate 
explanation for the failure of the therapeutic situation is 
described as the avoidance of unpleasures accompanying the release 
of the repressed. The initial hypothesis is therefore to explain the 
avoidance of the repressed in terms of an avoidance of unpleasure. 
The pleasure principle emphasizes an economy of behaviour with the 
premium on the maintenance of an efficient flow of (neuronal) 
Quantity. The disruption of the efficient flow results in a 
traumatic experience. Therefore, repetition is an innate property of 
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the pleasure principle.
43
 Repetition is part of the pleasure 
principle, not only in terms of its repetitive function, but also as 
a defence mechanism against the reality principle: the adaptation or 
transformation of the facilitations through which (neuronal) 
Quantity runs. The efficiency of the pleasure principle can be 
attributed to the repeatability of the pleasure principle. The 
description of the pleasure principle outside of a neuronal-
quantative-economical framework retains the applicability of the 
pleasure principle. The neuronal distinction is maintained to assist 
with explaining the relation between the pleasure principle and the 
reality principle in a context from which Freud originally derived 
the pleasure principle.  
 
The relation between pleasure and unpleasure is described by Freud 
(1920) in terms of the repressed: 
But we come now to a new and remarkable fact, namely that the 
compulsion to repeat also recalls from the past experiences 
which include no possibility of pleasure, and which can never, 
even long ago, have brought satisfaction even to instinctual 
impulses which have since been repressed. (p. 21) 
The compulsion to repeat is therefore not only the repetition of 
behaviour proven pleasurable or beneficial, but includes even the 
facets repressed. In other words, the repetition compulsion is not 
the repetition and maintenance of beneficial behaviour or outcomes, 
but contains traces of the repressed trauma within the unconscious: 
“Loss of love and failure leave behind them a permanent injury to 
self-regard in the form of a narcissistic scar” (p. 21-2). This 
spills over into the therapeutic situation: “Patients repeat all of 
these unwanted situations and painful emotions in the transference 
and revive them with the greatest ingenuity” (p. 22). The repetition 
compulsion cannot be reproduction, rote memory, or mimesis. There 
isn‟t clear access to the contents of memories or dreams, as those 
                         
43
 Lacan (2008a) writes: “With Freud, it is not a question of creative 
imprinting but of the pleasure engendered by the functioning of the 
facilitations. Now the core of the pleasure principle is situated at the 
level of subjectivity. Facilitation is not a mechanical effect; it is 
invoked as the pleasure of a facility, and it will be taken up again as the 
pleasure of a repetition or, more precisely, as repetition compulsion” (p. 
275) 
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are reproductions or recreations of the original trauma. 
Consequently, Freud‟s focus on the repetition of the traumatic event 
is not in the verbal repetition, but in the unconscious recurrence 
of the trauma. To requote Lacan (1998), “what cannot be remembered 
is repeated in behaviour” (p. 129, his italics). 
 
Freud (1920) elaborates by generalizing the outcome of any situation 
based on previous circumstances: “Thus we have come across people 
all of whose human relationships have the same outcome” (p. 23). The 
full extent of the repetition cannot be explained or identified 
purely in the descriptive process, which is why Freud differentiates 
between active and passive repetition - active through a conscious 
and wilful activation of the events. But Freud is more interested in 
passive experiences: “We are much more impressed by cases where the 
subject appears to have a passive experience, over which he has no 
influence, but in which he meets with a repetition of the same 
fatality” (p. 23-4, his emphasis), only because “it can be noted in 
rare instances” (p. 24). In terms of the pleasure principle as the 
continuation of a flow of Quantity, the new facilitations are 
maintained through the incorporation of the alterations of the 
facilitations. The pleasure principle dictates the continuation of 
the behaviour, not for the purpose of beneficial outcomes, but for 
the maintenance of stability. Adaption and adjustment are features 
of the reality principle. But for Freud, the compulsion to repeat is 
distinct from the pleasure principle, illustrated when Freud writes, 
“we shall find courage to assume that there really does exist in the 
mind a compulsion to repeat which overrides the pleasure principle” 
(p. 24, my emphasis). 
But if a compulsion to repeat does operate in the mind, we 
should be glad to know something about it, to learn what 
function it corresponds to, under what conditions it can 
emerge and what its relation is to the pleasure principle. (p. 
25, his emphasis) 
 
Lacan (1998) critiques the notion that the repetition compulsion is 
revealed through transference, or even that transference can be 
described as a form of repetition: “I am not saying that it is not 
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on the basis of his experience of the transference that Freud 
approached repetition in the transference” (p. 33). For Lacan, the 
link between transference and repetition is made and maintained 
through the therapeutic situation, but proves this link problematic: 
“these displacements of interests have always been more in the 
direction of uncovering structures, which are badly described in 
analysis” (p. 32). Lacan consequently emphasizes the unreliability 
of the spoken word. “What I am saying is that the concept of 
repetition has nothing to do with the concept of the transference”. 
(p. 33) 
 
Lacan has a different reading of Freud‟s repetition compulsion, and 
consequently proposes alterations. The first undertaking in 
describing the repetition compulsion is Lacan‟s criticism of the 
English translation of Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), the 
same translation that was used in this reading.  
You will see, for example, that the translation of instinct 
for Trieb, and instinctual for triebhaft has so many drawbacks 
for the translator […] thus basing the whole edition on a 
complete misunderstanding since Trieb and instinct have 
nothing in common. (p. 49) 
 
This shows a problematic tendency in describing the repetition 
compulsion: Is the repetition compulsion part of drive, which is 
connected with the unconscious, or with instinct, which is connected 
with the conscious? The same is applicable to the notion of 
pleasure, when Lacan differentiates between jouissance and plaisir: 
Jouissance belongs to the unconscious and plaisir to the conscious.  
 
Where does the compulsion to repeat belong? With the conscious 
instinct, which is committed to the repetition of the same, which is 
to act in the way in which one is used to? Or with the drive, which 
is located in the unconscious, i.e. the pleasure principle? 
Therefore, there are two types of reading of the repetition 
compulsion and the therapeutic situation: the classical Freudian and 
the Lacanian. Freud places the repetition compulsion in opposition 
to the pleasure principle, demonstrating repetition as part of a 
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conscious process. Lacan (1998) critiques this conscious 
recollection: “The subject in himself, the recalling of his 
biography, all this goes only to a certain limit, which is known as 
the real” (p. 49). In linguistic terms, the Real is connected to the 
signified which remains distinct from the signifier. The Real 
features as that which cannot be expressed. In terms of the 
therapeutic situation, it is therefore impossible to say everything, 
which makes the account of the “patient” unreliable. Lacan described 
the therapeutic situation as “the uncovering of structures, which 
are badly described in analysis” (p. 32). 
 
Therefore, Lacan‟s reading demonstrates that the repetition 
compulsion is poorly uncovered in therapy. The content of what is 
described in analysis is according to Lacan (1998) a reproduction. 
“Wiederholen is not Reproduzieren” (p. 50, his italics), Repetition 
is not Reproduction. The critique is based on the notion of the 
Real
44
, which is further emphasized by the demonstration of the 
impossibility of reaching the Real. Therefore, what therapeutic 
situations do is grasp at the signifier. Any therapeutic situation 
is focused on the signifier and any act of purging the signifier 
always remains as a symbolic act. “But what Freud showed was that 
nothing can be grasped, destroyed, or burnt, except in a symbolic 
way, as one says, in effigie, in absentia” (p. 50, his emphasis). 
But it revolves around an act, an act which is done “in honour of 
something” (p. 50), and is a return to the separation and 
distinction of the signifier and the signified.  
 
“A true act always has an element of structure, by the fact of 
concerning a real that is not self-evidently caught up in it” (p. 
50). Repetition is therefore explained in terms of an act, which 
fronts as a signifier, but is always closed off from the signified, 
i.e. the Real, the unnameable. The importance of the name is an 
                         
44
 Lacan (1998): “Where do we meet this real? For what we have in the 
discovery of psycho-analysis is an encounter, an essential encounter – an 
appointment to which we are always called with a real that eludes us” (p. 
53) and “The real is beyond the automaton, the return, the coming-back, the 
insistence of the signs, by which we see ourselves governed by the pleasure 
principle” (p. 53-4). Therefore, real is the unknown quantity, illustrated 
when Lacan (1998) writes: “The real supports the phantasy, the phantasy 
protects the real” (p. 41). 
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emphasis on the inaccessibility of the unconscious, which is exactly 
why it is not clear what is behind the act of repetition 
[wiederholen].  
What, then, is the function of traumatic repetition if nothing 
– quite the reverse – seems to justify it from the point of 
view of the pleasure principle? To master the painful event, 
someone may say – but who masters, where is the master here, 
to be mastered? Why speak so hastily when we do not know 
precisely where to situate the agency that would undertake 
this operation of mastery? (p. 51) 
 
The classical Freudian explanation of repetition is often focused on 
the active participation in a traumatic event or experience. The 
repetition is then the repetition of the events in order to gain 
mastery of the situation. However, as Lacan shows, such an 
understanding is problematic, for one, to presume to know how the 
unconscious works, secondly, to know where the repetition is located 
in the unconscious, and thirdly, to know how the subsequent 
repetitions affect the conscious self. 
 
Lacan (1998) writes:  
In these first stages of the experience in which remembering 
is gradually substituted for itself and approaches even nearer 
to a sort of focus, or centre, in which every event seems to 
be under an obligation to yield itself – precisely at this 
moment, we see manifest itself what I will also call the 
resistance of the subject, which becomes at that moment 
repetition in act. (p. 51, his emphasis) 
 
The description of repetition remains enigmatic and problematic. 
Lacan introduces the notion of repetition as a defence mechanism, a 
feature that conceals more than it reveals. The problem arises when 
trying to understand the compulsion to repeat in terms of a 
functional explanation or description. The description always 
supersedes the actual repetition, which is also why Lacan maintains 
a distance between the act of repetition and the description of 
repetition. This is where the problem of locating “mastery” is 
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revealed: is the mastery done in the description of the repetitious 
act, or is the repetitious act itself the master in the 
determination of behaviour?  
 
There is consequently a greater link between the repetition 
compulsion and the L-schema. The repetition between the four corners 
of the L-schema, and the perpetuation of the L-schema, consequently 
reveals how the repetition compulsion is maintained. The L-schema is 
therefore an important demonstration, not only of an intersubjective 
theory, but it also demonstrates and elucidates Lacan‟s 
understanding of Freud‟s repetition compulsion. It is impossible to 
isolate the effects or the influence of the repetition compulsion, 
as there is a continual reintroduction and redistribution of the 
repetition. This affects the discourse of the repetition, which is 
why it is difficult to identify the “master”. “Repetition is 
fundamentally the insistence of speech” (Lacan, 1993, p. 242); this 
is paradoxical and maintains the separation between the act of 
repetition and the description of repetition. The description of 
repetition depends on the recollection of the repetition, which is 
done through memory, and consequently verbalized. 
 
Lacan (1993) elaborates:  
The notion of repetition is so perplexing for us that one 
tries to reduce it to a repetition of needs. If on the 
contrary we read Freud we see that the compulsion to repeat 
was based, as it always had been from the beginning of his 
entire theory of memory, to the question raised for him by the 
insistence of speech which returns in the subject until it has 
said its final word, speech that must return, despite the 
resistance of the ego which is a defence, that is, the 
adherence to the imaginary misconstrual of identification with 
the other. Repetition is fundamentally the insistence of 
speech. (p. 242) 
 
Consequently, a practical example is needed to demonstrate 
connection between the L-schema and the repetition compulsion. The 
example that Freud provides is that of Fort/Da. But the Fort/Da case 
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study presents plenty of problems of its own. Freud and Lacan 
emphasize different aspects, but as will be shown, the Fort/Da case 
study presents the unifying theme of Beyond the Pleasure Principle. 
Attention will be given to Freud, Lacan and Derrida‟s reading. 
 
3.4.1. Freud’s Case Study of the Fort/Da 
 
The Fort/Da case study mentioned in Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
(1920) is significant and demonstrative of the repetition 
compulsion, as well as the linguistic turn in Freud. The case study 
is of an 18 month old boy who had a healthy attachment to the 
mother. The boy created a game with a toy connected to a string that 
would be thrown out of the cot, and the child would say “Fort” (go 
away). Whenever the string was pulled, the toy would appear and the 
child would joyfully exclaim “Da” (there).   
 
The repetition compulsion is demonstrated through the repeatability 
of the game. If the repetition compulsion is the symbolic 
substitution of signifier with signifier, Freud postulates that this 
game will continue indefinitely. The game will not always remain 
within the Fort/Da demonstration, but will evolve and take on a new 
form, of new signifiers, of new words. The game was not played with 
a specific toy, but could be played with any toy, any object. In 
other words, the importance is not with what the game is played, but 
that the game is played. The symbolic reference of the game is, as 
summarized by Freud (1920): “This, then, was the complete game – 
disappearance and return” (p. 14), the disappearance and return of 
das Ding [the Thing], the substitute object of desire. 
 
The difference between Freud and Lacan is the emphasis on the 
appearance and reappearance of the mother. It is more pertinent to 
Lacan connecting words with sentiments. The verbal expression of 
either “Fort” or “Da” is connected with appearance and 
disappearance. The activation of the symbolic is demonstrated in the 
entire situation summed up in Fort/Da.  
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For Freud, the Fort/Da is important for two reasons. First, that the 
game the child plays is an attempt to become active in the 
unpleasant experience, “he was overpowered by the experience; but by 
repeating it, unpleasurable though it was, as a game, he took on an 
active part” (p. 15). With the disappearance of the mother the child 
is passive, as the disappearance is done without any volition of the 
child. But through the recreation and re-enactment of the game the 
child can become active. The child forces the reappearance of the 
object – “though there was no doubt that the greater pleasure was 
attached to the second act” (p. 14) - in the joyous exclamation of 
“Da”, which accompanies the reappearance of the object. Second, 
through what Freud calls the “power instinct”. This is the impulse 
to obtain mastery of the situation. “These efforts might be put down 
to an instinct for mastery that was acting independently of whether 
the memory was in itself pleasurable or not” (p. 15). But as Lacan 
(1998) criticized this point in The Four Fundamentals of 
Psychoanalysis, the notion of mastery is problematic as to the 
source of the master. Is the master the conscious subject who 
chooses, or is it the repetition that compulsively re-invests in a 
signifier? 
 
“How then does his repetition of this distressing experience as a 
game fit in with the pleasure principle?” (p. 15, my italics). Freud 
encounters an interesting turn of events: the return of the object, 
toy, or mother results in a pleasurable outcome, but the 
disappearance is necessary for the return. The disappearance is then 
staged in order to have the pleasurable outcome. But as Freud notes, 
the first part does not always play out with the second part, the 
return. The importance of the first part, - the disappearance - has 
to be accounted for. “It is clear that in their play children repeat 
everything that has made a great impression on them in real life” 
(p. 16).  
 
Freud (1920) concludes in Chapter 2: 
The consideration of these cases and situations, which have a 
yield of pleasure as their final outcome, should be undertaken 
by some system of aesthetics with an economic approach to its 
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subject matter. They are of no use for our purposes, since 
they presuppose the existence and dominance of the pleasure 
principle they give no evidence of the operation of tendencies 
beyond the pleasure, that is, of tendencies more primitive 
than it and independent of it. (p. 17, his italics) 
 
Freud gets caught up in the validation of the game as a feature of 
the pleasure principle. The game has another function not mentioned 
in Freud‟s text, that of internalization. The internalizing of the 
traumatic experience and the consequent return of the traumatic 
experience takes the shape of a game. This still does not explain 
the beyond of the pleasure principle, that which falls outside the 
scope of the pleasure principle. The notion of pleasure, especially 
in Freud‟s description in the second chapter of Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle (1920), is rather misleading. As Lacan differentiates 
between jouissance and plaisir, Freud refers to the pleasurable 
component of the game through the return. This can only be accounted 
for in terms of plaisir, which according to Lacan denotes a 
conscious pleasure. Jousissance is applicable to the pleasure 
principle as the notion of jouissance denotes an unconscious 
pleasure, relating to efficient discharge (cathexis).  
 
To return to Freud‟s explanation of the Project for a Scientific 
Psychology (1950) would be to look at the effect of a traumatic 
experience (the reality principle) in the transformation of 
facilitations. What the „Project‟ mainly accounts for is the trace 
to the initial traumatic experience. The importance of the Fort/Da 
case study demonstrates how a traumatic experience is internalized, 
that regardless of the outcome, regardless of the re-enactment, 
regardless of the “mastering”, the traumatic experience affects 
consequent behaviour. There is no symbolic purging of the traumatic 
event, as the traumatic event affects and alters the core of the 
pleasure principle. The “illusory” mastery is merely a conscious 
pleasure, plaisir, which is made possible within the context of 
unconscious pleasure, jouissance. What the Fort/Da case study 
validates is the manifestation of a traumatic experience. The 
internalizing of the event creates a lasting impression, which can 
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only be accounted for in terms of the alterations in the 
facilitations [Bahnung]. The creation of an internal Law is at 
stake. The possibility of a beyond is not dealt with in the example, 
which is the limitation of the Fort/Da case study.  
 
Lacan‟s reading of the Fort/Da case study is the focus of the next 
section, and draws more attention to Freud‟s (1950) Project for a 
Scientific Psychology. Lacan presents a different reading of Fort/Da 
that is more fitting to the general theme of Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle (1920). 
 
3.4.2. Lacan’s reading of the Fort/Da case study 
 
Lacan‟s reading of the Fort/Da case study is problematic as Lacan 
never focuses specifically on the case study in any of the sections 
in the Seminars, but incorporates the Fort and the Da as an example 
throughout his work. The three aspects pertinent to Lacan‟s reading 
of the Fort/Da case study are: the linguistic aspects, the reel 
(toy) as the objet petit a, and the Fort/Da as demonstrative of the 
substitution that takes place, not only in terms of linguistic 
synonyms, but also the object of desire. 
 
Lacan re-introduces the distinction between the signifier and the 
signified as the first approach specifies the linguistic aspects. 
The signifiers are in this case the vocal Fort and Da as an 
expression: “Everything begins when several signifiers can present 
themselves to the subject at the same time, in a Gleichzeitigkeit” 
(2008a, p. 79, his emphasis). The usage of Fort and Da are not 
connected, as any other word would have sufficed. The words emerge 
through a play of differences as found in Saussure‟s description of 
the arbitrary nature of the signifier. “It is on the basis of this 
synchrony that something comes to be organized, something that the 
mere play of Fort and Da could not produce by itself” (Lacan, 2008a, 
p. 80). The value of Fort and Da are only realized in terms of the 
case study, in terms of what is significant, signified. The meaning 
of Fort/Da for Lacan is demonstrated with the disappearance and 
appearance of the mother. The physical manifestation of the game is 
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of secondary importance, i.e. it is not that the game is played, but 
why the game is played, and what makes the game possible to begin 
with. 
When Freud grasps the repetition involved in the game played 
by his grandson, in the reiterated fort-da, he may indeed 
point out that the child makes up for the effect of his 
mother‟s disappearance by making himself the agent of it – 
but, this phenomenon is of secondary importance. (Lacan, 1998, 
p. 62) 
In other words, the traumatic event is repeated. The shape that the 
repetition takes is “of secondary importance”, wherefore it is not 
the contents of the game, but what is signified through the game. 
 
In terms of the pleasure principle and Freud‟s (1950) Project for a 
Scientific Psychology, the Fort/Da case study reveals how a 
traumatic experience is assimilated and surfaces in subsequent 
behaviour. In terms of neurology, the facilitations are adapted and 
adjusted to accommodate the influx of Qñ that the contact-barriers 
cannot control. The facilitations will always have a trace relating 
to the traumatic event, as the trauma is responsible for the 
alterations in the facilitations. The practical neurological 
explanation shows how the new facilitations are created in terms of 
the traumatic experience. The trauma cannot be detached from the new 
facilitations as trauma is placed at the centre of memory and the 
creation of memory. To quote Cilliers (1989) again: 
Memory does not lie in the facilitated pathways themselves, 
but in the relationship between them, and this relationship is 
one of differences. […] The forming of memory traces in the ψ 
[impermeable] neurons by quantity from the perceptual system, 
and from the endogenous stimuli, and the methods of the ψ used 
to discharge this quantity, are all unconscious. (Cilliers, 
1989, p. 112) 
 
The changes that occur are twofold, first in the facilitations 
themselves, and second in the way the facilitations are connected. 
To reiterate, it is not the facilitations themselves that make 
memory possible, but the arrangement of the facilitations. The 
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trauma leaves traces behind in the facilitations and through these 
(traumatic, painful) breaches within the facilitations, are 
impermeable neurons changed in structure. But because these 
facilitations are unconscious, it is for Freud and Lacan a question 
of how these embedded traces operate and are revealed. The Fort/Da 
case study shows how a traumatic event is reproduced in a game 
whereby the traumatic event is continually (unconsciously) 
reproduced. Therefore, when Lacan says that Fort and Da are “of 
secondary importance”, it can be best explained in terms of the 
Freudian separation between Sache and Wort. What is at stake is the 
Sache, or in Saussurian terminology, the signified, whereby the 
Sache (the signified) comes to be known through the Wort, the 
signifier. 
 
The understanding of the reel as synonymous with the mother proves 
problematic for Lacan, as the distance between the signifier and the 
signified has to be maintained. Lacan writes: “This reel is not the 
mother reduced to a little ball by some magical game worthy of the 
Jivaros – it is a small part of the subject that detaches itself 
from him while still remaining his, still retained” (1998, p. 62). 
Jivaros refers to an American Indian tribe of eastern Ecuador and 
northern Peru renowned for their custom of preserving hair and skin 
from the severed heads of their enemies. This is significant to 
Lacan because the trophy is the actual object, in contrast to the 
reel that is a representation. Lacan (1998) elaborates: 
If it is true that the signifier is the first mark of the 
subject, how can we fail to recognize here – from the very 
fact that this game is accompanied by one of the first 
oppositions to appear – that it is in the object to which the 
opposition is applied in act, the reel, that we must designate 
the subject. To this object we will later give the name it 
bears in the Lacanian algebra – the petit a. (p. 62) 
 
The reel plays two roles, first as the signifier and second as the 
objet petit a. The significance of the objet a is the link between 
the symbolic and the imaginary. Van Haute (2000) describes the objet 
petit a: “Het object a is het oorzaak-object van het verlangen 
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waartoe het subject zich in het fantasma verhoudt” [The object is 
the cause-object of the desire to which the subject relates himself 
in the phantasy] (p. 127). In other words, the objet a is the link 
between the Freudian Sache and Wort: an artificial connection that 
maintains the possibility of a link. The emphasis is on the 
separation between the unconscious sensation (Sache) and the 
conscious correlate (Wort), or more specific, between an emotional 
sensation and the correlation within an expression. The objet a 
accounts for both the signifier as the closest approximation in 
language to the unconscious sensation. The objet a is a component of 
phantasy correlating to the attributes of subjective desire that is 
constituted as desirable. For example, it is not the actual object 
that is the object of desire, but the qualities ascribed to it that 
make it the object of desire. It is an unnameable quality, 
considering that the source of the criteria deeming an object 
desirable is from within the impenetrable unconscious. 
 
The objet a explains why Lacan hesitates to link the reel with the 
Mother, even though this is unavoidable. Lacan links the reel with 
the Mother not in terms of a physical replacement, but in terms of 
transference. 
The activity as a whole symbolizes repetition, but not at all 
that of some need that might demand the return of the mother, 
and which would be expressed quite simply in a cry. It is the 
repetition of the mother‟s departure as cause of a Spaltung 
[divide] in the subject – overcome by the alternating game, 
fort-da, which is here or there, and whose aim, in its 
alternation, is simply that of being the fort of a da, and the 
da of a fort. (1998, p. 62-3, his italics) 
The emphasis of the Fort/Da case study, specifically for Lacan, is 
therefore not the substitution that takes place, nor the mastery of 
the situation, but the repetition that occurs, and how the traumatic 
event manifests in behaviour. The “overcoming” of the game over the 
situation results in the initial situation being “forgotten”, but 
repeated in the form of a game. The notion of the subject as master 
of a painful event is absurd, as Lacan shows that the repetition of 
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the game is not done in accordance with a conscious decision to 
repeat. 
To say that is simply a question for the subject of 
instituting himself in a function of mastery is idiotic. In 
the two phonemes are embodied the very mechanisms of 
alienation – which are expressed, paradoxical as it may seem, 
at the level of the fort. (1998, p.239) 
Through the Fort - the absence or disappearance - a gap
45
 is opened, 
but the potential for this opening was always there. Is it 
consequently only a matter of filling this void
46
 through 
substitution, which can take the place of a word or an object?
47
 
 
The chain linking signifier with signifier, which through a play of 
signifiers creates synonymous objects of desire passing from one 
link to the next. This never penetrates the core of the object of 
desire as the object desired always remains a semblance, the objet 
petit a. 
 
The possibility of recognizing the object of desire is achieved 
through closing the gap between the object and the qualities that 
make the object desirable [objet petit a]. But this gap first needs 
to be opened up so that the object can become the object of desire, 
thereby possess the characteristics/qualities that make it 
desirable. 
                         
45
 “Although we know that after such a loss the acute state of mourning 
will subside, we also know we shall remain inconsolable and will never find 
a substitute. No matter what may fill the gap, even if it be filled 
completely, it nevertheless remains something else. And actually this is 
how it should be. It is the only way of perpetuating that love which we do 
not want to relinquish” (Freud [in a letter to Binswanger], quoted in John 
Bowlby, 1985, p. 23)  
46
 Badiou (2007) writes on the „void‟: “It is a question of names here – 
„nothing‟ or „void‟ – because being, designated by these names, is neither 
local nor global. The name I have chosen, the void, indicates precisely 
that nothing is presented, no term, and also that the designation of that 
nothing occurs „emptily‟, it does not locate it structurally” (p. 56). 
47
 Badiou (2007) calls the naming of the „void‟ a nominal process, which 
validates the argument presented here. “Naturally, because the void is 
indiscernible as a term (because it is not one), its inaugural appearance 
is a pure act of nomination. This name cannot be specific; it cannot place 
the void under anything that would subsume it – this would be to 
reestablish the one. The name cannot indicate that the void is this or 
that. The act of nomination, being a-specific, consumes itself, indicating 
nothing other than the unpresentable as such” (p. 59). 
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Lacan (1998) elaborates:  
The subject is an apparatus. This apparatus is something 
lacunary, and it is in the lacuna that the subject establishes 
the function of a certain object, qua lost object. It is the 
status of the objet a in so far as it is present in the drive. 
(1998, p. 185, his italics) 
The lacuna, or gap, is opened through disappearance, as demonstrated 
in the Fort/Da case study. The disappearance initiates the search 
for a supplement, a replacement. The disappearance is exactly the 
prelude that sets the process of substitution in action. This 
creates a link of synonyms which connect different objects (with 
similar qualities) with each other through what Lacan call the objet 
petit a. The object petit a is the perceived connection with das 
Ding. But because the object of desire isn‟t das Ding, there is 
always an endless repetition. As the criteria changes, so does das 
Ding.  
The function of the exercise with this object refers to an 
alienation, and not to some supposed mastery, which is 
difficult to imagine being increased in an endless repetition, 
whereas the endless repetition that is in question reveals the 
radical vacillation of the subject. (p. 239) 
 
Therefore, this accounts for why, at different stages, one desires 
different characteristics. The object of desire is still accounted 
for within the pleasure principle, linking drive with desire. “It is 
the status of the objet a in so far as it is present in the drive” 
(1998, p. 185, his italics). The unconscious drive is solely focused 
on the attainment of the object of desire. Lacan demonstrates that 
this is impossible as the qualities and the object are not 
synonymous. It is the gap between the object and the qualities that 
are bridged through the object petit a. However, the possibility of 
the desirability of an object is regardless of the actual 
[wirkliche] qualities and characteristics.  
 
The possibility of bridging the gap is a result of the pleasure 
principle: as a result of the conditions set by the facilitations 
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[Bahnung]. The emphasis on facilitations is the emphasis on an 
internal Law, as Lacan demonstrates that prohibition allows for 
desire, as described in Chapter 2. The pleasure principle is the 
maintenance of continuity which dictates the continual pursuit for 
the object of desire to reinstate the comfort and harmony, as 
explained in Chapter 1. The death drive is the pursuit of the object 
or object-cause of desire, whereby the conditions for attainment are 
stipulated through the pleasure principle, the Law, in an undeferred 
state. The death drive is discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
To reiterate the three reasons of the significance of the Fort/Da 
case study: First, the verbal communication in the Fort and Da by 
connecting the event with the approximate signifier with the absence 
and reappearance of the mother. Second, making an effigy of the 
situation by naming it Fort or Da, whereby the Fort and Da capture 
the event in a symbolic gesture and replace the origins of the game. 
Third, the process of substitution that takes place in the process 
of naming, not only in how the name of the situation replaces the 
situation, but also how the imaginary links are made between the 
signifier and the signified through the objet petit a. 
 
3.4.3. Derrida’s reading of the Fort/Da case study 
 
Jacques Derrida‟s account of Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle focuses specifically on the Fort/Da case study as 
described in Psychoanalysis and the Question of the text (1978). 
Derrida presents a chapter entitled “Coming into One‟s Own”48. 
Derrida‟s reading is discussed, as Derrida provides a critique 
illustrating how Freud‟s own repetition compulsion impacts on the 
development of a theoretical position today known as Psychoanalysis.  
 
The significance of Derrida‟s reading of the Fort/Da case study to 
this thesis is found in what Geoffrey H. Hartman writes in the 
Preface: “How do we classify that book [Beyond the Pleasure 
                         
48
 Derrida also discusses Freud‟s description of the Fort/Da case study in 
The Post Card (1987) in greater depth in Chapter 2, Freud‟s Legacy, pp. 
292-337 
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Principle] after reading Derrida? Is it Psychoanalysis, philosophy, 
literature, or autobiography?” (p. xii). This section is centred on 
this question by Hartmann, as Derrida provides a different reading 
of Fort/Da achieved by Derrida through blurring the distinction 
between Fort/Da as an example, Fort/Da as biography, and Fort/Da as 
a theory. 
 
The first aspect that Derrida brings into question is the objective-
scientific distance that Freud initially tries to maintain in the 
case study. 
Here, for the first time in this book, is a passage that 
appears to be autobiographical and even domestic. This face is 
veiled, but all the more significant. Freud says that he was a 
witness – an interested witness – to the experiment. It took 
place in his family, though he does not mention this [in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920)] (1987, p. 115-6, his 
italics) 
Derrida exposes the many layers of the case study, rather than 
expound on the information given. The smaller clues throughout the 
text fascinate Derrida. The Fort/Da case study becomes 
autobiographical; rather than a theoretical explanation of, for 
example, the repetition compulsion, desire, absence/presence, etc. 
Derrida demonstrates how Freud is part of the Fort/Da case study, 
not only as an author, but also as a participant, an “actor”, and an 
instigator. The description of the scene is scrutinized not in the 
big details, but in the small gestures, for example: 
Everything is fine, wonderful child, but. Here‟s the “but”: 
this wonderful child had one disturbing habit. It‟s hard to 
see right off how Freud, at the end of the amazing description 
of it that he offers, can calmly conclude: “I eventually 
realized that it was a game”.  
(p. 123, his italics, quoting Freud, 1920, p. 13) 
Derrida focuses on a single word, in this example, the word but. The 
word but follows the affirmation of the child‟s behaviour but 
suggests disappointment. It is the manner in which the child plays 
with the reel: “Why doesn‟t he play train or car? Would that be more 
normal?” (1978, p. 129). 
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Derrida suggests that the Fort/Da case study is then brought to life 
through the misapplication of a toy. Freud reassures himself of this 
misapplication, as well as the reader, his daughter, and the mother 
of the child when he writes: “I eventually realized that it was a 
game” (Freud, 1920, p. 13) 
 
It wasn‟t just the game being played, but the accompanying sounds 
that fascinated Freud. “The concurrence linking father and daughter 
in the interpretation of „0-0-0-0‟ as „fort‟ is unusual in several 
ways” (Derrida, 1978, p. 127; Freud, 1920, p. 13-4). The sound made 
by the child is in turn given a veil by both Sigmund Freud (the 
grandfather and father) and Sophie Freud (the mother and daughter). 
The “o-o-o-o” is interpreted as “fort” by the grandfather, father, 
mother, and daughter. For Derrida, this too is part of the game 
becoming theory, best exemplified when Freud (1920, p. 14) wrote: 
“This then was the complete game”.  
 
Derrida (1978) critiques the Fort/Da as a theoretical example: 
And this is what I shall call the argument of the wooden reel: 
a legendary argument that is neither story nor history nor 
myth nor fiction. Nor is it the systematic elaboration of a 
theoretical proof. It is fragmentary, without conclusion, 
selective: rather an argument in the sense of an outline. 
(Derrida, 1978, p. 115) 
 
According to Derrida the Fort/Da game remains incomplete for two 
reasons. First, “the scene is that of an endlessly repeated 
supplementation, as if it could never become complete” (1978, p. 
128). The game never plays out in isolation, and is influenced – by 
the viewer and at the same time influences the viewer - by the 
interpreter, the mother, the daughter, the father, the grandfather. 
Second, “there is something like an incomplete axiom in the 
structure of the writing scene, owing to the position of the 
spectator as an interested observer” (p. 128). The description of 
the scene, as set out by the author, is always an incomplete 
description. To fully describe the scene, the author has to speak on 
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behalf of all the participants. Specifically in the Fort/Da case 
study, Derrida negates the description of Freud as impartial 
observer. His direct involvement within the case study already 
supposes Freud as a participant. The role of the grandfather, 
father, already supposes a narration. As Derrida (1978) concludes: 
“Even if completeness were possible, it would never appear to such 
an observer, nor could he declare it to be complete” (p.128). 
 
This is the focus of Derrida‟s critique on the Fort/Da case study, 
whereby Derrida (1978) shows how Psychoanalysis is built on the 
unconscious workings of Freud the grandfather and the father. 
If there lingers in the astounding event of this co-operation 
the unanalyzed remnant of an unconscious, if this remnant 
shapes and constitutes with its otherness the auto-biography 
of this testamentary writing, then I wager that it will be 
handed down blindly by the entire movement of the return to 
Freud. (p. 120) 
 
The Fort/Da case study has become a hallmark of Freudian 
Psychoanalysis with its insemination. “If we were to simplify the 
question, it would become, for example, how can an auto-biographical 
writing, in the abyss of an unterminated self-analysis, give its 
birth to a world institution?” (1978, p. 121). The separation 
between Freud as person and Freud as theoretical perspective is 
problematized. Derrida shows how Freud as person‟s own repetition 
compulsion plays in on the development of a theoretical Freudian 
position. Derrida blurs this distinction by showing how biographical 
information within the footnotes and main text provide important 
clues, for example: “When this child was five and three-quarters, 
his mother died” (Derrida, 1978, p. 140; Freud, 1920, p. 16n7). With 
the death of the daughter/mother/Sophie, Derrida shows how the 
Fort/Da is applicable to a biographical situation; the object, the 
reel, is applicable to Sophie, who is at the same time the mother of 
the boy and the daughter of Freud. Derrida questions who is really 
playing the Fort/Da game: “Not deceiving, in any case, about a 
daughter (mother) who should stay where she is, daughter, mother – a 
wife, perhaps, but undividedly so, or divided between the two 
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Freuds, in their sole possession” (1978, p. 139). Derrida emphasizes 
how Freud describes the absence of the daughter as a lost object for 
the son, but the daughter could just as easily have been the lost 
object for Freud. 
 
Derrida effectively shows that Freud is an active participant within 
the Fort/Da case study. Derrida demonstrates how Freud‟s theory is 
marred by Freud‟s biography and in turn shapes an entire discipline, 
namely Psychoanalysis. Freud‟s own participation is that of more 
than an observer, as Derrida shows how the Fort/Da case study is 
also a description of Freud dealing with the death of Sophie. 
This falling-off would suggest a dead woman is easier to keep 
for oneself: one‟s jealousy is relaxed and idealization 
interiorizes the object out of the rival‟s grasp. Thus Sophie, 
daughter and mother, is dead, preserved from and surrendered 
to each „sole possession‟. (1978, p. 140, his emphasis) 
 
Derrida‟s reading of the Fort/Da is a critique of the Fort/Da and 
the way that it is presented. Any notion of objectivity is 
destroyed, as any description by Freud cannot be impartial. 
Derrida‟s critique focuses on how a personal tragic loss has become 
internalized into a psychoanalytic practice; how the loss of a 
daughter, mother, wife presented through a biographical event has 
transformed the notion of death within Psychoanalysis. The Fort (the 
absence) precedes but anticipates the Da (the presence) the return. 
Derrida consequently shows how problematic it is to discuss the 
topic of death without referring to an already perceived “presence”. 
The anticipation of the “disappearance” is continually anticipated 
through the return. Therefore the same applies to life, which cannot 
be discussed independently from death, and vice versa.  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter is the cornerstone of this thesis, as this chapter ties 
three important theoretical notions together: the L-schema, the 
repetition compulsion and the Fort/Da case study. This chapter 
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examines the Fort/Da case study in a broader perspective that 
incorporates biography and a greater theoretical perspective than 
merely describing a child playing with a toy. Three perspectives of 
the Fort/Da case study are examined: of Freud, Lacan, and Derrida. 
 
Freud‟s description of the Fort/Da focuses on the substitutive 
process at work where traumatic experience returns in the form of a 
game. The repetition of the game validates the hypothesis that a 
traumatic event is embedded in the unconscious (as described in 
Chapter 2, the influx of Q alters the facilitations, and leaves an 
impression). The repetition of the traumatic experience is what 
Freud called the repetition compulsion. Freud originally presented 
the Fort/Da as demonstrative of the relationship between the child 
and the mother, but also concedes how it illustrates the repetition 
compulsion. The actions within the game represent the repetition of 
a traumatic experience, namely the absence of the mother. The child 
incorporates the features of the mother leaving, and repeats the 
gesture in a game. Freud emphasizes how a traumatic event is 
repeated in everyday behaviour and gestures. Freud incorporates 
language in the Fort-Da, as the disappearance of the mother is 
accompanied with a Fort (go away!) and the return is accompanied 
with a Da! (there!). It was Lacan who took the linguistic component 
further. 
 
Lacan refines the linguistic component which was always present in 
the Fort/Da. Lacan builds on Freud‟s distinction between Sache and 
Wort, which is the distinction between the unconscious sensation and 
the conscious description. Even Lacan‟s L-schema denotes an 
Otherness in the words used to describe the self. Meaning is always 
cycled between the L-schema‟s four corners, and results in a 
repetition. The four corners of the L-schema are connected through a 
symbolic and an imaginary link: the symbolic pertains to the words 
used and the imaginary pertains to the descriptions attributed. For 
example, a sentence consists of words (the symbolic), but it is the 
imaginary that gives the sentence multiple meaning. The L-schema 
illustrates how a méconnaisance [misrecognition] of the self occurs. 
This means that when the self looks in the mirror, the self isn‟t 
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seen as it actually is, but always in terms of an idealized 
description. Méconnaisance [misrecognition] occurs in the gap 
between the Sache and Wort, signified and signifier; in other words, 
between the actual self and description of the self.  
 
Lacan also uses the L-schema to demonstrate how desire is explained 
in terms of the Other. The first chapter presents the primary 
caregiver as the source of desire, but the third chapter explains 
how the Other is the source of desire. Or as van Haute (1989) 
describes desire and the Other:  
Het subject heft aan de Ander niets te bieden … dan zijn 
tekort: ik kan de begeerte van de Ander niet voltooien. Wat ik 
ook geef of krijg, het is nooit wat ik zoek. Het tekort van de 
Ander keert terug in het tekort van het subject. De 
circulariteit van de relatie tussen het subject en de Ander 
krijgt zo een meer concreet karakter. [The subject has nothing 
to offer the Other … than his lack: I can never complete the 
desire of the Other. What I give or receive is never what I 
seek. The lack of the Other returns as the lack of the 
subject. The circular relation between the subject and the 
Other accordingly creates a more concrete character] (p. 144) 
 
But the problem still remains how one can know what the object of 
desire is. Lacan emphasizes that desire is insatiable, and that 
there can never be saturation. Moyaert (1995) explain how the flux 
of desire takes place: 
Het feit dat men nooit genoeg heft, dat het nooit precies dat 
is wat men verlangde, dat men steeds meer wil en dus ook 
altijd naar iets anders verlangt, is een andere vorm van 
opaciteit dan de onmogenlijkheid om aan de objectpool precies 
aan te duiden wat het verlangen veroorzaakt. [The fact that 
one never has enough, that it is never exactly what one 
desires, that one still wants more and therefore always longs 
for something else, is another form of opacity (of desire) 
than the impossibility of indicating precisely through the 
object-pole what causes desire.] (p. 21) 
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A second explanation for the unattainability of the object of desire 
is through the gap between the signifier and the signified. This gap 
maintains the distance between the true object of desire and the 
representation of the object of desire. All that we can grasp is the 
representation, which is fleeting. Because the signified is never 
penetrated, signifiers and representations are always grasped at. 
Substitution is the replacement of one representation for a closer 
representation of the object of desire. The process of substitution 
continues until an approximation of infatuation is found. A closer 
approximation does not necessarily mean that this is the final 
representation. “Het „object‟ van verlangen kan altijd omslaan in 
het indifferent en terugvallen in het banale” [The „object‟of desire 
can always be overturned into the indifferent and relapse into the 
banal] (Moyaert, 1995, p. 22, his emphasis). It is therefore neither 
the presence of the object, nor the name of the object of desire 
that facilitates desire, but the pursuit of a closer approximation 
to the phantasized object of desire.  
 
The Fort/Da case study, in the classical Freudian description, 
focuses on the mother, symbolized through the reel. The child re-
enacts the departure/arrival or the absence/presence of the mother 
through a game. The explanation that the attempt of gaining mastery 
of the situation, a preliminary remark made by Freud, is proven 
inconclusive, as Lacan demonstrates how the master is not the 
subject who desires. “Het subject van het verlangen is onbewust 
omdat het niet op zichzelf gericht en betrokken is” [The subject of 
desire is unconscious because it is not focused on nor involved with 
itself] (Moyaert, 1995, p. 20, his emphasis). For Lacan, the master 
is therefore located in the pleasure principle that compulsively 
repeats the re-investment of the (arbitrary) signifier that never 
penetrates the signified, the Sache. “Het verlangen is immers het 
effect van een principieel onvolledige orde van betekenaars” [The 
longing is consequently the effect of one fundamental incomplete 
order of signifiers] (van Haute, 1989, p. 138, his emphasis). 
 
A third description of the Fort/Da case study is that of Jacques 
Derrida, who fine-combed the Fort/Da case study to highlight its 
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inconsistencies. Ironically, these findings only validate the 
workings of the unconscious. Derrida applies the psychoanalytic 
approach to a psychoanalytic example and demonstrates how the 
Fort/Da case study demonstrates more than just a boy playing with a 
toy and mimicking the presence/absence of the object of desire on an 
unconscious level. Derrida illustrates how Freud‟s own compulsion to 
repeat plays out in the Fort/Da case study.  
 
The case study of the Fort/Da is significant beyond Derrida‟s 
critique of the biographical content of the case study and how 
Freud‟s own compulsion to repeat plays in on his discussion of 
Fort/Da. The critique only gives credence to the psychoanalytic 
approach whereby the reel demonstrates and acts as the objet petit a 
in terms of the absence that allows for the presence of another [an 
Other]. “De begeerte word gestructureerd door de betekenaars van de 
Ander waarin de Vraag gearticuleerd werd. Deze betekenaars bepalen 
de betekenis van het fanstasme en beslissen over de concrete 
lichamelijke interpretatie van het tekort” [Desire is structured 
through the signifiers of the Other whereby the Question is 
articulated. These signifiers determine the meaning of the phantasy 
and rules over the concrete corporal interpretation of the lack] 
(van Haute, 1989, p. 146). 
 
The difference between Lacan and Derrida is most notably how Lacan 
incorporates the Fort/Da case study within a larger corpus of work, 
including Linguistics and repetition. Lacan adds a linguistic 
component, which builds on Freud‟s distinction between Sache and 
Wort. This is also a distinction between the unconscious sensation 
and the conscious description. Even Lacan‟s L-schema denotes an 
Otherness in the words used to describe the self. The distance 
between the Sache and Wort, signified and signifier, is the gap 
where méconnaisance [misrecognition] occurs. Lacan thereby focuses 
on the attempts to bridge the gap between the Sache and the Wort, 
the signified and the signifier. Because this gap can never be 
closed, there is a continual process of substitution of 
signifiers/Wort in search of the signified/Sache. The appearance of 
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corroboration between the signifier and the signified, the Wort and 
the Sache is what Lacan calls the objet petit a. 
 
The next chapter will focus on the conditions whereby the pleasure 
principle reaches cessation. The goal of the pleasure principle is 
the death drive. The primacy of the pleasure principle demonstrates 
how desire and substitution are incorporated and explain what the 
death drive is. Through the death drive is the beyond of the 
pleasure principle revealed. The Fort/Da demonstrates, as Derrida 
shows, how the disappearance already anticipates and precedes the 
reappearance. This is exactly why it is problematic to discuss the 
notion of death in terms of a disappearance, or even in terms of 
absence. If death cannot be explained in terms of absence, Chapter 4 
provides an alternative by defining death in terms of entropy, 
desire, the pleasure principle, the reality principle and phantasy.  
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Chapter 4 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the final two chapters of Freud‟s (1920) 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle which probably are the two most 
controversial in Freud‟s oeuvre marked by the introduction of the 
death drive. This chapter focuses on the death drive, Freud‟s 
explanation, Lacan‟s rewording, and the relevant criticisms. 
 
The first section focuses on Freud‟s description as presented in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). Freud‟s description of the 
death drive - especially pertaining to Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
(1920) - is especially problematic as the arguments Freud presents 
are often illogical and nonsensical. This makes salvaging the death 
drive all the more difficult. Freud attempts a few different 
methods, but continually returns to the model presented in The 
Project for a Scientific Psychology (1950) (in this chapter 
hereafter referred to as „Project‟, which denotes a neuronal 
economy, applicable to a libidinal economy. 
 
The second section focuses on the critiques of the death drive, as 
presented by Havi Carel and Richard Boothby. Carel disagrees 
vehemently with the description of the death drive in terms of a 
neuronal or libidinal economy, whereby Carel has to find an 
alternative solution to the death drive, but this is also 
problematic in its own right. Freud‟s death drive is consequently 
reworded by Carel to accommodate the notion of aggression. Boothby 
argues for a Lacanian reading of the death drive, but with his own 
twist in the reading of the pleasure principle.  
 
Carel and Boothby provide well argued claims, but closer inspection 
reveals the hindrance in their respective approaches. Based on their 
criticisms, adjustments are made so that the death drive can be 
redescribed with their criticisms in mind.  
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The third section focuses on Lacan‟s understanding of the death 
drive, as described through a culmination of all the topics 
mentioned in previous chapters. Lacan‟s description is presented in 
three subsections, focusing on Lacan‟s incorporation of (1) 
aggression and defining the death drive in terms of (2) desire and 
(3) castration.  
 
Lacan‟s description of the death drive is twofold: firstly, the 
mechanical explanation of the pleasure principle, and secondly, how 
desire features within the pleasure principle. Lacan‟s description 
of the death drive encompasses libido, desire, economy, Linguistics, 
and the Oedipus complex. This proves why Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle is not only an important text in Freud‟s oeuvre, 
but also in Lacan‟s.  
 
4.2. Freud’s description of the Death Drive 
 
Freud‟s description of the death drive is presented in the final two 
chapters of Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). The description 
presented here will focus solely on that text. Although Freud‟s 
argument proves problematic, there is a very basic argument provided 
in which Freud formulates the connection between life and death.  
 
Freud‟s approach emphasizes the primacy of the death drive in 
contrast to the traditional argument that stresses the primacy of 
the life drive. To take a single passage of Chapter 5, Freud (1920) 
writes: 
For a long time, perhaps, living substance was thus being 
constantly created afresh and easily dying, till decisive 
external influences altered in such a way as to oblige the 
still surviving substance to diverge ever more widely from its 
original course of life and to make ever more complicated 
détours before reaching its aim of death. (p. 46, his 
emphasis) 
The „détours‟ Freud is speaking of, is the delays that occur, 
preventing the attainment of the goals, just as the reality 
principle intrudes into the pleasure principle, or in terms of 
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Quantity that exceeds the contact-barriers, adjustments are 
consequently made. Death can then be articulated in terms of 
neuronal Quantity whereby the complete minimalization of Quantity 
leads to zero. If death is the zero flow in Quantity, Freud 
hypothesizes that the death drive would be the minimalized flow of 
Quantity, void of any excesses or delays. Freud continues: “These 
circuitous paths to death, faithfully kept to by its conservative 
instincts, would thus present us to-day with the picture of the 
phenomena of life” (p. 46). In other words, according to Freud, life 
is that which happens en route to death. Life is the deferral of 
death, the inevitable delay that prolongs death through the 
intrusion of external effects. The death drive is therefore 
synonymous in function with the pleasure principle, as the death 
drive is the progression towards death, whereas the continual 
intervention acts as the prolongation, the delay. Freud recognizes 
the inherent paradox and contradiction, especially when he writes: 
“Hence arises the paradoxical situation that the living organism 
struggles most energetically against events (dangers, in fact) which 
might help it to attain its life‟s aim rapidly – by a kind of short-
circuit” (p. 47).  
 
Freud first has to account for the paradox identified. For example, 
physical threats are feared, but the threat would only speed up the 
process of death, which would make the threat sought-after. Freud 
writes: “What we are left with is the fact that the organism wishes 
to die only in its own fashion” (p. 47).49 The correct conditions of 
death are important, and this is a notion that Lacan makes explicit 
in his reading of the death drive; there are preferred conditions in 
which death is sought after. This understanding of death does not 
                         
49
 Joan Copjec (2002) expands on the paradox Freud confronts: “The 
paradoxical Freudian claim that the death drive is a speculative concept 
designed to help explain why life aims at death, in fact, tells only half 
the story; the other half is revealed by a second paradox: the death drive 
achieves its satisfaction by not achieving its aim. Moreover, the 
inhibition that prevents the drive from achieving its aim is not understood 
within Freudian theory to be due to an extrinsic or exterior obstacle, but 
rather as part of the very activity of the drive itself. The full paradox 
of the death drive, then, is: while the aim (Ziel) of the drive is death, 
the proper and positive activity of the drive is to inhibit the attainment 
of its aim” (p. 30). 
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denote destruction or absence, but finitude as the limit or 
threshold where life ceases. In other words, the pleasure principle 
has reached its final conclusion when deferral or delay is no longer 
possible. A modest description is needed of the death drive that can 
account for the paradoxes Freud faced. However, this is not a 
radically new reading of Freud‟s death drive, but can also be 
inferred in Karen Horney‟s (1939) New Ways in Psychoanalysis 
description of the death drive. By combining instincts with “its aim 
to extinguish the disturbing stimulation and re-establish the 
equilibrium as it was before the stimulation interfered” (p. 122) 
and the repetition compulsion that Horney describes as “seems to be 
the expression of a tendency, inherent in organic life, to restore 
an earlier form of existence and to return to it” (p. 122). Horney 
concludes that the death drive is a logical product of instincts and 
the repetition compulsion: 
From these considerations [instincts and the repetition 
compulsion] Freud jumps to a daring conclusion: since there is 
an instinctual tendency to regress, to re-establish former 
stages, and since the inorganic existed prior to the organic, 
prior to the development of life, there must be an innate 
tendency toward re-establishing the inorganic state; since the 
condition of non-living existed earlier than the condition of 
living, there must be an instinctual drive toward death. “The 
goal of life is death”. (p. 122-3) 
However, Horney proceeds to counteract the death drive with the life 
drive, which she equates with the sexual drive. Horney‟s 
understanding of the death drive is therefore a drive set out on the 
destruction of the self, but is counteracted by the life drive, 
which is the sexual drive. “What we are able to observe are fusions, 
an alliance of the death instinct with the sexual instinct. It is 
this alliance which prevents the death instinct from destroying us, 
or at least postpones this destruction” (p. 123). However, Horney is 
still presupposing a drive towards the destruction of the self. The 
two readings presented in Section 4.3. provide two different lines 
of argument with regard to aggression: whether aggression is the 
product of an internal, already presupposed drive; or whether 
aggression is the product of tension between the death and life 
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instincts. The same can be asked of self-destruction: whether a 
drive towards self-destruction is an innate possibility already 
present, or whether self-destruction is the product of tension 
between the death and life instincts. 
 
4.3. Two readings of Freud’s (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
 
There is ample resistance to Freud‟s death drive, which needs to be 
dealt with before Lacan‟s description can be evaluated. Two readings 
of Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle presented are those 
of Richard Boothby (1987, 1991) and Havi Carel (2006). Both point 
out the tremendous body of criticism against Freud‟s death drive and 
both point out the shortcomings in Freud‟s own articulation of the 
death drive. Both present alternative readings of the death drive 
that would, in their view, validate the death drive. However, both 
of them differ significantly from the conclusion made in this 
chapter, as this thesis contends that the death drive should be 
described in terms of desire, drive, entropy, and the pleasure 
principle. 
 
4.3.1. Critiques on the Death Drive 
 
The critiques on the death drive are added not necessarily to show 
the shortcomings of Freud‟s argument as presented by Boothby and 
Carel. The criticisms are important to show the areas of contention 
in the description of the death drive and will be dealt with in the 
next section.  
 
The notion of the death drive is dismissed by many and consequently 
Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle is also rejected. 
Boothby introduces the main criticism of Freud‟s death drive. 
Boothby (1987) quotes Jean Laplanche: “Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, which in 1920 […] introduces the death drive, remains the 
most fascinating and baffling text in the entire Freudian corpus” 
(1976, p. 106; Boothby, 1987, p. 22; also Boothby, 1991, p. 1). The 
rejection ranges from critiques on the logical presentation of 
Freud‟s death drive, as well as on the scientific description and 
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validity of the death drive. Boothby quotes Ernest Becker: “Freud‟s 
tortuous formulations on the death instinct can now securely be 
relegated to the dust bin of history” (Becker, 1973, p. 99; quoted 
in Boothby, 1991, p. 7).  
 
For Boothby, the redeeming element of Freud‟s death drive lies with 
Lacan‟s (which is also a sentiment replicated in this thesis) 
reading of the death drive. Boothby however, continually returns to 
the argument that Freud lacked the vocabulary to fully articulate 
the death drive. Boothby consequently focuses on Lacan‟s reading of 
the death drive that redeems the notion and the possibility of the 
death drive. 
 
Carel (2006) provides a more in-depth critique
50
 of the Freudian 
death drive and death instinct. Carel presents her critique on three 
fronts. Her first critique repeats the sentiments that Freud lacked 
the necessary vocabulary to express the death drive [Todestrieb]. 
Carel writes, “His [Freud‟s] struggle did not end with a single 
unproblematic formulation, but the process itself manifests the 
difficulties in defining, describing and representing the death 
drive” (p. 3).  
 
Carel‟s second critique focuses on the problems that arise in 
maintaining the duality of the life drive (Eros) and the death drive 
(Thanatos). “From 1920 onwards Freud repeatedly attempts to put 
forth a dualistic and dialectical model of the drives, but his model 
collapses time and time again” (p. 3). Carel focuses on the problems 
of describing the death drive and the life drive as separate but 
mutually influential forces opposing each other. “The view Freud 
wanted to support is one in which Eros [life drive] and Thanatos 
[death drive] are equal but opposed forces. This view is appealing 
because of its symmetry and dialectic dynamics. But Freud‟s own 
examples refute this picture” (p. 41). Carel proposes a specific 
approach to the distinction between the death drive and the life 
drive. To quote Carel (2006) at length: 
                         
50
 Carel‟s points of critique will be responded to in Chapter 4.3.2. 
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The complex relationship between Thanatos [death drive] and 
Eros [life drive] manifests the problems of the two-drive 
model. On the one hand the death drive is opposed to Eros, but 
on the other hand, the sexual drive always contains a sadistic 
component that is a portion of the death drive. In certain 
respects the death drive is more fundamental than Eros (Freud 
sees it as prior to the pleasure principle) but it needs Eros 
in order to be expressed. The two drives are presented as 
opposed, but sometimes each other‟s aims, as in the case of 
externalised aggression which protects the organism. On the 
other hand, the death drive exists only with Eros and never 
appears in pure form. (p. 41) 
Carel proposes an alternative to blur the distinction between the 
death drive and the life drive, “I believe that strictly speaking no 
such separation exists” (p. 3). 
 
The third critique focuses on the neurological assumptions 
underlying the description of the death drive, as presented in 
Freud‟s „Project‟. “The death drive rests on a neurophysiologic 
model that has long been rendered obsolete” (p. 3). This leads Carel 
to re-describe the death drive, neither in terms of a neurological 
model nor economical-behavioural, but in terms of a metaphysical 
context. This creates different problems for Carel‟s proposed „new 
reading‟ of the death drive. Carel defends her project as well as 
her proposed alterations. “As a result of the considerations 
presented earlier, the Nirvana principle and the constancy principle 
are removed from this reconstruction” (p. 53). And, “There is no 
justification for retaining the pleasure principle or the Nirvana 
principle” (p. 53).  
 
Carel‟s dismissal of the neurophysiological model is based on three 
arguments. First, “the pleasure principle rested on a mistaken 
picture of neuronal action” (Carel, 2006, p. 39). But as shown in 
Chapter 2, not everyone is in opposition to Freud‟s 
neurophysiological model. Second, “the nervous system does not 
function as a reflex arch” (p. 39). Freud‟s argument hinges on the 
Newtonian laws of physics whereby energy can only be transferred, 
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which Carel dismisses, whereby the nervous system produces its own 
energy rather than acts as a passive receptacle. Third, “the 
organism and the mental system are no longer considered closed 
systems. So the main arguments for the economic view collapse, as 
does the entropic argument for the death drive” (p. 40). The call 
for the neurophysiological model as an open system allows for 
interaction with different elements and different energies aside 
from the facilitations (Bahnung), opening up the possibility of 
interaction or exchange, instead of isolating the facilitations. 
 
Carel provides strong arguments that warrant the dismissal of the 
biological explanation of the pleasure principle. But this results 
in an „all or nothing‟ situation where you either completely dismiss 
or completely accept the claims of Freud‟s (1950) „Project‟. The 
abandonment of the pleasure principle, is reckless and careless, as 
this thesis argues for the maintenance of the pleasure principle, as 
defined in Chapter 2. The biological validity aside, the pleasure 
principle provides an important framework to explain the 
establishment of an internal Law. The functioning of the pleasure 
principle therefore can only be defended on another level other than 
a biological-physiological one
51
. 
 
If the pleasure principle is to be maintained as a valid argument 
and reference point in this thesis, the “all or nothing” situation 
has to be avoided. The defence of the pleasure principle relies on 
the acumen of the pleasure principle, rather than on an 
observational-mechanical explanation. Therefore, the first response 
is to describe the pleasure aside from a neurophysiological 
perspective. The pleasure principle has never been deemed a closed 
system. This would be a response to the second and third point of 
Carel‟s criticism against Freud‟s description of the pleasure 
principle. The emphasis lies with the facilitations [Bahnung], which 
emphasize the relations between the neurons, rather than the energy 
itself. Expressed in linguistic terms, it is not the words 
themselves that carry meaning, but rather the way the words are 
                         
51
 The same argument was levelled against Lacan‟s mirror stage by Dreyer 
(2005) in Chapter 3. 
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combined to generate meaning. The same goes for the neuronal model 
that Freud proposed, to emphasize the relations between the neurons 
rather than the neuronal contents as such. Carel assumes the 
neurophysiological model of Freud is a closed system; however, the 
intrusion of the reality principle is exactly what prevents the 
system from being closed off. The alterations do not occur in a 
predictable fashion, which is a condition of an open system
52
. 
 
Can the pleasure principle only be described in terms of 
neurophysiological functioning? Cilliers‟ (2000) Complexity and 
Postmodernism defends the contents of Freud‟s (1950) „Project‟ on 
two fronts: First, by incorporating Freud‟s conception of memory: 
“Memory refers here to the physical condition of the brain: which 
pathways are breached („facilitated‟) and which are not” (p. 45-6). 
Second, Cilliers emphasizes Freud‟s description regarding the role 
of the neuron: “No neuron is significant by itself. Memory does not 
reside in any neuron, but in the relationship between neurons” (p. 
46, his italics). By combining Freud‟s theory on memory and the 
neuron, Cilliers demonstrates the theoretical possibilities that 
Freud‟s „Project‟ allows. By delocalizing meaning, memory isn‟t 
located within the neuron, but between the neurons, i.e. the 
structure and connections between the neurons. The same is 
applicable to language, where meaning isn‟t generated in the words 
themselves, but in the way words are connected to other words. 
Cilliers uses the neuronal model to illustrate a language theory, 
validated when he writes: “Taking Derrida‟s reading of both Freud 
and Saussure
53
 as a cue, we can develop a description of the dynamics 
of networks of interacting neurons, using the theoretical equipment 
developed in the post-structural approach to language” (p. 46). 
Cilliers is therefore not arguing for the validity of Freud‟s 
claims, but for the application of the descriptive model that Freud 
provides. 
 
So it is rather short-sighted of Carel to completely dismiss the 
notions presented in Freud‟s (1950) „Project‟. Therefore Carel‟s 
                         
52
 For more information on open and closed systems, see Cilliers (2000) 
Complexity and Postmodernism 
53
 See Chapter 3 
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description of the death drive, void of any acknowledgement of the 
pleasure principle, already contains limitations, especially when it 
comes to the far-reaching effects of the pleasure principle. 
 
4.3.2. Rewording Freud’s Death Drive 
 
This subsection will focus on the attempts to overcome the 
description Freud presented. Both Boothby and Carel criticize 
Freud‟s presentation of the death drive, but propose solutions. 
Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle is an unreliable source 
in deciphering what Freud truly meant with the death drive. If the 
primary problem lies in Freud‟s description, then the solution 
should lie in a rewording of the death drive.  
 
Boothby (1987) summarizes the validations of the death drive in 
three categories. The first category is the focus on recurring 
dreams. Freud focuses on the repetition of dreams, especially those 
he observed in victims of war neurosis. Freud also noticed how their 
dreams are significant in terms of wish fulfilment. Freud in so 
doing wanted to account for the recurrence of traumatic events in 
dreams, which counts as evidence for the internalization of a 
traumatic event. In the second category, Freud examines the games 
that children play in which a painful event is symbolically re-
enacted, such as described in the Fort/Da case study. In the third 
category, Freud incorporates masochism. Masochism disproves “the 
notion that mental life is governed simply by the pursuit of 
pleasure” (p. 27). Freud views masochism as the faculty that can 
endure pain since masochism can go against the pleasure principle. 
How the death drive accounts for the abovementioned evidence is 
problematic on its own, as Freud failed to successfully describe and 
discuss the death drive in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920).  
 
Freud attempted to define the death drive with three points in mind, 
summarized by Boothby (1987). Freud‟s first attempt focuses on 
bridging the gap between the mind and the body, i.e. the conscious 
and the unconscious. Boothby explains, “differentiating between 
erotic and death-seeking instincts moved Freud a step closer to 
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conceptualizing the biological basis of human mental life and helped 
satisfy his life-long desire to clarify the implications of the 
psychic with the somatic” (p. 27-8). Consequently the death drive 
[in conjunction with the life drive] would be the umbrella concept 
to unite both “psychic” and “somatic”. 
 
The second attempt is to unite both life and death instincts through 
a tension. “The new theory re-expressed Freud‟s deeply-held dualist 
sensibility as it installed conflict in the very heart of the 
psyche, indeed, in the nature of organic material itself” (p. 28). 
The conflict is what holds the death and the life instincts 
together. The dualism of the life and death instincts is a 
tremendous source of conflict, as is seen in Carel‟s (2006) argument 
for treating the life instinct and death instinct as separate. 
Boothby adds: “the opposition between the life and death instincts 
allowed Freud to reassert a fundamental dualism in the aftermath of 
his studies on narcissism
54
. The theory of narcissism had closed the 
gap between ego libido and object libido” (p. 28). The closing of 
the gap between the ego libido and the object libido is also the 
closing of the gap between the “psychic” and the “somatic”. The 
second attempt emphasizes the desire for a unifying theory. 
 
On the third attempt, the notion of self-destruction is introduced 
to contrast both conscious and unconscious self-destruction. Boothby 
(1987) writes: 
The notion of an internal force of self-destruction promised 
to shed light on some of the key problems of Psychoanalysis, 
without the assumption of some basic force acting in 
opposition to the pleasure principle, posed apparently 
insoluble difficulties for the theory. (p. 28) 
The difficulty identified, is to account for an innate possibility 
of self-destruction, also described in terms of aggression. The key 
notion that Boothby emphasizes is the emergence of aggression or 
aggressivity as a product of the tension between the life and death 
instincts. The focus hereby is on an innate property of the pleasure 
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 See Chapter 1 for Freud‟s definition and description of Narcissism, and 
the discussion on object libido and ego libido 
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principle which allows for the possibility of aggression, which in 
Freud‟s later work is turned into self-punishment. Freud (1920) 
criticizes Jung‟s monistic description in Jung‟s libido theory: “the 
fact that he has called his one instinctual force „libido‟ is bound 
to create confusion” (p. 64). The monistic description of libido, 
according to Freud, undermines the tension between the death drive 
and the life drive, i.e. the dualism at work within the pleasure 
principle (the same pleasure principle that Carel (2006) proposes to 
discard). 
 
Freud‟s three attempts are unsuccessful as he still fails to present 
a unifying theory for the death drive, rather than three inklings of 
validation. Consequently, Boothby focuses on the relation between 
the death drive and the pleasure principle.  
 
Freud (1920) writes on the relations between the death drive and the 
pleasure principle: 
Another striking fact is that the life instincts have so much 
more contact with our internal perception – emerging as 
breakers of the peace and constantly producing tensions whose 
release is felt as pleasure – while the death instincts seem 
to do their work unobtrusively. The pleasure principle seems 
actually to serve the death instincts. (p. 77) 
This passage can be interpreted in a few ways, which is why there 
are such different readings of Freud‟s description of the 
associations between the death drive and the pleasure principle, as 
well as the associations between the death drive and the life drive. 
Any description of the death drive therefore needs to account for 
those associations. Boothby turns to Lacan‟s description and 
explanation, which will be dealt with in greater detail later on in 
section 4.4.1. 
 
Carel (2006) proposes a reading of the death drive that approaches 
the association between the death drive and the life drive 
differently. An important distinction needs to be made in Carel‟s 
approach, especially when Carel indiscriminately speaks of the 
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Nirvana principle. Freud‟s (1920) description of the Nirvana 
principle is very specific in Beyond the Pleasure Principle: 
The dominating tendency of mental life, and perhaps of nervous 
life in general, is the effort to reduce, to keep constant or 
to remove internal tension due to stimuli (the „Nirvana 
principle‟, to borrow a term from Barbara Low (1920, p. 73)) – 
a tendency which finds expression in the pleasure principle; 
and our recognition of that fact is one of our strongest 
reasons for believing in the existence of death instincts. (p. 
67) 
The Nirvana principle, according to Freud, is therefore the 
preference of the maintenance of the established facilitations 
(Bahnung), which can also be described in terms of a preference for 
the avoidance of the reality principle. The effects of the reality 
principle are described by Freud (1920): 
The latter principle [the reality principle] does not abandon 
the intention of ultimately obtaining pleasure, but it 
nevertheless demands and carries into effect the postponement 
of satisfaction, the abandonment of a number of possibilities 
of gaining satisfaction and the temporary toleration of 
unpleasure as a step on the long indirect road to pleasure. 
(p. 7) 
Therefore, the reality principle acts as the deferral and the delay 
in the pursuit of pleasure, whereas in terms of the death drive and 
the life drive, the Nirvana principle is the preference for 
stability. In terms of neuronal economy, the Nirvana principle is 
very similar to the pleasure principle, but as Freud (1920) 
explains, the Nirvana principle “finds expression in the pleasure 
principle” (p. 67). The pleasure principle and the Nirvana principle 
are therefore not synonymous. 
 
But Boothby (1991) has a different take on the pleasure principle, 
especially pertaining to the death drive. Boothby argues that when 
the facilitations are altered, there is an increase at work, contra 
the pleasure principle as the diminution of psychic tension. Boothby 
is making a logical argument that focuses and is centred on the 
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notion of tension, Spannung. To avoid any misunderstanding or 
misquotation in Boothby‟s (1991) argument, to quote at length: 
If, as Freud suggested, the death drive evidences its 
essential character in repetition of the trauma, then we are 
led to suppose that the essential activity of the death drive 
involves the infusion of fresh quantities of energy into the 
psychic apparatus, resulting in an unpleasurable increase in 
psychic tension” (p. 77) 
 
Boothby‟s mistake is in confusing tension with facilitations. The 
emphasis of Freud‟s pleasure principle, as highlighted in Freud‟s 
(1950) „Project‟, is not on the neurons themselves, but on the 
structure, the facilitations. This is illustrated in Cillers‟ (1989, 
2000, 2001) reading of Freud whereby the emphasis lies with the 
relationship between the neurons rather than the neurons themselves. 
This is best illustrated when Cilliers (2000) writes, “Because of 
the „distributed‟ nature of these relationships, a specific weight 
has no ideation content, but only gains significance in large 
patterns of interaction” (p. 46). Boothby‟s conclusion of “resulting 
in unpleasurable increase in psychic tension” is therefore false, as 
the emphasis lies with the facilitations, rather than the tension. 
In terms of Freud‟s (1950) „Project‟, the increase of neuronal 
Quantity (Q) can be described as forcing its way through the 
contact-barriers that regulate the flow of Q. When the flow of Q 
exceeds the limits of the contact-barriers, the facilitations are 
overrun and transformed to accommodate the influx. Boothby‟s 
argument focuses on the increase of Q, but what Boothby isn‟t taking 
into account, is that the increase in Q is the increase in tension 
on the contact-barrier and consequently breaks through the contact-
barrier and alters the facilitations. The Nirvana principle would 
then be the preference for the avoidance of any alterations in the 
facilitations, as these alterations are deemed traumatic, evidenced 
when Freud (1920) writes: 
The higher the system‟s own quiescent cathexis, the greater 
seems to be its binding force; conversely, therefore, the 
lower its cathexis, the less capacity will it have for taking 
up inflowing energy and the more violent must be the 
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consequence of such a breach in the protective shield against 
stimuli. (p. 34, my emphasis) 
 
Carel‟s (2006) argument proposes the abandonment of the Nirvana 
principle, but still retains select aspects. “An alternative picture 
is created by discarding the Nirvana principle (but preserving the 
insight that self-destructive behaviours are distinctively 
annihilative), while retaining the central role of aggression and 
erotic attachment, without placing them in a dualistic framework” 
(p. 52). The shortcoming in Freud‟s approach, as identified by 
Carel, specifically pertaining to the description of the death 
drive, is Freud‟s failure to describe the role of aggression. 
Carel‟s new reading is summarized as follows: 
Behaviours such as depression, melancholia, negative 
therapeutic action, self-harm and suicide have something in 
common over and above their aggressive nature. They are 
annihilative and self-destructive. This tendency requires 
distinct grouping, which I call Nirvana tendencies. So in this 
specific sense I retain an element of the Nirvana principle as 
having an annihilative aim. The Nirvana principle 
descriptively unifies these self-destructive behaviours by 
providing this self-annihilating aim. I believe that this 
provides the death drive with a significant descriptive 
function that is otherwise lacking. (p. 54) 
By collapsing a dualistic view, combining the life drive [Eros] and 
the death drive [Thanatos], Carel proposes to show how aggression is 
applicable to both the life drive and the death drive. Carel‟s 
emphasis lies with Freud‟s own inability to successfully deal with 
aggressivity as the major reason for Carel‟s reformulation of Freud. 
“Aggression, it seems, was always a problem for Freud” (p. 55). 
 
Carel‟s argument is summarized as follows: “aggression itself is 
conceived of as a nested grouping of various types of aggression, 
not a single force. Dropping the demand for singularity enables a 
reading that accommodates all aggressive tendencies and grounds them 
on an instinctual basis” (p. 61). Carel‟s view of aggression is 
therefore to explain aggression as an already conceived possibility 
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and potentiality. Carel‟s critique on a dualist position is to allow 
for a pluralistic explanation of drives, whereby the possibility of 
an aggressive drive materializes. This appeases Carel‟s need for 
observational evidence, as well as to overcome Freud‟s lack of 
proving that aggression is an instinctual, evolutionary depiction. 
 
According to Carel (2006, p. 57), there are three arguments for the 
incompatibility of aggression and the death drive. First, the 
failure to describe aggression in terms of a somatic source as 
compared to a sexual drive. Second, the multiplicity of aggression: 
Aggression cannot be accounted for as a fixed aim as aggression is 
applicable in an array of situations. Third, Freud‟s inability to 
account for an aggressive drive is solved by connecting aggression 
to the death drive. Carel‟s problem of the death drive is in the 
description of the death drive as formulated in Freud‟s neuronal 
economy, i.e. the pleasure principle, which forces Carel to account 
for aggression as an innate potential. Consequently, the death drive 
is seen as a drive separate from the Nirvana principle. 
 
Boothby (1991), in order to explain Lacan‟s understanding of the 
death drive, has to counter Carel‟s argument by explaining 
aggression in terms of the pleasure principle, in terms of the death 
drive. Boothby defends against the type of reading Carel proposes (a 
pluralistic reading of many drives, whereby the death drive features 
independently from the Nirvana principle): 
The thrust of Freud‟s idea was to conceive of a force of self-
destructiveness, a primordial aggressivity toward oneself, 
from which aggressivity toward others is ultimately derived. 
To fail to see that it is one‟s own death that is at stake in 
the death drive is to miss the point entirely.
55
 (p. 11, his 
emphasis) 
Boothby and Carel provide important criticisms and alterations, 
which shape the framework for the death drive. The shortcomings of 
Freud‟s description of the death drive are the potential 
shortcomings of Lacan. Consequently, for Lacan to succeed, he needs 
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 “Such was the typical error of ego psychologists, as Jean Laplanche has 
pointed out” (Boothby, 1991, p. 11) 
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to account for the criticism. Freud‟s theory presents plenty of 
pitfalls and traps as illustrated in Boothby and Carel‟s rewording 
of the death drive.  
 
Boothby (1991) turns to Jacques Lacan‟s reading of Freud and how 
Lacan‟s reading could avoid the problems highlighted, including 
those identified by Carel. “Lacan does more than reemphasize Freud‟s 
notion of the death drive, he re-installs it at the very centre of 
psychoanalytic theory” (p. 10).  
 
4.4. Lacan’s reading of Freud’s Death Drive 
 
Lacan‟s reading of Freud‟s death drive heralds the uniting feature 
of Freudian Psychoanalysis. The pivotal turn in Freud‟s approach to 
Psychoanalysis was with the introduction of the death drive. 
However, Freud‟s explanation provides plenty of questions and 
shortcomings.   
 
Is Lacan‟s reading exactly Freudian? The answer is no, but this is 
due to Lacan‟s introduction of Linguistics, jouissance, and desire 
(elements unmentioned in Freud). This also shapes the perspective 
for Lacan to deal with the death drive. Boothby (1996) summarizes 
the differences between Freud and Lacan:  
Lacan‟s assessment of the death drive stands opposed to 
Freud‟s formulation in a crucial respect. For where Freud 
based the unbinding effect of the death drive on a biological 
force operative in the very substance of organic matter, Lacan 
returns the entire question to a fundamentally psychological 
conflict. (p. 342) 
 
The solution to Lacan‟s description of the death drive lies with 
aggression, which is precisely the argument levelled against Freud, 
as seen for example in Carel (2006).  
 
The death drive is discussed in relation to three topics: (1) 
aggression, (2) desire and (3) castration. Aggression is the major 
shortcoming in Freud‟s description, and if Lacan can successfully 
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explain and incorporate aggression, the classical Freudian notion of 
the death drive might be salvaged. Desire explains how Lacan 
understands the death drive, as well as shapes the context wherein 
the death drive reveals itself. The important link between the death 
drive and desire is alienation, as illustrated by Ragland (1995): 
“[Lacan] equated the death drive with being alienated behind the 
mask of the symbolic order itself” (p. 86), but reformulates the 
death drive in terms of desire: “One begins to see how desire is 
hooked to the death drive” (p. 106). Boothby (1996) explains the 
hook between desire and the death drive: “it is with respect to 
alienation that the nature of the death drive in Lacan must be 
determined” (p. 344).  
 
Castration is the final link in explaining Freud‟s death drive. This 
doesn‟t explain the death drive per se, but explains an important 
aspect of desire. Castration is defined as the threat of 
confiscation, and consequently highlights the effects of any threat 
to the removal of the object of desire. Castration therefore 
illustrates one of the conditions for the conclusion of the pleasure 
principle. 
 
4.4.1. Aggression within Lacanian Psychoanalysis  
 
If Lacanian Psychoanalysis is to be taken seriously, a comprehensive 
explanation of aggression needs to be provided. Aggression is 
explained by Carel (2006) as destruction, which includes self-
destruction as well as destruction of the Other. But aggression not 
only explains destruction, but will also elucidate how a death drive 
can function free from this destructive notion – as explained by 
Carel - that haunts and plagues contemporary Psychoanalysis. 
 
The biggest flaw in Freud‟s description remains in interpreting 
Freud‟s understanding of aggression, i.e. whether aggression is an 
innate, instinctual trait or a contextual, situational response. 
Freud denies that aggression is an instinctual trait, whereas Lacan 
consolidates and reintroduces aggression as an emergent property as 
a result of the conflict between the actual self [wirkliche Ich] and 
139 
 
ideal self [idealich]. Meyer, Moore and Viljoen (2003) once again 
miss the plot when they quote Boothby: “Lacan‟s notion of 
aggressivity restores the central point of Freud‟s views: 
aggressivity is a function of a primordial destructiveness toward 
oneself” (p. 228; quoting Boothby, 1991, p. 40). How Meyer, Moore 
and Viljoen interpret Lacan and aggression isn‟t very clear until 
you read the activity box, where they ask: “Do you share Lacan‟s 
pessimistic view that human beings are inherently aggressive?” (p. 
229, my emphasis). Meyer, Moore and Viljoen use Boothby to 
substantiate their claim. However, Boothby‟s (1991) description is 
very apt and applicable, but in no way refers to aggression as an 
innate property, especially when he writes: “The keynote of the 
essay is that narcissism is intrinsically generative of 
aggressivity” (p. 38, my emphasis), which leads to the conclusion: 
“Properly understood, Lacan‟s notion of aggressivity restores the 
central point of Freud‟s view: aggressivity is a function of a 
primordial destructiveness towards oneself” (p. 40, his emphasis). 
Boothby continues: “It is because aggressivity represents a will to 
rebellion against the imago that aggressivity is specifically linked 
in fantasy to violations of bodily integrity” (p. 39). Boothby is 
reacting to some commentators who have argued that aggressivity is 
the product of the defence of the imago, whereas Boothby argues: “It 
is because aggressivity in Psychoanalysis is provoked not by a 
threat to the unity of the ego but by the alienating structure of 
the ego itself that a maximum aggressiveness would be produced by 
the individual‟s confrontation with an exact replica of himself” (p. 
39). Meyer, Moore and Viljoen (2003) use a passage of Boothby (1991) 
to explain the fascination with violence, but still fail to show the 
origins of aggression, or describe anything other than “humans being 
are inherently aggressive” (Meyer, Moore and Viljoen, 2003, p. 229). 
This thesis contends that aggression is an emergent property, and 
not an innate drive, nor instinct. Aggression as an emergent 
property places emphasis on the context and situation, whereby, 
according to Lacan, aggression is the product of an imaginary 
conflict (between the ego and the ideal-ego), rather than a 
naturalistic-behaviouristic reaction propelled by an innate 
aggressive drive/instinct. 
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In Lacan‟s (1966/2006) Écrits, in the article Aggressiveness in 
Psychoanalysis (p.82), the important links are made to explain 
aggression in terms of the narcissism of the ego. Lacan‟s definition 
of the ego is: 
In short, by “ego” I designate [1] the nucleus given to 
consciousness – though it is opaque to reflection – that is 
marked by all the ambiguities which, from self-indulgence to 
bad faith, structure the human subject‟s lived experience of 
the passions; [2] the “I” that, while exposing its facticity 
to existential criticism, opposes its irreducible inertia of 
pretenses and misrecognition to the concrete problematic of 
the subject‟s realization. (p. 88-9) 
However, aggression cannot be explained solely in terms of the ego, 
i.e. a conscious, cognitive explanation of aggression. This is most 
notably the explanation for Carel‟s stipulation for an aggression 
drive, as Boothby (1996) introduces alienation as a source of 
aggression which stems from narcissism. This results in 
méconnaissance, misrecognition of the self. Narcissistic 
méconnaissance is where the self is seen as the ideal. Narcissism is 
circumscribed in the mirror stage, as presented in the first 
chapter, where the emphasis lies with the recognition of the self as 
the image in the mirror, which inevitably results in misrecognition 
[méconnaissance]. Lacan (1966/2006) summarizes:  
Indeed, this form crystallizes in the subject‟s inner 
conflictual tension, which leads to the awakening of his 
desire for the object of the other‟s desire: here the 
primordial confluence precipitates into aggressive 
competition, from which develops the triad of other people, 
ego, and object. (p. 92) 
 
This quotation is best described in terms of the L-schema (Fig 4, p. 
86), discussed in Chapter 3, which shows the connection and relation 
between the self, the perceived self, and the Other. But this is 
only possible in the sphere of language, which allows for the 
possibility of description and distinction. A subtle point to Lacan 
is that the distinction between the self, the perceived self and the 
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Other can easily be confused for one another, whereby méconnaissance 
is enhanced. Lacan therefore explains aggression in terms of the 
alienation/méconnaissance between the self, the perceptual self, and 
the Other. The relation between the self and the perceptual accounts 
for the narcissistic mode of identification and recognition 
experienced when the self looks, for example, in the mirror. There 
remains a distance between the actual [wirkliche, O] self and the 
reflected [ideal, O‟] self, which creates a distance whereby the 
self can be seen as an other: “thus the two moments, when the 
subject negates himself and when he accuses the other, become 
indistinguishable” (p. 93). This is then how Lacan proceeds to 
explain aggression, whereby aggression is a product of conflict 
between the self and the image of the self, O and O‟56; the ideals of 
the self are projected, even transferred onto the other: “it is by 
identifying with the other that he experiences a whole range of 
bearing and display reactions” (p. 92).  
 
This relation is taken a step further: “The satisfaction of human 
desire is possible only when mediated by the other‟s desire and 
labour” (p. 98). Lacan‟s (1998) alternative definition of “the 
unconscious is the discourse of the Other” (p. 131) emphasizes that 
any description given of the self is always done in accordance with 
words, which are the closest approximation. It is never one‟s own 
description. To quote Lacan (1998) at length: 
Now, what is a signifier? I have been drumming it into you 
long enough not to have to articulate it once again here. A 
signifier is that which represents a subject. For whom? – not 
for another subject, but for another signifier. In order to 
illustrate this axiom, suppose that in the desert you find a 
stone covered with hieroglyphics. You do not doubt for a 
moment that, behind them, there was a subject who wrote them. 
But it is an error to believe that each signifier is addressed 
to you – this is proved by the fact that you cannot understand 
any of it. On the other hand you define them as signifiers, by 
the fact that you are sure that each of these signifiers is 
related to each of the others. And it is this that is at issue 
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 See the Simplified Schema of the Two Mirrors, Fig 1, p. 37 
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with the relation between the subject and the field of the 
Other. The subject is born in so far as the signifier emerges 
in the field of the Other. But, by this fact, this subject – 
which, was previously nothing if not a subject coming into 
being – solidifies into a signifier. (p. 198-9) 
The relation between the self and Other, as seen in the L-schema, 
pertains to both the symbolic relation and the imaginary. Boothby 
(1991) emphasizes the imaginary, which he defines thus: “the 
„imaginary‟ designates that basic and enduring dimension of 
experience that is oriented by images, perceived or fantasized, the 
psychologically formative power of which is lastingly established in 
the primordial identification of the mirror phase” (p. 18). Whereas 
the symbolic consists “of signifying elements whose meaning is 
determined by their relation to the other elements of the system […] 
in which meaning is free to circulate among associated elements or 
signifiers without necessarily referring to a particular object or 
signified” (p. 18). The L-schema incorporates both spectra of the 
imaginary and the symbolic in terms of the relation between the 
subject and the Other, which nonetheless remains a very specific 
relation in Lacanian Psychoanalysis. “The Other is the locus in 
which is situated the chain of the signifier that governs whatever 
may be made present of the subject – it is the field of that living 
being in which the subject has to appear” (Lacan, 1998, p. 203). The 
subject cannot be detached from the Other, and as argued in the 
third chapter in response to Dreyer, it is not an actual Other, but 
the Other described in terms of the imaginary and symbolic relations 
to the subject. The physical Other that confronts the subject is 
merely a signifier: 
The signifier, producing itself in the field of the Other, 
makes manifest the subject of its signification. But it 
functions as a signifier only to reduce the subject in 
question to being no more than a signifier, to petrify the 
subject in the same movement in which it calls the subject to 
function, to speak, as subject. (p. 207) 
 
Lacan‟s (1966/2006) reaction to Carel‟s attempt to locate aggression 
as a biological drive is: 
143 
 
Let us note here that to attempt a behaviourist reduction of 
the analytic process – to which a concern with rigour, quite 
unjustified in my view, might impel some of us, to which 
favourite fantasies bear witness in consciousness and which 
have enabled us to conceptualize the imago, which plays a 
formative role in identification. (p. 86) 
Lacan‟s critique on a behaviourist-reductionist-evolutionary 
approach towards locating aggression as a biological drive is how 
they miss an important aspect of the subject; what constitutes the 
subject, and how the subject is conceptualized through the imago. 
The image is where the ego is located: “what demonstrates the 
phenomenon of recognition, implying subjectivity, are the signs of 
triumphant jubilation and the playful self-discovery that 
characterize the child‟s encounter with his mirror image” (p. 91). 
Aggression, however, is located within that interaction with the 
imago in the mirror, more specifically, the interaction between the 
actual [wirkliche] self and the ideal self: “thus the aggressiveness 
that is manifested in the retaliations of slaps and blows cannot be 
regarded solely as a playful manifestation of the exercise of 
strength of their employment in getting to know the body” (p. 91). 
The same is said of any notion of desire to destroy the self, which 
is not a product of any innate instincts or drives, but is the 
aggression towards the mirror image. 
 
The Oedipus complex proves invaluable and will be explained in terms 
of four aspects: (1) the connection between the Oedipus complex and 
the Superego, as mediated through guilt, (2) the formation of the 
Law through the Non du Père/Nom du Père [the No of the Father/Name 
of the Father], (3) secondary identification, and (4) Desire. 
 
The first explanation for the importance of the Oedipus complex is 
the introduction of an important concept for Lacan (1966/2006), 
which is guilt: 
Here, obviously, lies the import that Freud‟s work, Totem and 
Taboo, still has, despite the mythical circularity that 
vitiates it, insofar as from a mythological event – the 
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killing of the father – it derives the subjective dimension 
that gives this event its meaning: guilt. (p. 95) 
The introduction of guilt is a very important facet of the superego. 
Guilt is connected to the superego in two parts, first in terms of 
the achievement of the ideals imposed from the ego-ideal (or the 
lack of achievement); and second, whereby guilt is the result of the 
desire for the destruction of the father. As argued in the second 
chapter, the Law is connected with jouissance - unconscious pleasure 
- as stipulated by the pleasure principle, from which an internal 
Law is derived. Therefore the relation between guilt and the 
superego is: the more you obey the superego, the more you are 
guilty. In other words, the superego is synonymous with the ideal-
ego as described in terms of the mirror stage. The superego is the 
impossible ideals that the primary caregiver imprints on the child. 
The more you obey the ideals (the superego) the more you are guilty 
of not succeeding in the ideals, and the more you are entrenched in 
obeying the superego.
57
 
 
The second explanation focuses on the Oedipus complex and the role 
of the father. In classical Freudian Psychoanalysis, the Father took 
the role of the author of the Law, as the Father in the Oedipus 
complex is the first intrusive force that prevents an everlasting 
satisfaction of the auto-erotic zones. This explains why the Father 
figure is seen as the figure/author of Law in Freudian 
Psychoanalysis. The Father is the figure that prohibits the object 
or object-cause of desire, achieved through the word of the Father 
as this includes the imaginary as well as the symbolic. 
 
Lacan (1966/2006) shows in Écrits, The Function and Field of Speech 
and Language in Psychoanalysis the passing from symbolic to the 
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 Slavoj Žižek (2005) words the same differently: “According to Lacan, 
this „feeling of guilt‟ is not a self-deception to be dispelled in the 
course of the psychoanalytic cure – we really are guilty: superego draws 
the energy of the pressure it exerts upon the subject from the fact that 
the subject was not faithful to his desire, that he gave it up. Our 
sacrificing to the superego, our paying tribute to it, only corroborates 
our guilt. For that reason our debt to the superego is unredeemable: the 
more we pay it off, the more we owe. Superego is like the extortioner 
slowly bleeding us to death – the more he gets, the stronger his hold on 
us” (p.68, his italics). 
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imaginary, in terms of the Oedipus complex
58
 and how the primordial 
Law ensues. Lacan defines the primordial Law thus: “The primordial 
Law is therefore the Law which, in regulating marriage ties, 
superimposes the reign of culture over the reign of nature, the 
latter being subject to the law of mating” (p. 277). It is through 
the transgression of the Law that crime is committed. “Neither crime 
nor criminals are objects that can be conceptualized apart from 
their sociological context” (p. 126). But as Lacan shows, the 
symbolic is an all-encompassing domain that cannot be selectively or 
partially used. Identification and the Law of the word are 
illustrated when Lacan writes: “Man thus speaks, but it is because 
the symbol has made him man” (p. 276). But Lacan pinpoints the 
location of the Law within language, within the symbolic order, as 
the Law is expressed in language through a commandment, through a 
verbal injunction. 
This law, then, reveals itself clearly enough as identical to 
a language order. For without names for kinship relations, no 
power can institute the order of preferences and taboos that 
knot and braid the thread of lineage through the generations. 
(p. 277) 
The Father is seen as the author of the injunction, which is why the 
symbolic father, i.e. the name of the father, has such an important 
role within the Oedipus complex. “It is in the name of the father 
that we must recognize the basis of the symbolic function which, 
since the dawn of historical time, has identified his person with 
the figure of the law” (p. 278). However, the father as author of 
the Law is only an identification of the father as origin of the Law 
- the father as the figure of the Law - illustrated when Lacan uses 
Le Nom-du-Père [the Name-of-the-Father] synonymously with Le Non-du-
Père [the No-of-the-Father. The Oedipus complex is the start of the 
injunction. “The very normalization of this maturation is henceforth 
                         
58
 Lacan (2008a) writes: “One shouldn‟t forget that in a sense Oedipus did 
not suffer from the Oedipus complex, and he punished himself for a sin he 
did not commit. He simply killed a man whom he didn‟t know was his father 
[…] [Oedipus] doesn‟t know that in achieving happiness, both conjugal 
happiness and that of his job as king, of being the guide to the happiness 
of the state, he is sleeping with his mother. One might therefore ask what 
the treatment he inflicts on himself means. Which treatment? He gives up 
the very thing that captivated him. In fact, he has been duped, tricked by 
reason of the fact that he achieved happiness” (p. 374) 
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dependent in man on cultural intervention, as is exemplified by the 
fact that sexual object choice is dependent upon the Oedipus 
complex” (p. 98). 
 
The third aspect demonstrates how The Oedipus complex is shaped 
through secondary identification. Secondary identification is also 
connected to the mirror stage. The mirror image contains more than 
just the idealized version of the self. “In its normal form, its 
function is that of sublimation
59
, which precisely designates an 
identificatory reshaping of the subject and […] a secondary 
identification by introjections of the imago of the parent of the 
same sex” (p. 95). Secondary identification is the prelude to the 
Oedipus complex
60
 whereby the child will relate to either the mother 
or the father. Or as Boothby (1991) states:  
In the negotiation of the Oedipus complex, the child faces the 
question of being versus having the phallus. On the level of 
the imaginary identification constitutive of the mirror phase, 
the child is unable to symbolize to itself its own desire 
except in and through the desire of the other. (p. 155) 
 
Lacan (1966/2006) reveals how secondary identification is 
accordingly connected to castration: “Freud thus unveiled the 
imaginary function of the phallus as the pivotal point in the 
symbolic process that completes, in both sexes, the calling into 
question of one‟s sex by the castration complex” (p. 555, his 
italics). The importance is therefore in the sublimation of a gender 
identity as idealized through the development of an ideal, but also 
how the secondary effects have lasting effects as to how the desire 
of the other takes shape. 
                         
59
 On sublimation, Lacan (2008a) writes: “in the definition of sublimation 
as satisfaction without repression, whether implicitly or explicitly, there 
is a passage from not-knowing to knowing, a recognition of the fact that 
desire is nothing more than the metonymy of the discourse of demand” (p. 
360) 
60
 “At a very early age the little boy develops an object-cathexis for his 
mother, which originally related to the mother‟s breast and is the 
prototype of an object-choice on the anaclitic model; the boy deals with 
his father by identifying himself with him. For a time these two 
relationships proceed side by side, until the boy‟s sexual wishes in regard 
to his mother become more intense and his father is perceived as an 
obstacle to them;from this the Oedipus complex originates” (Freud, 1923, p. 
32) 
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The fourth and probably most important aspect of the Oedipus complex 
is the link to desire through language. It is based on this 
explanation of desire that the death drive will be described in the 
next section.  
 
Lacan (1966/2006) writes: 
These are occultation games which Freud, in a flash of genius, 
presented to us so that we might see in them that the moment 
at which desire is humanized is also that at which the child 
is born into language. (p. 262) 
Desire is therefore articulated in language, which proves 
problematic; the signifier is the death of the signified. This is 
best illustrated when Lacan writes: “Thus the symbol first manifests 
itself as the killing of the thing, and this death results in the 
endless perpetuation of the subject‟s desire” (p. 262). 
 
The endless perpetuation can be explained in Saussurean terminology 
to emphasize the difference between the signifier and the signified, 
as seen in the Fort/Da case study. The distance between the 
perceived sensation and the correlate within the domain of the 
symbolic is an important transition. Lacan opens the gap between the 
signified and the signifier whereby the signifier does not 
necessarily correspond with the signifier, but is a close 
approximation. Regardless of the proximity of the signifier to the 
signified, the signifier destroys the signified, and replaces the 
signified in both form and content. To quote Lacan (1966/2006) at 
length: 
For his action destroys the object that it causes to appear 
and disappear by bringing about its absence and presence in 
advance. His action thus negativizes the force field of desire 
in order to become its own object to itself. And this object, 
being immediately embodied in the symbolic pair of two 
elementary exclamations, announces the subject‟s diachronic 
integration of the dichotomy of phonemes, whose synchronic 
structure the existing language offers up for him to 
assimilate; the child thus begins to become engaged in the 
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system of concrete discourse of those around him by 
reproducing more or less approximately in his Fort! and Da! 
the term he receives from them. Fort! Da! It is already when 
quite alone that the desire of the human child becomes the 
desire of another, of an alter ego who dominates him and whose 
object of desire is henceforth his own affliction. (p. 262, 
his emphasis) 
Desire can therefore be articulated in two ways, first through 
prohibition, as seen in the Oedipus complex through the „No‟ of the 
Father [Le Non-du-Père].
61
 Second, the evocative proponents of 
language: “For the function of language in speech is not to inform, 
but to evoke” (p. 247).  
 
This second aspect even precedes the first aspect, as is articulated 
in Lacan‟s (1998) Four Fundamentals of Psychoanalysis. “Man‟s desire 
is the desire of the Other”62 (p. 235), which Lacan describes in 
greater detail: 
If it is merely at the level of the desire of the Other that 
man can recognize his desire, as desire of the Other, is there 
not something here that must appear to him to be an obstacle 
to his fading, which is a point at which his desire can never 
by recognized? This obstacle is never lifted, nor ever to be 
lifted, for analytic experience shows us that it is in seeing 
a whole chain come into play at the level of the desire of the 
Other that the subject‟s desire is constituted. (p. 235) 
A second explanation for man‟s desire is the desire of the Other is 
that desire is located within the co-ordinates of the Other, that is 
                         
61
 “The super-ego retains the character of the father, while the more 
powerful the Oedipus complex was and the more rapidly it succumbed to 
repression (under the influence of authority, religious teaching, school 
and reading), the stricter will be the domination of the super-ego over the 
ego later on – in the form of conscience or perhaps of an unconscious sense 
of guilt” (Freud, 1923, p. 35) 
62
 Lacan (2008b) explains: “When man‟s desire has to be extracted from the 
field of the Other, and has to be my desire, well, something very funny 
happens. Now that it is his turn to desire, he notices, well, that he is 
castrated. That is what the castration complex is. It means that something 
necessarily happens in significance, and it is that sort of loss which 
means that, when man enters the field of his own desire insofar as it is 
sexual desire, he can do so only through the medium of a symbol that 
represents the loss of an organ insofar as it takes on, in the 
circumstances, a signifying function, the function of the lost object” (p. 
40-1).  
149 
 
expressed in language. It is within language that the self is 
identified (in terms of the ideal imago) as well as the Other, which 
ties into the theme of appearance and disappearance as seen in the 
Fort/Da case study.  
 
Lacan‟s description of the death drive lies with Lacan‟s description 
of desire through the Oedipus complex. This involves explaining (1) 
the relation between the subject and desire, (2) the maintenance of 
desire, (3) the Law of desire, as well as (4) the Law revealing 
desire (through prohibition). 
 
4.4.2. Lacan’s Death Drive through Desire 
 
The death drive is the focus of this chapter, and has already proved 
a contentious affair. There are two prevalent readings of the death 
drive.  
 
First through equating the death drive with the diminution of 
tension; death is equated to a reduction [of either Quantity or 
tension], to zero or a bare minimum. The state of minimal flow of 
Quantity, or even minimum tension, is the point at which the reality 
principle cannot intervene, where any deferral is impossible. In 
terms of economy, this state would be the ideal condition whereby 
deferral or alteration is impossible. The one state would be the 
classical notion of death and the other would be the second reading: 
which is the first reading plus desire.  “In order to talk about 
desire, one notion in particular came to the fore, the libido” 
(Lacan, 1988b, p. 221). Libido has a very specific and significant 
role in Psychoanalysis, and is discussed in chapter 1 with specific 
emphasis on Freud‟s usage of the notion of libido in context of 
auto-erotism. 
 
Lacan‟s argument is set out in Lacan‟s (1988b) The Seminar of 
Jacques Lacan, Book II, which was originally presented in 1955, an 
early description of the death drive. “The organism already 
conceived by Freud as a machine, has a tendency to return to its 
state of equilibrium – this is what the pleasure principle states” 
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(p. 79). To recapitulate the description of the pleasure principle: 
the focus on the diminution of tension is explained in terms of the 
facilitations [Bahnung] through which Q [Quantity in general] and Qñ 
[Quantity of the intercellular order of magnitude] flow is regulated 
by contact-barriers which impose limitations, effectively managing 
the flow of both Q and Qñ. However, for Lacan, to speak of the 
minimum has two different explanations: 
The minimum tension can mean one of two things, all biologists 
will agree, according to whether it is a matter of the minimum 
given a certain definition of the equilibrium of the system, 
or the minimum purely and simply, that is to say, with respect 
to the living being, death. (p. 80) 
This is applicable to the outcome of the pleasure principle 
regardless of the different readings of minimum tension. Lacan 
emphasizes that the two different meanings of minimum tension are 
both equally valid and applicable to the description of the pleasure 
principle. The same argument goes for the first law of 
thermodynamics, which Lacan summarizes as “the first law of the 
conservation of energy – if there‟s something at the end, just as 
much had to be there at the beginning” (p. 81). But the kicker is 
the second principle, which is more pertinent to the pleasure 
principle, as Lacan elaborates: 
The second principle stipulates that the manifestation of this 
energy has undegraded modes and others which aren‟t. To put it 
another way, you can‟t swim against the current. When you do a 
job, a part of it is expended, as heat for instance – there‟s 
a loss. That‟s called entropy. (p. 81) 
 
Thermodynamics therefore show an inherent loss at work within the 
structure; however the first law stipulates a return to equilibrium 
is a return to the same. But it is important to emphasize that 
equilibrium does not equal stability, since stability is equal to 
death. The Freudian notion of the death drive is therefore not a 
far-fetched notion whereby the subject consciously aims towards the 
destruction and annihilation of the self
63
, but that the death drive 
                         
63
 Lacan (2008a) dismisses this understanding of death: “How can man, that 
is to say a living being, have access to knowledge of the death instinct, 
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is an innate property described in terms of entropy. Entropy is a 
technical physics term denoting a measure for the amount of disorder 
in a system or the unavailability of energy for doing work. The 
introduction of thermodynamics shows how Carel‟s critique on Freud‟s 
description of the pleasure principle is reckless and irresponsible. 
Carel failed to see the functional as well as theoretical 
significance of the pleasure principle as an interdisciplinary 
theoretical framework. 
 
Lacan presents an alternative explanation of the death drive that 
accommodates the notion of desire. In other words, Lacan explains 
how desire is located within the realm of entropy. Lacan (1988b) 
writes: 
People seek their pleasure. So, why is this expressed 
theoretically by a principle which states the following – what 
is sought is, in the end, the cessation of pleasure. But you 
can see that the direction the theory takes at this point goes 
exactly in the opposite direction to that of subjective 
intuition – in the pleasure principle, the pleasure, by 
definition, is bent on its end. The pleasure principle – the 
principle of pleasure [le principe de plaisir] – is that 
pleasure should cease. (p. 84, his italics) 
 
The difficulty continually encountered in Freud‟s description of 
both the death drive and the pleasure principle is the 
terminological ambiguity, which many struggle to grasp. The 
condition for the cessation of pleasure is the death drive, which is 
why Lacan explains desire in terms of the death drive, and the death 
drive in terms of desire. But as already argued, the immediate 
cessation is not possible as described in the domain of the reality 
principle. In terms of Freud‟s (1950) „Project‟, the reality 
principle, also known as the second principle, is explained in terms 
of the influx of Q that exceeds the limitations of the contact-
                                                                            
to his own relationship to death? The answer is, by virtue of the signifier 
in its most radical form. It is in the signifier and insofar as the subject 
articulates a signifying chain that he comes up against the fact that he 
may disappear from the chain of what he is. In truth, it‟s as dumb as can 
be” (p. 362) 
152 
 
barriers, thereby altering the structure of the facilitations 
[Bahnung]. In terms of the death drive and pleasure, Lacan writes: 
The reality principle consists in making the game last, that 
is to say, in ensuring that pleasure is renewed, so that the 
fight doesn‟t end for a lack of combatants. The reality 
principle consists in husbanding our pleasures, these 
pleasures whose aim is precisely to end in cessation. (p. 84) 
In thermodynamic terms, the reality principle can therefore be 
equated with the first law, which stipulates that the conservation 
of energy is a priority, as well as the maintenance of equilibrium. 
However, this equilibrium is not synonymous with stability, but 
synonymous with the maintenance and sustainability, which can 
consequently be equated with a life drive. 
 
Only through the abovementioned can we make sense when Freud (1920) 
writes: 
Another striking fact is that the life instincts have so much 
more contact without internal perception – emerging as 
breakers of the peace and constantly producing tensions whose 
release is felt as pleasure – while the death instincts seem 
to do their work unobtrusively. The pleasure principle seems 
actually to serve the death instincts. (p. 77) 
 
Life instincts and the reality principle therefore work in tandem, 
whilst the pleasure principle and the death instincts work together. 
In other words, the life drive [Eros] and the reality principle work 
in unison, whilst the death drive [Thanatos] and the pleasure 
principle work in unison. Their functioning overlaps towards similar 
outcomes. The pleasure principle serves the death drive in creating 
the possibility of a death drive, whereby the pleasure principle 
aims for a minimum of tension. A mistake is often made in viewing 
the death drive as synonymous with the pleasure principle, as Carel 
(2006) does when dismissing the Nirvana principle, but maintains 
select facets of the Nirvana principle. 
 
What Lacan (1988b) adds is how pleasure and desire fit within the 
framework of the death drive. This is the inclusion of another 
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dimension to the death drive, rather than viewing the death drive 
solely in terms of the diminution of tension. Lacan then turns 
towards the description of desire. “Desire, a function central to 
all human experience, is the desire for nothing nameable” (p. 223). 
In other words, what is desired cannot be expressed in terms of 
words, i.e. desire is originally not located within the symbolic 
realm. To once again reiterate Lacan‟s adaption of Saussure‟s 
Linguistics, the separation between the signifier and the signified; 
the signified initially does not have a correlate word, which needs 
to be found in the symbolic order. It is this absence of a signifier 
that Lacan calls the lack, which is thereby assigned with a 
“signifier”, a close or as close as possible approximation, but this 
signifier is never an exact correlate.  
 
In Freud‟s (1914) On Narcissism: an Introduction, the qualities that 
gain privilege stem from the primary caregivers through the creation 
of an ideal. But because this is a lack, any signifier can take the 
place of this “desire for nothing nameable”. Or in Lacan‟s (1988b) 
own words: 
This lack is beyond anything which can represent it. It is 
only ever represented as a reflection on a veil. The libido, 
but now no longer used theoretically as a quantitative 
quantity, is the name of what animates the deep-seated 
conflict at the heart of human action. (p. 223) 
Desire is the Archimedean point around which the subject finds its 
co-ordinates within the symbolic order, whereby one specific 
signifier stands out. But this signifier is not the signified, also 
known as das Ding [the Thing]. Lacan introduces desire as the 
Archimedean middle point around which the pleasure principle 
functions and through which the reality principle intervenes, 
defers, and delays. Desire is described in terms of the conscious 
and unconscious, as described in Chapter 2, with regards to plaisir 
and jouissance. Plaisir relates to conscious pleasure and jouissance 
relates to unconscious pleasure. Because jouissance is unconscious, 
jouissance is consequently described as a drive, a driving force. 
Proceeding in terms of libidinal economy, jouissance dictates a 
drive towards the attainment of the conditions in which pleasure 
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would cease. This is best exemplified when Lacan (1988b) writes: 
“The pleasure principle – the principle of pleasure – is that 
pleasure should cease” (p. 84). This is when pleasure is in an 
undeferred state. This is illustrated in linguistic terms as 
impossible, as the signifier can never encompass or encapsulate the 
signified; the symbolic illustration of das Ding is never 
sufficient. Put in context of Freud‟s (1914) On Narcissism: an 
Introduction, the death drive is a return to the harmony that was 
the satisfaction as a product of the stimulation of the auto-erotic 
zones, as explained in Chapter 1. 
 
But this reading of the death drive does have a critique against it. 
Tim Dean‟s (2000) Beyond Sexuality criticizes a reading of the 
pleasure principle proposed here, demonstrated when he writes on 
jouissance: 
Jouissance and the subject (of speech, of discourse, of 
desire, of the unconscious) are basically incompatible. 
Furthermore, jouissance remains so far beyond the pleasure 
principle that it works against the subject‟s well-being, as 
the Sadian
64
 text, for instance – which is about jouissance as 
opposed to pleasure – illustrates. (p. 125, his italics) 
 
To respond to Dean, is to respond to two aspects he highlights. 
First, that a death instinct is part of an unconscious desire; and 
second, to respond to the distance Dean maintains between the Self 
and the Other. The first response is to describe death in terms of 
the death drive, which when explained in terms of libidinal economy, 
or even thermodynamics, is an inevitable outcome. Death is not a 
beckoning desire which is pursued unconsciously. The incompatibility 
between jouissance and the subject is correct, as the unconscious 
pleasure functions regardless of the well-being of the subject; this 
is argued in Chapter 2 with regard to the internal Law as a feature 
of the unconscious. However, the death drive is such an important 
feature that it does affect the conscious subject. However, as 
previously argued, there is no way of knowing how the unconscious 
                         
64
 Tim Dean is referring to Lacan‟s (1966/2006) article found in Écrits, 
Kant with Sade (p. 645). Which is also a critique on Kant‟s Categorical 
Imperative, see page 67   
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affects the conscious
65
. This is due to the misrecognition 
[méconnaissance] of the signifier for the [unconscious] signified. 
The second aspect is explained in terms of the L-schema, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 3. Dean‟s usage of the notion of the Other 
pertains to a metaphysics of presence, as argued in Chapter 3 with 
regard to Dreyer‟s reading, whereby the presence of an Other is seen 
as the Other to whom Lacan is referring. But as seen in the L-
schema, the Other is not a person, but denotes a more abstract 
concept. Dean is not necessarily guilty of the metaphysics of 
presence claim, but it is a matter of how this Other is assimilated 
within the L-schema to the extent that this Other is part of the 
self. Even in terms of a more simplistic formulation of the 
simplified schema of the two mirrors (Fig 1, p. 34), the distance 
between the self (o) and the mirror image of the self (o‟) is where 
aggression and guilt lies. The discrepancies between the true 
[wirkliche] self and the idealized version of the self is the 
imaginary identification. The concepts and notions ascribed are 
imaginary, but the Other grants access to the symbolic. Dean writes: 
“Since the acceptance of one‟s own death is completely unthinkable 
in the unconscious, jouissance is therefore impossible for the 
subject. But not for the Other” (p. 125, his emphasis). This is 
problematic. Dean is referring to the subject, the Lacanian 
decentred subject, who continually mediates between itself and the 
mirror-image, as argued in Chapter 1. The link is between the self 
and the idealized version of the self, or in Freudian terms, the 
self and the ideal-ich [ideal-ego] later coined the Superego. The 
desire of the Superego, or even the desire of the ideal-ich is the 
desire of the Other, even the desire for the Other.  
 
It is through the Other that desire is realized, since this desire 
can only be expressed through language. “Desire always becomes 
manifest at the joining of speech, where it makes its appearance, 
its sudden emergence, its surge forwards. Desire emerges just as it 
becomes embodd ied in speech, it emerges with symbolism” (Lacan, 
1988b, p. 234). Language is not my own, which is why it is through 
                         
65
 Cillers (1998): “Models of language and the brain work with systems of 
relationships and are not understood in representation terms (Freud, Lacan, 
Derrida)” (p. 30) 
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the Other‟s language that my desire is realized. “The form in which 
language expresses itself in and of itself defines subjectivity” 
(Lacan, 1966/2006, p. 246). The possibility of subjectivity is 
firmly located within language. “I identify myself in language, but 
only by losing myself in it as an object” (p. 247).  
 
The link between language and desire is therefore twofold, first in 
exceeding the limits of identification, whereby an object can be 
over valuated. Second, that language can evoke desire. “For the 
function of language in speech is not to inform, but to evoke” (p. 
247). 
 
However, there still remains a problem with linking language and 
death in forming a description of the death drive. Van Haute‟s 
(1989) description of death elucidates this problem. Van Haute‟s 
description of death is in line with Heidegger‟s (1962) notion of 
Sein Zum Tode as found in Being and Time: 
De dood, schrijft Lacan, is de limiet van de historische 
functie van het dood. De dood beëindigt immers ons historisch 
bestaan. In navolging van Heidegger begrijpt Lacan de dood als 
de uiteindelijke toekomst van het subject die vanaf zijn 
geboorte op til is. De dood is niet in de eerste plaats een 
biologisch factum, maar een intrinsieke en onbepaalde 
mogelijkheid van het subject. Deze mogelijkheid is altijd 
aanwezig. Zij is onbepaald omdat we niets „weten‟ oor de dood. 
[Death, writes Lacan, is the limit of the historical function 
of death. Death ends our historical existence. Following 
Heidegger, Lacan understands death as the final outcome of the 
subject from his birth onwards. Death is not in the first 
place a biological fact, but one intrinsic and undeterminable 
possibility of the subject. This possibility is always 
present. It is undeterminable because we do not “know” 
anything about death] (p. 80) 
 
Discussing death in terms of the pleasure principle or even the 
death drive has an ambiguous tenet since the notion of death is 
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understood in terms of quantity [the pleasure principle as a 
neuronal/libidinal economy].  
 
The imaginary consists of the attributes ascribed to death, whereby 
any understanding of death will infer the attributes ascribed to 
death. As we cannot know what death really is - aside from a 
biological or mechanical state of equilibrium, also known as 
stability - death remains elusive.  
 
Dean (2000) is evoking a specific meaning of death experienced 
through the Other. This is problematic considering that death 
doesn‟t have a fixed meaning, expressed when Van Haute (1989) 
writes: “De (eigen) dood kan niet anders dan aan de 
betekenisproductie ontsnappen. Hij is het betekenloze bij uitstek” 
[(One‟s) Death can do nothing but escape the production of meaning. 
It is meaningless par excellence] (p. 87). But this is not only 
applicable to one‟s own death, but to death in general; the word 
death can act as a signifier. To evoke Saussurian Linguistics again, 
death as signifier does not encapsulate death as signified. “Deze 
hetorgeniteit van de dood (deze heterogene dood) is als zodanig niet 
articuleerbaar in de taal, omdat iedere talige articulatie 
onvermijdelijk betekenissen creëert” [This heterogeneity of death 
(this heterogeneous death) as such is not articulable in language, 
because every spoken articulation inevitably creates meaning] (p. 
88). 
 
This is why it is problematic when Dean (2000) concludes: “Therefore 
the death drive cannot be conceptualized at the level of unconscious 
desire; it is not part of the Other‟s discourse (the unconscious is 
the discourse of the Other), but an effect of the Other‟s 
jouissance” (p. 125). A clue to what Dean means with jouissance is 
“Jouissance may be understood as „self-destructive‟ insofar as it 
overwhelms the ego or coherent self” (p. 164), which is not 
necessarily true, because there always remains indeterminacy to 
jouissance, as jouissance is equated with unconscious pleasure. 
Dean‟s argument is therefore in locating death in the Other whereby 
the Other‟s “self-destruction” is equated with the Other‟s death. 
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This is a literal interpretation of desire is the desire for the 
Other, whereby Tim Dean is referring to a physical person. Even 
seeing a person die is not enough to grasp death, because the 
gesture remains within the imaginary and calling the event death 
evokes the symbolic. Dean is referring to death as desirable. But 
this is perhaps not quite what Lacan had in mind with his 
formulation of fantasms [desire is the desire of the Other]: ($◊a). 
“$ staat voor het (gespleten) subject. „a‟ is het object-oorzaak van 
de begeerte. Het ruitje duidt de wijze aan waarop het gespleten 
subject zich in het fantasme tot het object verhoudt” [$ stands for 
the (divided) subject. „a‟ is the object-cause of  desire. The 
diamond indicates the way in which the divided subject relates 
itself in the phantasy to the object-cause] (Van Haute, 1989, p. 
143). The formulation of Fantasms, or Phantasy is ($◊a)66, which is 
the relation between the (barred) subject and the relation with the 
object-cause of desire. The objet a is equivalent to the signifier, 
which stands for nothing nameable, but known through the symbolic, 
through language, “de begeerte is, zoals het subject, altijd een (in 
de taal) voorgestelde begeerte” [desire is, according to the 
subject, always (in language) a proposed desire (p. 144). The ◊ is 
divided further into two parts: ˇ denoting the alienation and ˆ the 
splitting of the subject. Van Haute describes how this phantasy 
affects the relation with the Other:  
Het subject heft aan de Ander niets te bieden … dan zijn 
tekort: ik kan de begeerte van de Ander niet voltooien. Wat ik 
ook geef of krijg, het is nooit wat ik zoek. Het tekort van de 
Ander keert terug in het tekort van het subject. [The subject 
has nothing to offer the Other … except his lack: I can never 
complete the desire of the Other. Whatever I give or receive 
is never what I seek. The lack of the Other returns as the 
lack of the subject] (p. 144) 
 
The first example that illustrates how an object can mediate desire 
between the subject and the Other is found in the Oedipus complex. 
Lacan (1966/2006) illustrates the effects of “having phallus”, which 
                         
66
 “Fantasy is defined by the most general form it receives in an algebra. 
I have constructed for this purpose – namely, the formula ($◊a), in which 
the lozenge ◊ is to be read as „desire for” (Lacan, 1966/2006, p. 774)  
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means that when the Other is in possession of the object of desire, 
the Other becomes desirable. Lacan writes: 
The demand for love can only suffer from a desire whose 
signifier is foreign to it. If the mother‟s desire is the 
phallus, the child wants to be the phallus in order to satisfy 
her desire. Thus the division immanent in desire already makes 
itself felt by virtue of being experienced in the Other‟s 
desire, in that this division already stands in the way of the 
subject being satisfied with presenting to the Other the real 
[organ] he may have that corresponds to the phallus; for what 
he has is no better than what he does not have, from the point 
of view of his demand for love, which would like him to be the 
phallus. (p. 693, his emphasis) 
 
The reformulation of Freud‟s Oedipus complex - in terms of signifier 
and signified - illustrates how the lack is identified in the Other. 
The relation between the subject and the Other described through the 
ideal-ego [ideal-ich] is the recognition of the ideals of the self 
within the Other. In other words, the recognition of the ideal-ego 
in the Other is compared to the self‟s inability to achieve those 
ideals. Consequently, what the self lacks is found in the Other. In 
terms of the signifier and the signified, it is important to find a 
signifier for the signified, i.e. an object; because this object 
never is the object, only the resemblance. Lacan continues by 
emphasizing that it is not the “phallus” itself, but the qualities 
ascribed to the “phallus” that makes the phallus desirable. The 
emphasis is located not on the object, but on the qualities of the 
object. It never is about the “truth” or accuracy of the 
description, as “truth” is always given up at the expense of the 
phantasy. Lacan elaborates: 
Paradoxical as this formulation may seem, I am saying that it 
is in order to be the phallus – that is, the signifier of the 
Other‟s desire – that a woman rejects an essential part of 
femininity, namely, all its attributes, in the masquerade. It 
is for what she is not that she expects to be desired as well 
as loved. But she finds the signifier of her own desire in the 
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body of the person to whom her demand for love is addressed. 
(p. 694, my italics) 
This description is equally applicable to the ideal-ego [ideal-ich], 
whereby the Other is an object of desire. What the self lacks, the 
Other fulfils. This is the connection between the self and the 
Other, as illustrated through the L-schema (Fig 4, p. 86), where 
there is a criss-crossing between the symbolic and the imaginary. 
The ideal-ego is fully embodied in the imaginary and still needs to 
be connected and grounded in a symbol or an object. Once again, the 
symbol can be easily confused for the qualities and attributes 
ascribed. Lacan reminds us through Saussurean Linguistics that the 
link between the object and the qualities are arbitrary, as any 
other object would have sufficed. Yet the appearance of the object 
conforming to the qualities is what makes the object desirable.   
 
This explains Dean‟s (2000) argument in light of a reciprocal 
relation in terms of death. However, where Dean‟s argument falters 
is in his treatment of death as „a‟ in the phantasy ($◊a). But this 
only works if „a‟ = death, whereby „a‟ can be anything. What 
complicates Dean‟s argument is when Lacan (1998b) writes: “The 
subject is separated from the Others, the true ones, by the wall of 
language” (p. 244). The role of language is thereby to confuse the 
matter, “language is as much there to found us in the Other as to 
drastically prevent us from understanding him” (p. 244). Dean‟s 
argument is consequently difficult to follow and difficult to 
implement in terms of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, especially the notion 
of death, the death drive, and the desire for death. 
 
But the relation between the desire and the pleasure principle has 
been argued. However, what still remains, is an explanation as to 
the effects of castration. In other words, what happens when the 
object of desire is threatened or purged? This is examined in the 
next subsection. 
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4.4.3. Castration  
 
Castration was the word introduced by Freud in the Oedipus complex 
to illustrate the threat of the removal of what Freud deemed the 
most important manifestation of das Ding, the penis.   
 
The preservation of the object of desire
67
 is always in doubt. 
A process of substitution takes place whereby one signifier is 
replaced with another. This is done when the object loses appeal or 
when a closer approximation is realized. This is how the object 
(signifier) of desire is replaced, and in so doing (the signified) 
maintained
68
. This may seem paradoxical, but the idealization remains 
as the signifier changes, but the signified doesn‟t. All that 
changed was the signifier, which is arbitrarily connected to the 
signified.  
 
The source of desire is through the Other. Therefore, castration is 
explained in terms of the Other‟s desire [jouissance]. Lacan 
(1966/2006) argues in The Subversion of the Subject and the 
Dialectic of Desire that “Castration means that jouissance has to be 
refused in order to be attained on the inverse scale of the Law of 
desire” (p. 827).69 Prohibition is essentially what maintains the 
object of desire, but also reveals the object of desire (as argued 
in Chapter 2). The prohibition of desire delays the attainment of 
the object or object-cause of desire by artificially maintaining a 
distance between the subject and object of desire.
70
 The threat of 
                         
67
 Ellie Ragland-Sullivan (1982) defines desire as: “a structural 
inadequacy in the human subject which drives individuals to strive forever, 
to seek new ways to compensate for the elemental loss of a psychic illusion 
of unity” (p. 8)  
68
 Ellie Ragland-Sullivan (1982) writes: “People, language itself, material 
goods, meaning and belief systems, all play substitutive roles in 
displacing the lost object(s) along a signifying chain of Desire” (p. 8) 
69
 Lacan (2008b) writes on castration: “The reason why castration exists 
is, perhaps quite simly that desire – when it really is a question of our 
desire – cannot have been, cannot be, something we have, cannot be an organ 
we can handle. It cannot be both being and having. So, the organ serves, 
perhaps, a purpose that functions at the level of desire. It is the lost 
object because it stands in for the subject qua desire” (p. 42, his 
italics) 
70
 Ellie Ragland-Sullivan (1982) writes: “The Oedipal crisis occurs, not 
because a child wants to possess its mother sexually, but when the child 
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the removal of the object of desire (castration) is what embeds the 
Law.  
 
This disruption can be described in terms of the reality principle, 
described as the interruption or deferral of the pleasure principle. 
But as the pleasure principle is the primary process, the reality 
principle is the secondary process. The continual substitution of 
the object or object-cause of desire is unwanted, as the pleasure 
principle is a call to efficiency. Any disruption to this efficiency 
is known as the reality principle. The question then is, what 
maintains the object of desire to which the subject commits, 
refusing to substitute the object of desire for another. The 
pleasure principle advocates efficiency, but is not enough to 
maintain the object of desire, which is why the Law and prohibition 
play such a vital role.  
 
According to Lacan, the object of desire is maintained through 
prohibition, as prohibition not only reveals the object of desire, 
but also maintains the object of desire. This is relevant to the 
notion of death and the death drive. This is best articulated by 
Lacan (2008a), whereby das Ding acts as object or object-cause of 
desire: 
But when the commandment [prohibition] appeared, the Thing 
[das Ding] flared up, returned once again, I met my death. And 
for me, the commandment that was supposed to lead to life 
turned out to lead to death, for the Thing found a way and 
thanks for the commandment seduced me; through it I came to 
desire death. (p. 102, his italics) 
Stability is found once the object of desire is achieved, keeping in 
mind that the condition of death is homeostasis. Therefore, the 
death drive is the drive towards the state where the self cannot be 
removed from the object or object-cause of desire.  
 
                                                                            
comprehends the sexual rules of society. The crisis is resolved when the 
rules are accepted and acceded to” (p. 7)For 
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However, castration
71
 takes on two forms, the removal of the object 
of desire as well as the threat of the removal of the object or 
object-cause of desire as described through “the lack that 
constitutes castration anxiety” (Lacan, 1998, p. 73). Lacan clearly 
links the return of the object or object-cause of desire with the 
desire for death, which, as argued in this paper, utilizes the 
definition of death as homeostasis, i.e. stability. This is when the 
object of desire can no longer be separated from the subject or even 
threatened. This is how the death drive is explained, by emphasizing 
the conditions when the object of desire can no longer be threatened 
or removed. 
 
Lacan does not introduce death as a result of a sequence of events, 
but instils death at the very beginning. It is from the possibility 
of death that the process of substitution and superimposement 
begins. Lacan (1998) elaborates in the Four Fundamentals of 
Psychoanalysis: 
The first object he proposes for this parental desire whose 
object is unknown is his own loss – can he lose me? The 
phantasy of one‟s death, of one‟s disappearance, is the first 
object that the subject has to bring into play in this 
dialectic, and he does indeed bring it into play – as we know 
from innumerable cases, such as in anorexia nervosa. We also 
know that the phantasy of one‟s death is usually manipulated 
by their child in his love relations with his parents. One 
lack is superimposed upon the other. The dialectic of the 
objects of desire, in so far as it creates the link between 
the desire of the subject and the desire of the Other – I have 
been telling you for a long time now that it is one and the 
same – this dialectic now passes through the fact that the 
desire is not replied to directly. It is a lack engendered 
from the previous time that serves to reply to the lack raised 
by the following time. (p. 214-5) 
                         
71
 Castration in terms of the imaginary and the symbolic is described by 
Lacan (2008a): “The important thing is to recognize that the depriving 
agent is an imaginary function, he who is given in the relationship that is 
half rooted in naturalness of the mirror stage, but such as he appears to 
us there where things are articulated at the level of the symbolic” (p. 
283) 
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Castration is consequently a term incorporated within the context of 
the larger corpus of work. Castration means more than just a 
physical circumcision, but a symbolic removal or threat of removal. 
Castration consequently reintroduces the mirror stage. The Mirror 
stage
72
 is an important contribution to Psychoanalysis, not only in 
terms of the origin of the dialectic relation between the self and 
the Other, but also in terms of the institution of desire. Desire is 
institutionalized through the prohibition of the desire, which is 
exactly what the Oedipus complex describes; the origin of the 
substitutive process of signifier with signifier. The original 
object of desire is shaped through Freud‟s narcissism that is 
described as the satisfaction of auto-erotic zones – originally 
achieved by feeding and nurturing the infant. Lacan‟s argument 
demonstrates that castration isn‟t necessarily connected with the 
origins of the object of desire, but connected to revealing the 
object of desire [by threatening to remove the object, or through 
the modality of loss] and in maintaining the object of desire 
[through establishing a distance whereby the prohibition of the 
object prolongs the desirability].
73
 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle introduces the notion 
of the death drive. This notion has proven problematic for 
Psychoanalysis, as many have refuted Psychoanalysis based on the 
                         
72
 Ellie Ragland-Sullivan (1982) writes on the Mirror stage: “At around 18 
months two major changes occur. The child begins to use language somewhat 
coherently, and also becomes aware that the father‟s presence – or any 
other third person – is a prohibiting force to the infant‟s merger with the 
(m)Other” (p. 8) 
73
 Lacan (1966/2006): “What analytic experience attests to is that 
castration is what regulates desire, in both normal and abnormal cases. 
Providing it oscillates by alternating between $ and a in fantasy, 
castration makes of fantasy a chain that is both supple and inextensible by 
which the fixation of object cathexis, which can hardly go beyond certain 
natural limits, takes on the transcendental functioning of ensuring the 
jouissance of the Other that passes this chain on to me in the Law.” (p. 
826, my italics) 
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description thereof. Consequently there has been an attempt to re-
describe the death drive in more acceptable terms.  
 
Boothby and Carel‟s descriptions were evaluated and proven 
problematic. Carel discarded or abandoned many of the Freudian 
terms, and Boothby misunderstood Freud‟s description of the pleasure 
principle. Lacan was the only one to present an argument in line 
with the classical Freudian notions, as well as to propose 
alterations in line with the Freudian description. The 
misapprehension evident in defining the death drive has often been 
to describe the death drive in terms of a conscious desire for 
death. Death can only be described as desirable through phantasy 
($◊a), whereby death is the object petit a, the semblance of desire. 
Death is then viewed as the relation between the barred subject and 
the description of death, but as a result, death is described in 
terms of the conscious. 
 
This chapter aimed to describe the death drive in terms of the 
pleasure principle as well as desire. Consequently, the death drive 
functions and features on an unconscious level. The object of desire 
can only be known through language, because this object of desire is 
located within the unconscious. However, because there is no direct 
correlation between the unconscious content and the conscious 
correlate, there always remains a discrepancy between the signifier 
and the signified. This is why the death drive is very difficult to 
pinpoint. The first step in a misreading of Lacan, is in 
underestimating the complexity innately involved, especially when 
discussing the links between the various aspects, for example the 
death drive [Thanatos], the pleasure principle, the reality 
principle and the life drive [Eros]. 
 
The classical description is often to explain Eros and Thanatos as 
two independent and opposing forces pushing and pulling on a central 
point. Lacan‟s explanation proves that Thanatos and Eros are more 
closely linked in their functioning, as a helix, operating side by 
side. Instead of merely describing the pleasure principle in terms 
of a mechanical functioning, Lacan infuses the notion of Desire to 
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redefine the death drive so as to explain the condition for the 
cessation of pleasure. This condition is explained as the point at 
which deferral is no longer possible.  The two different variations 
of death are explained as either a zero flow of libido, or an 
undeferrable flow of libido. Therefore, the death drive is the 
attainment of the state of stability in terms of both descriptions 
of death. The outcome of the pleasure principle is the cessation of 
pleasure, which is why Freud describes the pleasure principle as 
serving the death instincts. To quote Lacan (2008a) at length: 
What is the death instinct? What is this law beyond all law, 
that can only be posited as a final structure, as a vanishing 
point of any reality that might be attained? In the coupling 
of pleasure principle and reality principle, the reality 
principle might seem to be a prolongation or an application of 
the pleasure principle. But, on the other hand, this dependent 
and limited position seems to cause something to emerge, 
something which controls in the broadest of senses the whole 
of our relationship to the world. It is this unveiling, this 
rediscovery, that Beyond the Pleasure Principle is about. And 
in this process, this progress, we see before our eyes the 
problematic character of that which Freud posits under the 
term reality. (p. 23-4, his italics) 
 
The argument presented is to emphasize the structuring of phantasy 
in terms of the co-ordinates within the symbolic order
74
, which is 
how the object or object-cause of desire is realized or 
materialized. Lacan‟s formulation of phantasy ($◊a) accentuates the 
relation between the barred subject with the objet a, also known as 
the representation of the object of desire. However, a distance is 
maintained between the barred subject and the objet a by means of 
prohibition. 
 
To accomplish symbolic identification, the self has to be located 
within the symbolic order with all the accompanying laws of the 
                         
74
 Ellie Ragland-Sullivan (1982) summarizes the symbolic order as: “In 
other words, the Lacanian Symbolic interprets, symbolizes, articulates, and 
universalizes both the experiential and the concrete, which it has in 
paradoxically circular fashion already shaped” (p. 7) 
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symbols.
75
 The search for a substitute of the object-cause of desire 
is found in the symbolic order. To quote Lacan (1966/2006) at 
length: 
Symbols in fact envelop the life of man with a network so 
total that they join together those who are going to engender 
him “by bone and flesh” before he comes into the world; so 
total that they bring to his birth, along with the gifts of 
the stars, if not with the gifts of the fairies, the shape of 
his destiny; so total that they provide the words that will 
make him faithful or renegade, the law of the acts that will 
follow him right to the very place where he is not yet and 
beyond his very death; and so total that through them his end 
finds its meaning in the last judgment, where the Word 
absolves his being or condemns it – unless he reaches the 
subjective realization of being-toward-death. (p. 279) 
 
The outcome of Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle is not 
to describe the death drive in terms of a conscious desire for self-
destruction or self-annihilation, but in terms of the relation 
between the pleasure principle and the reality principle. If the 
pleasure principle is focused on that attainment of stability, the 
reality principle is the deferral thereof. Consequently, death is 
the point where deferral is no longer possible. In other words, the 
death drive aims for the conditions where the subject and the object 
of desire cannot be separated.  
 
Néstor Braunstein (2003) comes to the same conclusion, and in so 
doing, ties many elements together: 
Jouissance is indeed the satisfaction of drive – the death 
drive. Such is the basis of the opposition between desire and 
jouissance. Desire points towards a lost and absent object; it 
is lack in being, and the craving for fulfilment in the 
                         
75
 Lacan (1966/2006) writes “The effect of language is to introduce the 
cause into the subject. Through this effect, he is not the cause of 
himself; he bears within himself the worm of the cause that splits him. For 
his cause is the signifier, without which there would be no subject in the 
real. But this subject is what the signifier represents, and the latter 
cannot represent anything except to another signifier: to which the subject 
who listens is thus reduced” (p. 835). 
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encounter with the lost object. Its concrete expression is the 
phantasy. Jouissance, on the other hand, does not point to 
anything, beyond the pleasure principle, different from any 
(mythical) encounter. The subject finds himself split by the 
polarity jouissance/desire. This is why desire, phantasy, and 
pleasure are barriers on the way to jouissance
76
. (p. 106-7, my 
italics) 
Braunstein‟s view connects jouissance as unconscious pleasure with 
the death drive. Lacan‟s reformulation consequently shapes an 
alternative context in which the death drive can be defined.  
 
Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle consequently ties many 
different elements together and deals with far more than just the 
pleasure principle. All the elements discussed throughout this 
thesis head towards a single point, which is the death drive. Lacan 
succeeds in tying many of the elements and in developing a different 
perspective that prevents a static reading of Freud or 
Psychoanalysis.  
 
  
                         
Lacan (2008a) knew very well the problem of jouissance, as shown when he 
wrote: “The problem involved is that of jouissance, because jouissance 
presents itself as buried at the centre of a field and has the 
characteristics of inaccessibility, obscurity and opacity; moreover, the 
field is surrounded by a barrier which makes access to it difficult for the 
subject to the point of inaccessibility, because jouissance appears not 
purely and simply as the satisfaction of a need but as the satisfaction of 
a drive. (p.258, his emphasis) 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
 
“Lacan and Freud: Beyond the pleasure principle” set out to explore 
Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle, so as to rediscover 
important themes and concepts which influence a contemporary 
understanding of Psychoanalysis. The title indicates that this 
thesis focused on both Freud and Lacan‟s reading of Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle.  
 
This thesis comprised of four chapters, each explaining an important 
aspect of Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Many of the 
themes and concepts are repeated to illustrate how the one concept 
influences the next. Each chapter will be quickly revised, as well 
as how the chapters are connected. 
 
Chapter 1 focuses on the developmental model as presented in the 
papers preceding Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). Freud‟s 
primary narcissism highlights the development of the Ideal-ego and 
the Ego-ideal. Connected to the developmental approach is Lacan‟s 
Mirror stage that also explains a very significant moment in the 
child‟s development that is the separation between the self, the 
image of the self, and the idealized version of the self. In other 
words, the Mirror stage demonstrates how Freud‟s primary narcissism 
manifests. This is the criterion used to explain instincts, which 
has traditionally been explained in terms of Darwin or evolution. 
The definition of Instincts used in this thesis is: to behave or act 
in a fashion that is consistent with how one has acted in the past. 
In revising the definition of instincts, logic and rationality are 
removed. Instincts are then explained case-by-case rather than 
universalizing behaviour. Primary narcissism, the Mirror stage and 
Instincts shape the context for a preliminary definition of 
pleasure.    
  
Chapter 2 provides an alternative explanation to the pleasure 
principle and the definition provided in the first chapter. This 
definition focuses on Freud‟s (1950) Project for a Scientific 
Psychology, a posthumously published manuscript, and defines the 
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pleasure principle in terms of neurons, contact-barriers and 
facilitations [Bahnung]. The neurological model has also been 
applied to illustrate how meaning is generated in a sentence. 
Meaning is not generated in a single word or a single neuron, but in 
the facilitations, the way the neurons or the words are connected. 
Linguistics is an important part of this thesis, and specific 
attention is paid to Freud‟s language theory as well as the 
adaptations made by Lacan in incorporating Saussurian terminology. 
The importance of Linguistics is to explain how we can begin to know 
what is in the unconscious, as we only have access to fragments as 
they surface to the conscious. Consequently, Freud‟s pleasure 
principle explains four important Freudian concepts: 1) the 
unconscious, 2) repression, 3) das Ding as object of desire, and 4) 
the Law in Psychoanalysis. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on three aspects. Lacan‟s L-schema, the repetition 
compulsion [Wiederholungszwang] and the Fort/Da case study. The L-
schema is introduced as a pre-text to the Fort/Da case study. The 
Fort/Da case study is a practical example that shapes the focal 
point of this thesis as Fort/Da demonstrates how a trauma is 
internalized, and consequently repeated through the repetition 
compulsion. Fort/Da is therefore significant to the application of 
the pleasure principle, the repetition compulsion, and 
intersubjectivity (as illustrated through Lacan‟s L-schema).  
 
Chapter 4 focuses on death and the death drive. Freud (1920) 
introduces the death drive in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, but 
Freud‟s description is problematic. For this reason is Freud‟s 
(1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle dismissed by many. This thesis 
focuses on two readings of Freud‟s death drive as described and 
critiqued by Boothby (1987) and Carel (2006). The biggest 
shortcoming in Freud‟s description remains his description of 
aggression. The biggest dispute has been whether aggression is an 
innate, instinctual trait as opposed to a contextual, situational 
response. Freud denies that aggression is an instinctual trait, 
whereas Lacan consolidates and reintroduces aggression as an 
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emergent property as a result of the conflict between the actual 
self [wirkliche Ich] and ideal self [ideal-ich].  
 
Lacan‟s explanation of the death drive is an incorporation of all 
the topics and aspects mentioned in the previous chapters. Lacan 
incorporates desire to explain the death drive. Desire determines 
the conditions under which the achievement of desire will be 
satisfied. The pleasure principle is defined in terms of consistency 
and stability, whereas the reality principle is described as the 
disruption of this consistency. In terms of the pleasure principle 
and the reality principle, the death drive strives for the 
conditions whereby the object of desire can no longer be purged or 
removed. The death drive would then be the state where the reality 
principle cannot intervene and consequently results in the 
attainment of the object of desire. Or put in Freud‟s (1920) own 
words: “What we are left with is the fact that the organism wishes 
to die only in its own fashion” (p. 47). But this position is only 
tenable within a language theory, which is exactly what Lacan 
provides and is discussed in Chapter 2. The language theory 
complicates the identification of the object or object-cause of 
desire, as the object of desire will and can only be known as a 
word. The separation between the signifier and the signified is the 
separation between the object and what the object is known as. But 
because the signifier does not fully encapsulate the object, the 
representation of the object of desire is never complete. Through 
substitution will there always be a continual pursuit of the object 
of desire. Hence, the problem of representation is that any attempt 
at representation is incomplete. Baudrillard‟s assessment that 
Freud‟s death drive is a pulsion is then quite accurate. Freud‟s 
death drive as pulsion can be defended on two fronts.  
 
First, the death drive is the pulsion to the completion of the 
signifier-signified, whereby substitution is no longer possible. It 
is around this definition of the death drive that phantasy has 
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meaning. Lacan‟s formulation of phantasy is ($◊a)77: the relation 
between the (barred) subject ($) in proportion to the object-cause 
of desire (a), accentuating the relation between the barred subject 
with the objet a, also known as the representation of the object or 
object-cause of desire. 
 
Second, the death drive is the pulsion to the return to a previous 
completeness that was experienced in the early developmental stages 
by means of the satisfaction of the auto-erotic zones as described 
in Chapter 1. However, the death drive is the pursuit of stability 
and equilibrium, whereby the relation between the subject and the 
object or object-cause of desire cannot be removed, delayed, 
withheld, or withdrawn. It is in this context that the Oedipus 
complex
78
 and the castration complex
79
 are explained. The Oedipus 
complex is the first important confrontation with the Law that sets 
the process of substitution in motion. The Oedipus complex is the 
first confrontation with the father who is seen as the author of the 
injunction. “The very normalization of this maturation is henceforth 
dependent in man on cultural intervention, as is exemplified by the 
fact that sexual object choice is dependent upon the Oedipus 
complex” (Lacan, 1966/2006, p. 98). The Oedipus complex can 
consequently be seen as an artificial divider creating and 
maintaining distance between the barred subject and the objet a. The 
father as author of the Law is only an identification of the father 
as origin of the Law or the father as the figure of the Law. This is 
illustrated when Lacan uses Le Nom-du-Père [the Name-of-the-Father] 
synonymously with Le Non-du-Père [the No-of-the-Father]. Therefore, 
it is not only the reality principle, but also prohibition that 
prevents the immediate attainment of the object or object-cause of 
desire. On prohibition, Freud (1919) writes in Totem and Taboo, 
“Obsessive prohibitions possess an extraordinary capacity for 
                         
77
 “Fantasy is defined by the most general form it receives in an algebra. 
I have constructed for this purpose – namely, the formula ($◊a), in which 
the lozenge ◊ is to be read as „desire for” (Lacan, 1966/2006, p. 774) 
78
 The Oedipus complex is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 4 
79
 Freud (1970) writes: “what is termed the castration complex, the 
reaction to that intimidation in the field of sex or to that restraint of 
early infantile sexual activity which is ascribed to the father” (p. 218, 
his italics) 
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displacement; they make use of almost any form of connection to 
extend from one object to another and then in turn make this new 
object “impossible” (p. 55). The substitution of object of desire 
does not destroy the previous object of desire, but is maintained in 
the unconscious. Freud (1919) writes: 
The persistence of taboo teaches, however, one thing, namely, 
that the original pleasure to do the forbidden still continues 
among taboo races. They therefore assume an ambivalent 
attitude toward their taboo prohibitions; in their unconscious 
they would like nothing better than to transgress them, but 
they are also afraid to do it; they are afraid just because 
they would like to transgress, and the fear is stronger than 
the pleasure. (p. 60-1, his emphasis) 
 
The death drive is consequently marred by obstacles preventing the 
attainment of the object or object-cause of desire. The death drive 
is an impossible task, as the conditions for completion are 
unobtainable for three reasons. First, the problem of representation 
illustrated through the gap between the signifier and the signified; 
second, the problem of continual deferral and delay as demonstrated 
through the reality principle; third, prohibition whereby the object 
or object-cause of desire is forbidden yet retained in the 
unconscious. Therefore, phantasy ($◊a) is always influenced by the 
unconscious that directs and influences subsequent objects of 
desire. Therefore the death drive is argued as the pulsion towards 
the fruition of phantasy in an undeferred state. 
 
This description of the death drive opposes the description provided 
by Carel (2006). Carel‟s approach can be summarized in three parts. 
First, the abandonment of the dualistic view whereby life (Eros) and 
death (Thanatos) are disconnected and seen as separate. Second, 
Carel abandons the Nirvana principle; and third, Carel wants to rid 
Freud of erroneous scientific assumptions. The predominant problem 
in Carel is that her adjustments results in the loss of meaning. By 
simplifying the connection between the pleasure principle and the 
reality principle, Eros and Thanatos, death drive and a life drive, 
Havi Carel leaves out important aspects of Freud. 
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For Carel, to disconnect the dualism of life and death in Freud is 
rather risky. Connecting life and death is part of an important 
theoretical distinction. In the dualism of life and death, Freud 
demonstrates another example of the way the pleasure principle and 
the reality principle are connected. Freud (1920) writes in Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle: 
For a long time, perhaps, living substance was thus being 
constantly created afresh and easily dying, till decisive 
external influences altered in such a way as to oblige the 
still surviving substance to diverge ever more widely from its 
original course of life and to make ever more complicated 
détours before reaching its aim of death.  (p. 46, his 
emphasis) 
This quotation is discussed at greater length in section 4.2, but 
this quote shows how life and death are connected. The aim of life 
is death [“the aim of all life is death” (p. 46, his emphasis)] but 
the deferral of death results in life. Therefore, the way Freud 
describes life and death results in a dualism.
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Baudrillard (2000) criticizes the duality of life and death. Even 
though Baudrillard is extremely critical of Psychoanalysis, he 
maintains Freud‟s distinction in the dualism of life and death. 
Baudrillard writes on the history of the separation between life and 
death: 
Our whole culture is just one huge effort to dissociate life 
and death, to ward off the ambivalence of death in the 
interests of life as value, and time as the general 
equivalent. The elimination of death is our phantasm, and 
ramifies in every direction: for religion, the afterlife and 
immortality; for science, truth; and for economics, 
productivity and accumulation. (p. 147) 
                         
80
 But for technical clarity, this thesis contends that homeostasis or 
stability is death, to be precise, death is when deferral is no longer 
possible. In terms of the Project for a Scientific Psychology, this means 
that death is the state where there is no flux of energy, where no 
alterations or adjustments are possible.  
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The predominant reading of life and death is that life has been 
given a theoretical preference over death. Baudrillard goes as far 
as to laud Freud for his contribution in connecting life and death, 
as opposed to viewing the two as separate entities. Baudrillard 
still remains critical of Freud as he describes Freud‟s death drive 
as pulsion in terms of a dialectic. 
With Freud we pass from philosophical death and the drama of 
consciousness to death as a pulsion process inscribed in the 
unconscious order; from a metaphysics of anguish to a 
metaphysics of the pulsion. It‟s just as if death, liberated 
from the subject, at last gained its status as an objective 
finality: the pulsional energy of death or the principle of 
psychical functioning. (p. 148, his emphasis) 
But Baudrillard‟s main concern still remains with the way that death 
is described, the way that death is dealt with. With Freud‟s 
description, death is driven by pulsion, which Baudrillard 
inevitably links with his biggest critique on Freud: the 
predominance of the unconscious in Freudian thought. 
Death, by becoming a pulsion, does not cease to be a finality 
(it is even the only end from this standpoint: the proposition 
of the death drive signifies an extraordinary simplification 
of finalities, since even Eros is subordinated to it), but 
this finality sinks, and is inscribed in the unconscious. (p. 
148) 
Death and the death drive are now inscribed in a theoretical 
framework. The problem that arises is in maintaining this 
theoretical framework without stepping into a metaphysical trap 
whereby death accrues meaning independently. Death only gains 
meaning when placed in contrast to life, whilst life only has 
meaning in contrast to death. The question arises as to how death 
should be dealt with whilst maintaining meaning and value. 
Baudrillard acknowledges the value within Freud‟s description of the 
death drive, but still remains cautious as to the application. 
 
This thesis is not a free interpretation of Freud or Lacan, but a 
rigorous reading of the primary texts. What makes this thesis 
different and new in many regards is the incorporation of Freud‟s 
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(1950) A Project for a Scientific Psychology, a posthumously 
published manuscript, which provides a different frame to describe 
and define the pleasure- and the reality principle. This in turn 
affects the reading of Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
the repetition compulsion, Fort/Da, desire, and the death drive. 
This thesis consequently demonstrates how Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle changes or adapts our understanding of 
Psychoanalysis, Linguistics, and Anthropology. 
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